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Abstract 
This paper attempts to formulate the general asylum landscapes within the EU during the 2003 Iraq 
War and the 2011 Syrian Civil War. The overall picture gleamed from this comparison is intended to 
evaluate how the EU and its MS addressed the effects of one Middle Eastern crisis (in Iraq) in order to 
apply lessons learned to the current crisis in the Middle East (Syria). By concurrently analysing the 
phenomenon of Iraqis seeking shelter within the European Union following the 2003 Iraq War as well 
as the occurrence of Syrians fleeing to the EU following the 2011 Syrian civil war, this study attempts 
to provide a comparative lens with which to view the present-day crisis in Syria, to document the 
progress regarding asylum adjudication within the EU -indeed how asylum-seekers are granted or not 
granted protection within the European Union, especially in times of mass humanitarian crises- and to 
acquire an understanding of the past in order to formulate new solutions to current crises. 
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1. Introduction
*
 
By concurrently analysing the phenomenon of Iraqis seeking shelter within the European Union 
following the 2003 Iraq War as well as the occurrence of Syrians fleeing to the EU following the 
Syrian civil war, this study attempts to provide a comparative lens with which to view the present-day 
crisis in Syria, to document the progress regarding asylum adjudication within the EU -indeed how 
asylum-seekers are granted or not granted protection within the European Union, especially in times of 
mass humanitarian crises- and to learn lessons from the past and apply them to the present.  
The crises in Iraq and Syria are by no means identical. Whereas the most recent crisis in Iraq
1
 
began only after US-led multi-national forces invaded the country and destabilised the government 
through the removal of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent de-Baathification process, thereby 
creating a space for the insurgency to grow and wreak havoc across the country, the crisis in Syria 
began as a wholly internal conflict (partly inspired by the unrest of the Arab Spring) and, at the outset, 
involved a civilian opposition force fighting against the Syrian government led by the Assad regime, 
and its supporters. While elements of sectarian violence can certainly be seen in the Syrian conflict, 
(especially between the majority Sunni opposition and the mainly Alawite government and its 
supporters),
2
 in Iraq minority ethnic and religious groups- including Assyrians, Kurds, Christians, 
Mandaeans,Yezidis, and others- in addition to the intelligentsia (regardless of creed) were especially 
targeted for kidnappings and assassinations on a much larger scale than what is currently seen in Syria. 
The regional dimensions of the conflict are also not the same. While Iran certainly had (and has) a role 
to play during the Iraqi crisis, particularly given the historic religious and social links between the two 
countries, Iran’s role in the current Syrian crisis has been full supporter of the Assad regime as well as 
for Hezbollah forces fighting within the conflict. Also, the Assad regime can, for the most part, rely on 
two veto-wielding Members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, to oppose any such 
military intervention in Syria (for now) - a privilege rarely enjoyed by Saddam – and Russia has a 
particular relationship with Syria given its naval facility in Tartus (the only such facility on the 
Mediterranean Sea), its weapons deals with Syria, and for other economic and political ties. On the 
other side, the Gulf countries and Western nations are providing varying degrees of support to the 
rebels fighting against the Assad regime. Moreover, the situation for Iraqi and Syrian refugees in 
neighbouring countries are not the same, as Iraqi refugees were more likely to become urban refugees 
in surrounding countries, while Syrian refugees are more likely to be housed in camps within Syria’s 
neighbours. European opinions regarding the crises also differed. In Europe, the invasion of Iraq was a 
contentious issue, and not all Member States supported the US attack. While several EU MS 
participated in the multi-national forces that invaded and occupied Iraq (including Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and the UK), other MS were, in varying degrees, against the military 
offensive (particularly Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and Sweden). Additionally, the European 
Parliament was against the military invasion of Iraq without approval of the Security Council.
3
 In the 
Syrian crisis, even though there have been differences regarding military strikes against the Assad 
regime, the EU and its MS are generally in agreement that: 1) a political solution is the best solution; 
2) Assad should step down; and 3) they have equally condemned the violations of human rights in 
Syria, calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice. Finally, the aftermath of the Iraq crisis 
continues to plague the country ten years after the invasion, while the Syrian crisis, although nearly 
three years in, is still, by comparison, within its infancy.  
Likewise, the EU asylum landscapes (the legal systems, protection policies implemented, 
resettlement prospects, EU-wide legislation, etc.) were not always equivalent for Iraqis and Syrians 
entering the EU. Much has been developed and much has changed since the beginning of the Iraq war, 
in 2003, until now, 2013. Unforgettably, the EU itself has changed due to the enlargements in 2004, 
2007, and 2013. In addition to national legislation and specific protection policies, discussed below, 
several developments in EU-wide legislation dealing with asylum-seekers in the European Union have 
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also occurred. For instance, the EU Qualification Directive (2004) and its recast (2011), which 
clarifies the grounds for granting international protection; the Asylum Procedures Directive from 2005 
and its recast from 2013, setting minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status; the Dublin Regulation (2003) and its recently adopted revision, which 
establishes the State responsible for examining asylum applications; as well as several developments 
in resettlement, for instance the EU Joint Resettlement Programme, adopted in 2012. These legal acts, 
amongst other developments, have certainly shaped the asylum landscape within the EU, affecting 
how Iraqis and Syrians (and others) apply for asylum and which protection statuses they receive, 
clarifying which Member State determines their asylum applications, and even influencing which 
nationalities are resettled into the EU.  
Although the Iraqi and Syrian crises are not identical, they certainly resemble each other in many 
ways. For one, the magnitude and geographic locations of displacement are similar. Although numbers 
have varied widely regarding the Iraqi crisis,
 4
 by April 2008, the UNHCR estimated that 2 million 
Iraqis were displaced within Iraq and over 2 million were displaced throughout the region, mainly in 
Syria (1.5 million), Jordan (500,000), Egypt (120,000), Lebanon (20,000-50,000), Iran (57,000), the 
Gulf States (200,000) and Turkey (5,000).
5
 The conflict-induced displacements from the Syrian crisis 
are similarly massive and geographically located. Current figures show that from March 2011 through 
September 2013, approximately 5.1 million Syrians have become internally displaced
6
 and an 
additional 2.1 million Syrians have fled to neighbouring countries - Lebanon (775,991), Turkey 
(494,361), Jordan (533,104), Iraq (194,234), Egypt (126,717), and several North African 
countries(14,959).
7
 Civilian deaths in both conflicts are unfortunately similar, while perhaps on a 
larger-scale in Syria. During the Iraq crisis, numbers of war-related deaths since the invasion have 
ranged from approximately 175,000 to 650,000; with some estimates including direct war casualties 
while others also include indirect war casualties.
8
 Likewise, Syria is also a battlefield, and by October 
2013 the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights placed the figure of civilian casualties over 41,000, 
with another 41,000 government fighters and 23,000 rebel fighters killed, for a total of 115,000 direct 
war causalities since the war began.
9
 The human toll in both crises is certainly tragic: a generation of 
children without proper education; lack of proper health care; the immeasurable psychosocial effects 
of war and displacement that stay with people for lifetimes; loss of home and loved ones; among many 
other destabilising factors that will certainly impact the region for decades to come.  
As the European Union has been the main refuge for Iraqi and Syrian asylum-seekers within the 
industrialised world, the EU plays an enormous role in both conflicts. Indeed, the EU received 75% of 
all Iraqi asylum applications lodged in industrialised countries between 2003 and 2012, and received 
85% of all Syrian asylum applications lodged in industrialised countries between 2011 and 2012.  
While the crises are not the same, yet clearly have analogous elements, it is believed that 
comparing EU and Member States’ responses to both crises is a useful exercise as it can evaluate the 
challenges and best practices of the past in order to apply lessons learned to the present. Indeed, with 
almost 200,000 Iraqis and 55,000 Syrians applying for asylum within the EU since their respective 
crises, evaluation of policies is crucial to providing the best responses to these and other conflicts that 
will surely arise in the future.  
The methodology for this desk study mainly involves analysing data compiled from: the UNHCR; 
Eurostat; Frontex; official EU documents; annual and special reports conducted by the contact points 
for the European Migration Network; as well studies conducted by NGOs and other international 
organisations in order to formulate the general asylum landscapes within the EU during the Iraq and 
Syria crises. The overall picture gleamed from this comparison is meant to provide lessons from how 
the EU and its MS addressed one Middle Eastern crisis (in Iraq) in order to apply them to the current 
crisis in the Middle East (Syria). Although this study certainly analyses the asylum and migration 
policies of the EU and MS, this study is limited as it does not analyse the unique political situations 
occurring within MS (the outcomes of elections, anti- or pro-immigration political parties in the 
majority, etc.) nor does it evaluate the economic situation of each EU MS, both of which could have 
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impacts on measures taken to address migratory issues. It would certainly be an interesting area for 
future research, yet this study is limited in the sense that it does not address these issues.  
2. The EUs Response to Iraqis in the EU Following the 2003 Iraq War, 2003-2013  
2.1. Introduction 
Defying the international community’s expectation of an impending refugee crisis directly after the 
invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003,
 10
 the actual refugee crisis began three years later, following the 
February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari mosque in Samara, Iraq and the subsequent eruption of 
sectarian violence across the country. As a consequence, massive internal and external displacements 
of Iraqis (as well as Palestinian refugees and others in Iraq
11
) were observed. As mentioned, the 
displacements were massive: by April 2008, the UNHCR estimated that 2 million Iraqis were 
displaced within Iraq and over 2 million were displaced throughout the region. Governments, 
international organizations, and the media frequently referred to the Iraqi refugee crisis as the largest 
displacement of refugees in the Middle East since the Palestinian exodus in 1948.
12
  
While the war has subsided since 2003, violence and instability continue to plague Iraq due to an 
anti-government insurgency (as well as terrorist elements, complicated further by the conflict in 
Syria
13
) existing in Iraq, and sectarian violence and indiscriminate killings of civilians across the 
country are disparagingly the norm.
14
 Given the unremitting instability across Iraq, more than ten 
years after the invasion Iraqis continue to seek protection outside their homeland. Indeed, nearly 
20,000 Iraqis applied for asylum in the industrialised countries in 2012 alone,
15
 and during the first 
eight months of 2013 alone, nearly 7,000 Iraqis claimed asylum in the European Union (almost 
equivalent to the numbers of Syrians applying for asylum in the EU during the whole of 2011).
16
  
While the above paints an exceptionally brief picture of the situation in Iraq and the region 
following the 2003 war, the focus of this section is to explain the phenomenon of Iraqis seeking 
asylum within the European Union following the US-led invasion, how the phenomenon evolved over 
time, and how the EU and MS responded (and are still responding) to Iraqis already within the EU as 
well as the new influx of Iraqi migrants and asylum-seekers.  
2.2 Numbers and Trends of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers in the EU, 2003-August 2013 
Over the past thirty years, war, repression, ethnic cleansing, sanctions, invasion, and sectarian violence 
have contributed to the internal and external displacement of millions of Iraqis.
17
Indeed, between 1990 
and 2002 alone, potentially up to one and a half million Iraqis left Iraq permanently, with 
approximately one-third of these residing in Western Countries.
18
 Certainly, Europe held a sizeable 
Iraqi population before the 2003 Iraq War. Eurostat data shows that: between 1998 and 2002, the 
average annual Iraqi population within the EU was over 125,000 per year with the majority living in 
Germany and Sweden; between 1985 and 2002, nearly 255,000 Iraqis applied for asylum in EU 
Member States, mainly in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden; and between 1991 and 
2002, over 73,000 Iraqis gained citizenship within the EU mainly in Sweden, the UK and Germany 
(Table 1). Significantly, EU MS which held the largest Iraqi resident populations, granted the most 
Iraqis with citizenship, and received the most Iraqi asylum claims pre-2003 were also the EU MS to 
receive the most Iraqi asylum claims post-2003, demonstrating the impact of established Diasporas on 
new inflows of Iraqis to the EU (compare Table 1 and Table 2).  
By far, the European Union has been the largest receiver of Iraqi asylum applications filed within 
industrialised countries. Remaining the top destination for Iraqi asylum seekers after the 2003 Iraq 
war,
19
 according to UNHCR data between 2003 and 2012 the EU received 75% (or approximately 
183,000 out of a total 244,000) of all Iraqi asylum applications lodged in industrialised countries 
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(Graph 1). After the war, considering Eurostat data from the beginning of 2003 through August 2013, 
nearly 200,000 (196,055) Iraqis applied for asylum within the EU. Shouldering most of the inflow, the 
vast majority (83%) of Iraqi asylum applications were filed in just six EU Member States, half of 
which were filed in Sweden and Germany alone: Germany (49,350), Sweden (48,480), the 
Netherlands (25,210), Greece (15,040) the UK (13,960), and Belgium (11,180) (Graph 2 and Table 2, 
see footnote under Table 2 for description of asylum applications counted). 
Graph A. Distribution and Numbers of Iraqi Asylum Seekers in Main Receiving EU MS, 
2003-August 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables and explanation of claims counted 
 
The total number of Iraqi asylum applications in the EU was markedly cut in half in 2003, and 
numbers continued to decline drastically in 2004, reducing by 63% (Table 2). Indeed, according to the 
UNHCR, “As a result of initial optimism after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, over 
300,000 Iraqi refugees returned home during the two years following the war (mainly from Iran).
20
 
This optimism could help to perhaps partially explain the decline in Iraqi asylum application within 
the EU during this time.Most EU MS followed this overall downward trend, with the remarkable 
exception of the Netherlands, which actually saw numbers triple, reaching approximately 3,500 
applications in 2003. Notably, the Netherlands became the first EU MS following the invasion to 
implement a policy of ‘categorical protection’ for Iraqi asylum-seekers, from November 2002 until 
February 2006, regarding Iraqis from Central Iraq - a policy which most probably acted as a pull-
factor contributing to the unusual spike in Iraqi asylum applications within the Netherlands during this 
time (just as future policies of protection implemented in the Netherlands acted as pull-factors for Iraqi 
asylum-seekers, explained below) .
21
  
Following the Samara bombing in February 2006 and the consequent eruption of sectarian 
violence, the total number of Iraqi asylum applications in the EU essentially doubled in 2006, reaching 
nearly19,300 applicationsNumbers almost quadrupled in Sweden (from 2,339 in 2005 to nearly 9,000 
in 2006) and large increases were observed in Denmark,
 
Greece, and the Netherlands (amongst others) 
(Table 2).  
As the violence in Iraq intensified, overall numbers of Iraqi asylum applications in the EU doubled 
again in 2007, reaching over 38,000 applications – a sizeable increase due to the 18,600 Iraqi asylum 
applications filed in Sweden in 2007 alone. The UK saw an increase of 59%; Denmark,
22
 Germany 
and Sweden saw numbers double; quadruple in Greece, mainly due to a technical asylum procedure;
23
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increase 12-fold in Bulgaria, notably after joining the EU in 2007;
24
 and 37-fold in Spain, however this 
was due to large numbers of Iraqi applying at the Spanish embassy in Cairo
25
 (Table 2). Inconsistently, 
the Netherlands was the only MS to witness a significant decline in Iraqi asylum applications in 2007 
– a decrease of nearly 800 applications. Particularly, the decrease followed the Netherland’s 
termination of its categorical protection policy for Iraqis
26
 (Table 2). 
Extraordinarily, almost half of the EUs total of Iraqi asylum applications between 2006 and 2007 
was filed in Sweden alone. In addition to the explosion of sectarian violence in Iraq, and other factors 
like social networks
27
 (as mentioned above, Sweden was one of the EU MS with the largest resident 
Iraqi populations, etc., pre-2003) Swedish authorities implemented significant policy changes in 2006 
that had a direct impact on the levels of Iraqi asylum claims received in the country. Encouraged by a 
new Aliens Act and a ‘temporary law’ (pardon):  
 “Sweden became one of the main target countries for asylum seekers from Iraq. The reason for 
this is probably that the before mentioned pardon constituted a major pull-factor for asylum 
seekers. The assessment of the situation in Iraq together with the interpretation of the new Aliens 
Act regarding subsidiary protection led to a significant high recognition rate in Sweden compared 
to many other European states. This might have encouraged many Iraqi’s to seek asylum in 
Sweden.”28 
Counterbalancing the rise in Iraqi asylum applications, in 2007 Sweden’s Migration Court determined 
that the situation in Iraq was not one of ‘armed conflict,’ which “led to a significant fall in recognition 
rates and therefore potentially to a shift in flows from Sweden to its neighbours.”29  
Revealing this shift, in 2008 numbers of Iraqi asylum applications in Sweden were reduced by two-
thirds when compared to 2007, while numbers almost doubled in Germany, more than doubled in the 
Netherlands, quadrupled in Finland,
30
 and increased almost 5-fold in France and Italy, as many other 
MS witnessed decreases (Table 2). Furthermore, over 2,500 Iraqis withdrew their asylum applications 
in Sweden between 2007 and 2008 – a number unparalleled in size when looking at the number of 
withdrawals in other MS between 2003 and 2013
31
 – potentially demonstrating an outflow of Iraqis 
who abandoned their asylum claims in Sweden to seek protection in neighbouring countries (however, 
the EURODAC system, whereby asylum-seekers’ fingerprints are uploaded into an EU-wide system 
to prevent asylum shopping, coupled with the Dublin system, should have prevented these Iraqis from 
being granted a status in another EU MS or other participating country).  
The above example indicates two conclusions. First, in certain cases a direct correlation can be 
found between the policy implemented in an EU MS and the corresponding levels of asylum 
applications received – in this case, a restrictive policy in Sweden led to a corresponding decrease in 
Iraqi asylum-seekers within the country. Second, restrictive policies in one EU MS can potentially 
lead to increased asylum claims in neighbouring EU Member States, e.g., from Sweden to its 
neighbours. 
At the same time as access to protection for Iraqi asylum-seekers was being restricted in Sweden, 
some of Sweden’s neighbours and other MS concurrently implemented policies expanding access, 
perhaps further encouraging the aforementioned shift. Keeping the increase of violence as a push-
factor in mind, from April 2007 through September 2008, the Netherlands implemented a second 
declaration of categorical protection for Iraqis originating from Central and Southern Iraq,
32
 and in 
July 2007 assumed group persecution for religious minorities originating from Iraq, granting the 
majority subsidiary protection, perhaps contributing to the 62% increase of Iraqi asylum claims 
witnessed in the Netherlands in 2008;
33
 Germany implemented new immigration legislation and began 
assuming group persecution of religious minorities from Iraq in May 2007, leading to high 
percentages of Iraqis granted refugee status,
34
 showing a concurrent increase of 50% of Iraqi asylum 
claims in 2008; towards the end of 2007 France implemented a protection policy affecting threatened 
Iraqi nationals belonging to religious minorities (see below), and in 2008 France witnessed a 78% 
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increase; and in Finland, due to procedural changes in 2007, increased numbers of Iraqis were granted 
humanitarian protection,
35
 witnessing a 76% increase in 2008 (Table 2).  
It can also be hypothesised that the transposition (by the end of 2006) and interpretation of the 
Qualification Directive also had bearing on these developments, as the Directive introduced 
‘subsidiary protection’ as an EU-wide concept, perhaps advancing standards and leading to higher 
recognition rates.
36
  
Notably, numbers of Iraqi asylum seekers in Poland more than tripled in 2008 to reach 70 
applications (Table 2), far surpassing levels seen at any other time, most probably due to Poland’s 
decision to grant protection to Iraqi interpreters and their families at this time.
37
  
Despite the drastic increases in certain EU MS, in 2008 overall numbers of Iraqi asylum 
applications lodged within the EU declined by 28%, and reduced by a further 35% the following year 
(Table 2). As the security situation in Iraq slowly improved, conditions granting protection to Iraqis no 
longer applied (as in Sweden and other MS) and national protection policies for Iraqis were also 
terminated, partially explaining the decrease in Iraqi asylum claims, demonstrating a correlation 
between restrictive protection policies and decreases levels of asylum claims.  
For instance, in September 2008 categorical protection was terminated in the Netherlands,
38
 
contributing to the 60% reduction of Iraqi asylum applications in the Netherlands (from over 5,000 to 
just over 2,000, Table 2). As Dutch authorities noted: “The large decrease in the number of 
applications submitted by persons originating from Iraq is probably related to the abolition of the 
policy of categorical protection for persons from Central Iraq on 12 September 2008.”39 Finland also 
began restricting its protection space for Iraqis in May 2009, stating that “asylum seekers coming from 
Southern Iraq and Baghdad are no longer to be given international protection due solely to the security 
situation,” with subsequent decreases in Iraqi asylum claims by 54% in 201040 (Table 2).  
As opposed to slowly declining in number from the height of the crisis towards 2013, as was the 
case for the vast majority of Member States, Belgium, Finland, and Germany continued to receive 
sustained numbers of Iraqi asylum applications when compared to those witnessed during the peak 
years (Sweden and the Netherlands also received the second and third highest numbers of Iraqi 
asylum-seekers after Germany following 2008, yet these numbers have been decreasing since the peak 
years, unlike Germany, Belgium and Finland) (Table 2). While Germany and Finland received almost 
the same numbers of Iraqi asylum claims between 2010 and August 2013 as received during the 
previous four years, Belgium received more Iraqi asylum applications between 2010 and August 2013 
than in the previous seven years combined.  
Following 2007, Germany has been the main receiver of Iraqi asylum applications in the EU, and 
levels have far surpassed those seen in any other MS (Table 2). In addition to Germany’s protection 
policies for certain Iraqis (above), Germany began granting Iraqi asylum-seekers refugee status as 
opposed to any other status,
41
 (indeed, almost 100% of Iraqi asylum-seekers granted protection in 
Germany received refugee status, discussed below) perhaps partially explaining the sustained levels 
seen in this country.  
In Belgium, in 2011 the number of Iraqi asylum applications peaked to its highest level seen 
throughout the crisis (to over 2,000). Belgian authorities claimed that in 2011 the country became one 
of the most important destination countries for Iraqi asylum-seekers due to the “high quality of the 
asylum system and assessment, compared to some other Member States” and “the fact that Belgium 
already hosts large Diasporas.”42 Once protection space was restricted, however, following the 2012 
ruling of the Belgian Council for Aliens Law Litigation that there was no longer a situation of 
generalised violence in Iraq, according to article 15C of the Qualification Directive,
43
 there was a 
corresponding decline in applications, by 56% in 2012, and a further 50% during the first eight months 
of 2013 (Table 2).  
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In Finland, in December 2010 the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court ruled to automatically 
grant subsidiary protection to Iraqi applicants originating from certain areas of Iraq and accordingly 
reprocessed rejected Iraqi asylum claims during the first half of 2011 leading to a spike in 
applications.
44
 While nearly every other MS saw decreases in Iraqi asylum applications in 2012, 
Finland saw numbers of Iraqi asylum applications increase by 30%, reaching 830 applications (Table 
2).  
Overall, however, numbers of Iraqis applying for asylum within the EU have steadily decreased 
since the peak years, falling to a total of 13,180 applications in 2012, and dropping to 6,600 during the 
first eight months of 2013 (Table 2). Against the historical trend, in 2011 and 2012 only around half of 
all Iraqi asylum applications in industrialised countries were lodged in the EU (Graph 1). This 
anomaly is partially explained by the fact that large numbers of Iraqis sought asylum in Turkey 
between these years - 7,900 in 2011 and 7,000 in 2012.
45
 The downturn as well as shift to Turkey as a 
viable asylum country could be explained by: the aforementioned restrictive asylum rulings and lower 
recognitions rates for Iraqis in EU MS; increased border measures, especially along the Greek-Turkish 
border, and security operations by Frontex and MS; and increased emphasis on return of Iraqi 
nationals and the concluding of Memorandums of Understanding between Iraq and EU MS (although, 
the return of Iraqi nationals has been extremely difficult, explained below).  
Even so, with nearly 7,000 Iraqi asylum applications lodged in the European Union during the first 
eight months of 2013 alone (almost equivalent to the numbers of Syrians applying for asylum in the 
EU during the whole of 2011), it can be said that ten years after the war, Iraqis are still in search of 
asylum and they continue to search for it within the European Union.  
2.3. Decisions on Iraqi Asylum Applications in the EU, 2003-2013 
Receiving 75% of the industrialised world’s total between 2003 and 2012, EU MS –particularly 
Sweden and Germany –were obliged to contend with a significant caseload of Iraqi asylum 
applications. Indeed, between 2003 and June 2013 EU MS made nearly 200,000 decisions on Iraqi 
asylum applications (excluding certain decisions, see Table 3 for explanation).
 
Expectedly, the main 
receivers of Iraqi asylum applications were also the main adjudicators, and they rejected or accepted 
the majority of Iraqi asylum applications in the EU.  
As a whole, the European Union decided positively nearly 50% of the time overall between 2003 
and June 2013, as EU MS granted a positive decision
46
 to over 91,000 Iraqi asylum applications, and 
rejected the remainder, or nearly 108,000 applications. Overall annual recognition rates for the EU as a 
whole were highest in 2006 and 2007, when 56% and 63% (respectively) of all Iraqi asylum 
applications in the EU were granted a positive status – rates were lowest during the first three years of 
the Iraq war, see graph below (and see Table 6 in Annex).  
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Graph B. Distribution and Numbers of Decisions on Iraqi Asylum Claims in EU MS, 2003-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables and explanation of claims counted.  
Cumulative recognition rates between 2003 and June 2013 were around 50% in Sweden, Germany, 
and the Netherlands (and most other EU MS), and only 15% in Spain, 20% in the UK, 33% in Ireland, 
and 35% in Poland. The likelihood that an Iraqi asylum claim would be rejected in Greece was 
particularly high: far below its fellow MS, Greece had a cumulative recognition rate of 2% - out of 
15,540 decisions on Iraqi asylum claims only 240 Iraqis were granted a positive decision
47
 (Table 7). 
(Surprisingly, Greece granted 700 Iraqis with a positive decision at a final basis – i.e. on appeal - 
between 2008 and 2012, three times more than at a first instance basis in all ten years between 2003 
and 2012.
48
)  
Annual recognition rates were generally higher during the peak years of the crisis when compared 
to other years, demonstrating that EU Member States responded more positively when Iraqis were in 
the most need of protection; yet, recognition rates between MS varied greatly (see Table 6 and 7).  
Recognition rates also fluctuated in unison with the implementation of restrictive or generous 
protection policies within certain Member States. For instance, Sweden granted 94% of Iraqi asylum 
applications with a positive status in 2006 and 80% in 2007. Yet, after restrictive policies were 
implemented in 2007 (discussed above), recognition rates plummeted to 31% in 2008 and to 24% in 
2009, far below the rates granted in other MS at this time. Likewise, while the first categorical 
protection policy for Iraqis was implemented in the Netherlands, the recognition rate skyrocketed from 
9% in 2002
49
 to 75% in 2003 (subsequently 64% and 69% in 2004 and 2005). Yet, in 2006, when the 
categorical protection policy was terminated, the recognition rate fell to 19%, far below most other 
MS; similarly, in 2009, the recognition rate in the Netherlands decreased again following termination 
of the second categorical protection policy (Table 7).  
Showing the reversal, the amendment of restrictive policies in Germany increased the recognition 
rate for Iraqi refugees. For instance, in 2006 Germany had one of the lowest recognition rates out of 
the EU - only 11% of Iraqi asylum claims were granted a positive status; yet, in unison with protection 
policies for Iraqis implemented during this time (described above) national recognition rates for Iraqi 
asylum applications in Germany increased rapidly in 2007 to 85% and to 80% in 2008 (Table 7).  
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Other MS kept relatively steady recognition rates between 2003 and 2013 - for instance, Greece 
(which never exceeded 10%) as well as the UK (which never exceeded 33%, and in fact the highest 
recognition rates in the UK were observed only at the very beginning and end of the time period 
studied, in 2003 and in 2012) (Table 7). While Greece has become perhaps ill-famed for low 
recognition rates (due to several extenuating factors discussed below), the UK’s interpretation of the 
Qualification Directive may help to explain the unflinchingly low recognition rates for Iraqis during 
this time period. In February 2007, the UK’s Home Office Operational Guidance Notes (OGN) on 
Iraq
50
 stated that a general state of insecurity in Iraq did not by itself amount to a reason for granting 
refugee status, nor likely to grant asylum or humanitarian protection.
51
 Reaffirming this line of 
reasoning, in February 2008 in the case KH (Article 15(c) Qualification Directive) Iraq CG [2008] 
UKAIT 00023
52
 the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal ruled that although Iraq was a situation of 
internal armed conflict, Iraqi asylum applicants were required to show an individual threat in order to 
qualify for subsidiary protection.  
Inequalities in EU MS’ adjudication of Iraqi asylum applications were even observed by the 
European Parliament in a July 2007 resolution, which stated that: “great disparities have been 
determined in the way Iraqi asylum claims are being assessed in the Member States, illustrating the 
lack of progress made in the development of a Common European Asylum System.”53 Inconsistencies 
were also found in a 2008 ECRE report, which found that the overall differences between Member 
States in the interpretation of Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive may have “contributed to the 
large disparities in recognition rates for Iraqi nationals” in certain EU MS.54 However, even after 
transposition of the Qualification Directive in most EU MS, recognition rates and the ways in which 
MS interpret the situation in Iraq (and thereby assess asylum claims) continue to vary widely 
(evidenced in Tables 7 and 8). Demonstrating the differences in assessment even after transposition of 
the Qualification Directive, by 2013 Finland was granting at least subsidiary protection to Iraqi asylum 
applicants originating from particular areas of Iraq due the security situation;
55
 yet paradoxically, this 
interpretation is both similar and contrary to how other Member States currently interpret the situation 
in Iraq.
56
  
The inequalities and variances outlined above show that: 1) Iraqi asylum applications are more or 
less likely to be granted a positive decision depending upon the MS in which the asylum claim was 
filed (evidenced by the varying recognition rates throughout the EU); and 2) Member States have 
evaluated the security situation in Iraq differently and unevenly throughout the crisis, despite 
transposition of the Qualification Directive. This leads to the conclusion that harmonized ‘Country of 
Origin information’ (COI), which provides the view of the situation on the ground in origin countries 
and is essential for granting or terminating protection, seems to be crucial for the consistent 
interpretation of a particular situation and therefore the proper functioning of the Common European 
Asylum System.  
Despite these discrepancies, out of the nearly 91,000 positive statuses granted to Iraqis between 
2003 and June 2013, humanitarian or subsidiary protection was granted to the majority, with over 
51,000 Iraqis receiving this status (Tables 10, 11 and 12), and refugee status was granted to almost 
40,000 (Table 9). As recognition rates for Iraqi asylum-seekers varied depending upon a multitude of 
factors, so too did the statuses granted to Iraqi asylum-seekers in the European Union, as described 
below.  
2.3.1. Humanitarian Status and Subsidiary Protection 
Between 2003 and June 2013, over 51,000 Iraqis were granted either ‘humanitarian status’ or 
‘subsidiary protection,’ with classifications of these terms changing before and after implementation 
of the Council Regulation on Community Statistics, entering into force in January 2008, with the 
concept of subsidiary protection being introduced by the Qualification Directive, entering into force in 
2006.  
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Looking at the available Eurostat data between 2003 and 2007, EU MS granted approximately 
31,000 Iraqis with ‘humanitarian status,’ which included both humanitarian status57 and subsidiary 
protection.
58
 Sweden granted almost 67% of these humanitarian status decisions, with approximately 
20,350 Iraqis receiving humanitarian protection (reasons for high recognition rates in Sweden 
explained above). Concurrent with country-specific policies of granting categorical protection to Iraqis 
from either Central or Southern Iraq, the Netherlands granted the second highest number of 
humanitarian protection decisions, with over 5,000 Iraqis receiving humanitarian protection between 
2003 and 2007. Between 2008 and June 2013, after the Regulation began to disaggregate statistics on 
those granted humanitarian or subsidiary protection, Eurostat data shows that Member States granted 
an additional 20,000 Iraqi asylum-seekers with either ‘subsidiary protection’ (15,090) or humanitarian 
status (5,770). Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland granted the majority of subsidiary 
decisions, and the Netherlands granted the majority of humanitarian decisions. 
Depending upon the MS in which the asylum claim was filed, Iraqis were more likely to be granted 
either humanitarian status or subsidiary protection than another positive status. Almost all Iraqis 
granted a positive status in Sweden, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and Denmark between 2003 and 2007 
were granted humanitarian status (Table 10). Likewise, between 2008 and June 2013, almost all Iraqis 
granted a positive status in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Finland received subsidiary protection as opposed to 
another positive status (Tables 11 and 12). The likelihood that Iraqis would be granted a specific status 
depending upon the MS in which their asylum claim was filed can be demonstrated in the following 
graph (amongst other examples) (information can be found in Annex, Tables 10-12):  
Graph C. Distribution and Numbers of Decisions Taken on Iraqi Asylum Claims in Sweden, 
showing the likelihood of Iraqi asylum-seekers being granted Humanitarian Status in Sweden 
(2003-2007) 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables. 
While large numbers of Iraqis were granted humanitarian or subsidiary protection in the Netherlands 
and Belgium between 2003 and 2012, these countries were also more likely to withdraw protection 
from Iraqis. Between 2008 and 2012, the Netherlands withdrew the protection statuses of 
approximately 1,300 Iraqis (second in withdrawals to Germany, see below), as the “abolition of the 
protection policy for the category of asylum seekers from Central Iraq as of 12 September 2008 
resulted in a substantial increase in the number of asylum permits that were withdrawn in 2009 and 
2010.” 59 According to Dutch authorities, the abolition of the categorical protection policy led to the 
revocation of around 3,000 Iraqi residence permits.
60
 Belgium was third in withdrawals of protection 
statuses to Iraqis between 2008 and 2012, with nearly 1,200 statuses withdrawn – almost exclusively 
subsidiary protection (Table 13).  
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2.3.2. Refugee Status 
Between 2003 and June 2013, close to 40,000 Iraqis were granted ‘refugee status,’61 with the highest 
numbers granted between 2007 and 2009. Increasing more than 9-fold in 2007, numbers of Iraqis 
granted refugee status throughout the EU skyrocketed from 710 in 2006 to nearly 7,000 in 2007. 
Bestowing refugee status to nearly 28,000 Iraqis, Germany granted 70% of these decisions (Table 9). 
Indeed, out of all Iraqis granted protection in Germany between 2003 and June 2013, almost 100% 
were granted refugee status, showing the likelihood of Iraqis being granted this status in this country.  
Graph D. Distribution and Numbers of Decisions Taken on Iraqi Asylum Claims in Germany, 
showing the likelihood of Iraqi asylum-seekers being granted refugee status in Germany  
(2003-2012) 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
Germany’s willingness to grant refugee status, however, should be weighed against its inclination to 
revoke refugee status. In November 2003, German Authorities began to revoke the refugee status of 
18,000 Iraqis, ruling that the threat of persecution from Saddam Hussein’s regime no longer existed. 62 
Indeed, a German NGO estimated in April 2007 that 14,000 Iraqis were living with ‘tolerated status’ 
in Germany, with the threat of deportation hanging over them.
63
 Even though in June 2007 the German 
government temporarily suspended the revocation of refugee status for certain groups of Iraqis (those 
from Baghdad, single women, and members of religious minorities
64
), between 2008 and 2012 
Germany withdrew approximately 69% of all protection statuses withdrawn from Iraqi asylum-seekers 
in the EU (over 6,000 out of 9,000 statuses), with Germany withdrawing refugee status almost 
exclusively.
65
  
2.4. Iraqi Refugee Resettlement and Relocation to the European Union, 2003-2012
66
  
Due to a convergence of national, multi-national, and EU-wide policies (and indeed with the 
assistance of UNHCR), over 8,000 Iraqi refugees were resettled in EU MS through national 
resettlement programmes between 2003 and 2012, with Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Finland 
resettling the majority (Table 14).  
Although several EU MS have engaged in refugee resettlement at various times since WWII, 
annual or ad-hoc resettlement programmes existed in only eight MS between 2003 and 2007 – 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal (established in 2007), Sweden, the UK, and Italy 
(which began an ad hoc programme in 2007, yet no Iraqis were resettled). According to national 
statistics, these MS resettled approximately 1,330 Iraqi refugees between 2003 and 2007 (Table 14).  
Christine Marie Fandrich 
12 
Iraqi refugee resettlement in the EU took off in 2008 for several reasons. In addition to the UNHCR 
establishing eleven ‘priority resettlement’ profiles for Iraqi refugees –in order to help process 
prioritised resettlement to third countries,
67
 in July 2007 the European Parliament urged Member 
States “to contribute in a significant manner to the resettlement of Iraqi refugees.”68 In November 
2007, France took a bold step by becoming the first EU MS to create an ad hoc resettlement 
programme to specifically address the Iraqi refugee crisis through its ‘IRAK 500’ programme, 
whereby 500 Iraqis were allocated to be resettled in 2008 and 2009 (the total quota was later changed 
to 1,200).
69
 (Denmark also initiated a resettlement programme in 2007; however, this was specifically 
for Iraqis -and their families- employed by the Danish forces in Iraq, which brought approximately 
400 Iraqis to Denmark.
70
) 
Monumental for Iraqi refugee resettlement in the EU, however, were the conclusions of the Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in November 2008, which stated an objective of resettling up to 
10,000 Iraqi refugees throughout the EU.
71
 Although such resettlement was voluntary, the conclusions 
by the JHA represented the EUs first joint effort to encourage resettlement to a specific refugee 
population and to set a specific quota. Following the conclusions, four other MS joined France in 
establishing their own ad-hoc resettlement programmes explicitly for Iraqi refugees: Germany decided 
to resettle 2,500 Iraqis from certain groups in Jordan and Syria;
72 
Belgium offered 50 places; Italy 
agreed to resettle 180 Palestinian refugees fleeing Iraq; and Luxembourg committed 28 resettlement 
places.
 73
 Notably, in 2008 the UK stated it would resettle 200 Iraqis already in refugee camps in Syria 
or Jordan per year, in addition to aiming to grant refugee status to 600 UK-employed Iraqis in Iraq.
74
  
In another first for the EU, in May 2008 an Emergency Transit Centre (ETC) was opened in 
Timisoara, Romania. Originally receiving Eritrean refugees, the ETC also began to receive Darfuri 
Sudanese who fled Iraq after the war, and in 2009, the UK selected 81 Palestinian refugees from Iraq 
by conducting interviews at the centre. Following suit, Slovakia opened an ETC in July 2009 for 
processing Palestinians stuck at the Iraq border for resettlement.
75
  
Promoting joint missions and good practices in the field of resettlement was also an objective of the 
Temporary Desk on Iraq, set up in May 2009 by certain MS, and several missions took place further 
boosting efforts to resettle Iraqi refugees within the EU. In the area of resettlement, the TDI 
implemented two joint missions, one in May 2009 (Belgium and Netherlands) and the other in 
October-November 2009 (Bulgaria, Netherlands and Slovakia). 
Against this backdrop, from 2008 through 2012 EU MS with annual or ad hoc programmes 
resettled an additional 7,040 Iraqi refugees. The majority were resettled in Germany (2,630), the UK 
(1,290), Finland (880), Sweden (805) and France (790) (Table 15). Although Eurostat data reports that 
Italy has not resettled any Iraqi refugees, other sources claim that refugees from Iraq were resettled 
there in 2009.
76
 Relocation of Iraqi refugees (from one MS to another) was also utilised during this 
time period, particularly through the ‘EU Relocation from Malta’ (EUREMA) project (although data 
for total number of Iraqis is unavailable).
77
 However, the overall numbers resettled though EUREMA 
relocation is strikingly low: in 2011, approximately 250 persons were resettled; in 2012, 356 places 
resettlement places were pledged.
78
 
Although the objective set by the JHA Conclusions to resettle 10,000 Iraqi refugees has yet to be 
realized (by the time of writing), in March 2012 the ‘Joint EU Resettlement Programme’ was adopted, 
and the resettlement of Iraqi refugees was prioritized for 2013 (amongst other nationalities), showing 
that more Iraqi refugees should be resettled to EU MS in the future. Indeed, it also demonstrates that 
ten years after the start of the war, refugees from Iraq are still in need of resettlement.
 79
  
2.5. Iraqi Irregular Entry and Stay within the EU, and Return of Iraqis from the EU, 2003-2012 
Iraqi nationals have consistently been listed as one of the top nationalities of illegally present migrants 
within the EU, indeed aided by smuggling networks which have certainly facilitated the irregular 
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movement of Iraqis into the EU.
80
 While the complete picture of illegal presence within the EU is 
challenging to discern – given its clandestine nature, and as EU-wide statistics were collected only 
after 2008 – a partial glimpse into the phenomenon can be achieved.  
Looking at national statistics in Greece - the main entry point for Iraqis illegally entering the EU – 
between 2003 and 2007 Greek authorities apprehended nearly 20,500 Iraqi illegal immigrants. Annual 
numbers increased by almost 8-fold in 2006 to reach 8,157 Iraqis apprehended, and remained high 
with approximately 9,000 Iraqis arrested by the Greek authorities in 2007.
81
 In addition, between 2008 
and 2012, according to Frontex data, over 19,000 Iraqis were detected illegally entering Europe’s 
borders, with approximately half (almost 9,000) detected in 2008. Numbers were cut in half the 
following year, and slowly declined towards 2012.
82
  
Regarding illegal presence, between 2008 and 2012 almost 100,000 Iraqis were “found to be 
illegally present”83 within the EU, the majority (67%) being discovered in only three MS: France 
(25,210), Greece (22,240) and Germany (18,360) (Table 16). Overall, numbers decreased steadily 
from 2008 through 2012 – in 2008, a total of 37,350 Iraqis were found to be illegally present within 
the EU, while only 9,290 Iraqis were found to be illegally present in 2012 (Table 17). Interestingly, 
89% of Iraqis found to be illegally present in the EU between 2008 and 2012 were male, and 67% of 
these were between the ages of 18-34.
84
  
With a precisely unknown, but certainly large, population of Iraqi illegal immigrants within the 
European Union following the US-led invasion, the EU and its MS were forced to grapple with a large 
population of illegally present Iraqi nationals. Two main responses were: 1) enhanced efforts to return 
Iraqi nationals through voluntary and forced return programmes – aided by readmission arrangements 
signed between MS, Iraq and other transit countries during this time, and assisted by return 
agreements with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM);
85
 and 2) increased border 
security efforts.  
Graph E. Distribution and Numbers of Iraqis Found to be Illegally Present in Main Receiving 
EU MS, 2008-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
2.5.1. Returns of Iraqis from the EU 
Returns of Iraqi nationals, to transit countries or the country of origin, especially during the years of 
extreme violence inside Iraq, have been controversial.
86
 Indeed, in 2007 the European Parliament 
asked Member States to suspend temporarily all forced returns to any part of Iraq,
87
 and throughout the 
war several requests by would-be Iraqi returnees were made to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) to appeal their deportations (the ECtHR was still deciding this issue as recently as 2013).
88
 
Christine Marie Fandrich 
14 
Even though returns have been contentious, several MS have acted to facilitate the voluntary and 
forced return of Iraqi nationals from the EU.  
Assisted voluntary return programmes (AVR, or AVRR for Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration)
89
 that targeted Iraqi nationals were increasingly utilised and developed by EU MS in 
the years following the US-led invasion. AVR programmes for Iraqis have been employed by several 
MS -with resources from the European Return Fund, and mainly in cooperation with IOM as service 
partner - including: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, and the UK. In fact, Iraqis were among the top nationalities 
utilising such programmes in: Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, and the 
UK.
90
According to IOM figures, nearly 21,000 Iraqis have utilised AVR between 2003 and 2012 (out 
of all host countries, not only EU MS, this data is unavailable) (Table 18).  
A main component and incentive of assisted voluntary return programmes is return assistance, or 
so-called re-establishment support (usually monetary). Interestingly, in comparison to other 
nationalities, certain EU MS have offered higher rates of return assistance to Iraqi nationals (and other, 
particularly prevalent, nationalities, e.g. Afghanis and Somalis) in order to support their 
reestablishment and reintegration - for example, programmes in Denmark,
91
 Germany,
92
 Sweden,
93
 and 
the UK,
94
 amongst others. Notably, “the level of support offered by European host governments to 
returning Iraqis differ greatly from country to country.”95 
AVR has also been utilised by failed Iraqi asylum-seekers pressured by the reduction or full 
withdrawal of their social assistance allowances in EU host countries, thereby encouraging them to 
accept return as an alternative.
96
 Iraqis who have lost residence status within the host country have also 
been encouraged to return via AVR - according to the Netherlands, there was a “tendency for more 
Iraqis to leave the Netherlands [via AVR] most likely due to the ending of the Categorical Protection 
Policy…for Iraq” – (around 3,000 Iraqi had their residence permits retrieved).97 The “continuously 
worsening labour demand prompted many to opt for voluntary return” in Greece, demonstrating that 
economic factors may also encourage voluntary return.
98
  
Multi-national and EU-level strategies to support the voluntary and forced return of Iraqi nationals 
from the EU have also been employed. The multi-national Temporary Desk on Iraq (TDI), created in 
May 2009, 
99
 worked to develop voluntary return and reintegration in Iraq, and to facilitate 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on readmission.
100
 Similarly, in 2011 the UK and the 
Netherlands worked collaboratively to share information on the current status and issues with difficult 
return countries – including Iraq, and remarkably even Syria.101 Concerning unaccompanied minors 
from Iraq, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands cooperated within the European Return 
Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM), to assist in returns.
102
 Moreover, ‘Joint Return 
Operations’ for Iraqi nationals have been carried out by MS with cooperation from Frontex,103 and MS 
have also shared national return flights (e.g., cooperation between Netherlands and Sweden to return 
Iraqi nationals).
104
 Regarding reintegration after arrival, in 2011, the European Reintegration 
Instrument (ERI) (co-financed by the European Return Fund) was implemented by Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden to support the reintegration of returning Iraqi nationals.
105
 Following 
high arrivals in Finland, in 2010 the country developed the ‘Irak Country of Origin Information 
System’ in order to create the conditions for Iraqi return. “The project will also promote national and 
international cooperation and the exchange of information and produce information for use in 
preparing a return agreement between Finland and Iraq.”106 
Readmission arrangements (or Memorandums of Understanding – MoUs) have been instrumental 
in implementing voluntary (and forced) returns of Iraqi nationals from the EU. At varying times after 
the US-led invasion, MS acted to enter into readmission agreements with either Iraq or transit 
countries to facilitate return.
107
 Regarding readmission to Iraq, in January 2005 the UK became the 
first EU MS to conclude a MoU on returns with the Iraqi Interim Government,
108
 and in November 
2006, the German Federal Minister was asked by the Interior Ministers of the Länder to negotiate a 
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MoU with Iraqi authorities to return Iraqi nationals to Northern Iraq, with deportations beginning in 
the summer of 2007.
109
 In February 2008, Sweden signed a MoU to return Iraqis with the Iraqi 
Government,
110
 followed by Denmark in May 2009.
111
 Additionally, Greece began negotiating a 
bilateral readmission agreement with Iraq in 2011,
112
 followed by negotiations between Finland and 
Iraq in 2012.
113
  
Representing the first ever contractual relationship between the European Union and Iraq, the ‘EU-
Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ - signed in May 2012, yet not fully ratified- also 
includes a readmission clause for Iraqi nationals in the EU.
114
  
Regarding readmission agreements with transit countries, in October 2003 a MoU was concluded 
between the Netherlands and Jordan, under which Iraqi nationals who wished to return voluntarily to 
Iraq could do so through Jordanian territory.
115
 It was also reported that in 2007 Greece deported Iraqi 
nationals to Turkey via its readmission agreement - whereby Turkey consequently deported Iraqis to 
Iraq.
116
  
Given the above background on return programmes and readmission agreements, regarding returns 
of Iraqi nationals from the EU –either voluntary or forced - between 2003 and 2007, only part of the 
picture can be glimpsed, and the countries to which Iraqis were returned is uncertain:  
 Between 2003 and 2005, German authorities assisted over 1,800 Iraqis (316; 824; 688, 
respectively) to voluntarily return;
117
 
 In 2005, the UK forcibly returned 1,245 Iraqis and assisted the voluntary return of 760 Iraqis;
118
 
 In 2006, in Sweden, 89 Iraqis applied for return allowances through Sweden’s voluntary return 
programme;
119
 Italy forcibly returned over 1,400 Iraqis and the Netherlands forcibly returned 
1,200; and Germany and the UK had several Iraqi voluntary returnees (688 and 780, 
respectively)
120
 
 In 2007, forced returns of Iraqis took place from Denmark,
121
 Greece, Poland, Sweden and the 
UK, with forced returns to Iraq or other countries in the region (numbers ranging from one 
person to 87 persons)
122
 
 IOM figures show that nearly 9,000 Iraqis were voluntarily returned between 2003 and 2007 
(from all host countries, not only EU MS, this data is unavailable) (Table 18).  
While the total number of Iraqi returns by EU MS before 2008 is difficult to determine, Eurostat data 
between 2008 and 2012 paints an overall picture regarding Iraqis presented with an order to leave as 
well as Iraqis actually returned from the EU.  
During this time period, over 95,000 Iraqis found to be illegally present within the EU were issued 
an order to leave - by far, Greece issued Iraqis with the most orders (33,850) (Table 16).  
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Graph F. Distribution and Numbers of Iraqis Issued with an Order to Leave in Main Issuing EU 
MS, 2008-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
Although EU MS ordered over 95,000 Iraqis to leave their respective territories, only 30% (28,980) 
were recorded as actually being returned (including both voluntary and forced),
 
revealing the 
difficulties in return enforcement (the status of the remaining 70% of Iraqis ordered to leave the EU, or 
66,500 Iraqis, is uncertain). Sweden carried out the most returns. According to IOM figures, over 
12,000 Iraqis were returned through AVR between 2008 and 2012 (out of all host countries, not only 
EU MS, this data is unavailable), demonstrating that probably less than half of returns utilised AVR 
(Table 18). Unfortunately, Eurostat data does not provide the country to which Iraqis were returned, 
and therefore it assumed that some were returned to Iraq while others were returned to a third-country.  
In Greece, the gap between orders to leave and numbers actually leaving is stark – only 7% of the 
approximate 35,000 Iraqis ordered to leave were recorded as doing so. The status of the remaining 
93% of Iraqis issued with an order to leave in Greece is unknown, but it is assumed that very few are 
apprehended given the lack of a sufficient network of detention centres, which also “often leads to the 
deliberate avoidance of policemen to apprehend illegal immigrants originating from countries difficult 
to expel to,” especially to Iraq (for more information, see endnote 123).123 The Netherlands, Belgium, 
France and Italy also have high numbers of “missing” Iraqis. Excluding countries with low numbers 
overall, Sweden and the UK had the lowest gaps between the numbers of Iraqis ordered to leave and 
the numbers recorded as leaving (74% and 61% of those ordered to leave did so, respectively) (Tables 
16 and 17), perhaps demonstrating that these countries have more efficient return programmes.  
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Graph G. Distribution and Numbers of Iraqis Returned by Main Returning EU MS, 2008-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
Even though returns to Iraq from EU MS tended to increase as the violence in Iraq decreased,
124
 MS 
utilising voluntary or forced return programmes have incurred several complications in actually 
returning migrants due to unenforceability of readmission and the low motivation of Iraqis to return.
125
  
Although several MS have signed return MoUs with Iraq, Iraqi authorities have at various times 
been unwilling to accept returnees thereby complicating return. For instance, in 2010 the Kurdish 
regional government banned incoming flights carrying deported Iraqis from the UK, leading the UK 
Border Agency to redirect planes to Baghdad.
126
 Moreover, in direct contravention to the spirit of the 
EU-Iraq Cooperation Agreement entailing the readmission clause, in June 2012 – one month after 
initialling the Agreement - the Iraqi Parliament banned forced returns of rejected Iraqi asylum-seekers 
from Europe “for security reasons” (voluntary returns were still accepted).127 In addition, Iraqi 
authorities may not always be willing to grant travel documents, therefore complicating return.
128
 
Other potential complications to enforcing return could include the financial burden experienced by 
Iraqi returnees, perhaps thereby leading to demands by the Iraqi authorities upon returning MS - for 
instance, in June 2012, the Iraqi Government asked the Netherlands to support returnees for six 
months after their arrival in Iraq.
129
  
When Iraqi authorities refuse to accept the return of failed asylum-seekers and others, there is little 
choice but to allow these individuals to remain within the European Union, in rare cases with so-called 
“tolerated stay” status, engendering various access (or no access) to rights depending upon EU MS. 
Indeed, Iraqis frequently topped the list of nationalities granted this status throughout various years in 
several MS.
130
 In these situations “return is often not enforced and persons from these countries 
[Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia] who are refused protection remain on the territory of EU Member 
States in a legal limbo.”131  
While returns may be unenticing and difficult to enforce, return programmes also offer an added 
benefit, according to Greek officials, as they “have contributed substantially to tackle immigration” 
because they were able to remove “people in countries where the expulsion was impossible or very 
difficult (Iraq-Afghanistan-Nigeria, etc.) and in addition gave a discouraging message to would-be 
migrants and traffickers in irregular migrants.”132 Norway has also claimed that forced returns of Iraqi 
nationals have led to an increase in voluntary returns (see footnote 95).  
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2.5.2. Enhanced Security Measures during the Iraqi crisis  
In addition to addressing the (mainly irregular) Iraqi immigrant population within the EU through 
returns, the EU also took actions to enhance border security to keep out new waves of Iraqis from 
entering. Notably, over 4,000 Iraqis were refused entry into EU MS between 2008 and 2012, with over 
half being refused at the air border (2,510), followed by sea (960), and land (540).
133
 
In order to address entry at air borders, in 2005 through 2006, Sweden implemented special 
trainings for migration officials, airline personnel and the integrated Schengen missions in Islamabad, 
Kuala Lumpur, Syria and Jordan. “After these efforts, a clearly-observable reduction in individuals 
travelling on false documents or visas from these locations could be noted.” Further trainings were 
provided to Greek authorities, “primarily focussed on individuals travelling from the Middle East – 
especially Iraqis.”134  
In addition to operating its own chartered flights to Iraq for purposes of return, Sweden also 
increased security within its national borders, as – connected to these flights - the Police Authority in 
Stockholm County changed its working methods, and used outreach operations to identify irregular 
individuals. Swedish authorities noted that: “since the number of asylum applicants from Iraq has 
decreased, it can be assumed that this working method has sent out certain signals to smugglers and/or 
potential asylum seekers.” 135  
In order to address illegal-entries by the south-eastern land and sea border, between May and July 
2007 Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon led to “the diversion back to the Turkish coast of 248 migrants 
and the apprehension of over 1,500 migrants mostly Albanians, Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis, 
Palestinians and Somali.”136 Frontex has also cooperated with MS to address Iraqi illegal migration 
specifically. During its risk assessments projects, between August 2007 and February 2008 Frontex 
implemented a Tailored Risk Analysis regarding migration from Iraq, carried out in a task force with 
the participation of Germany, France, Norway, and Sweden; “to assess the phenomena of illegal 
migration from and via Iraq to the territory of the European Union in order to decide appropriate areas 
and fields of operations to be carried out.”137  
As security operations have increased, Iraqi migrants have sought out less-patrolled, and 
increasingly more dangerous, routes to Europe. Indeed, in September 2012, dozens of migrants, 
including Iraqis and Syrians, drowned off the coast of Turkey trying to reach Europe,
138
 followed by 
another tragedy in December 2012, when a small boat carrying Iraqis sailing from Turkey sank off the 
Greek island Lesbos, drowning 20 persons.
139
 Although ten years have passed since the conflict began, 
Iraqis continue to search for ways, by any means possible, to access the European Union.  
2.6. Main Findings  
 By far, the EU has been the main receiver of Iraqi asylum-seekers in the industrialised world. 
The EU received 75% of all Iraqi asylum applications lodged in industrialised countries between 
2003 and 2012, (or approximately 183,000 applications out of a total 244,000). Between March 
2003 and August 2013, an approximate total of 196,000 Iraqis applied for asylum within the EU. 
 By far, the majority of Iraqi asylum applications during the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath were 
filed in Germany and Sweden. Germany and Sweden received 50% of all Iraqi asylum claims 
filed in the EU between March 2003 and August 2013 (or a total of 97,820 out of 196,055). 
 Many of the EU MS with the highest numbers of Iraqi asylum claims also had Iraqi Diasporas 
and histories of Iraqi immigration, demonstrating the impact of established Diasporas on new 
inflows of Iraqis to the EU. It was particularly noticed that many EU MS experiencing high 
levels of Iraqi asylum claims also had, prior to the crisis, the highest numbers, when compared to 
other MS, of: 1) Iraqi resident populations; 2) Iraqis granted citizenship within the MS; and 3) 
Iraqi asylum claims filed in the years preceding the crisis. In the Iraq case, this was true for 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK. 
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 In some cases, a direct correlation was found between the policy implemented in an EU MS and 
the corresponding levels of asylum applications received - generous protection policies have 
contributed to increased asylum claims, and restrictive protection policies have led to decreased 
asylum claims. Indeed, as the Dutch National Contact Point for the European Migration Network 
noted, country-specific policy can have a significant influence on numbers of asylum decisions 
in a particular year. In the Iraq case, following implementation of protection policies in the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, and Finland, a corresponding increase of Iraqi asylum 
applications was observed. Indeed, recognition rates for Iraqi asylum-seekers also increased 
during the protection periods. Following termination of such policies, or changes in asylum 
policies, particularly in the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Finland, a corresponding drop in 
Iraqi asylum claims and recognition rates for Iraqis were observed.  
 Restrictive policies in one EU MS can potentially lead to increased asylum claims in 
neighbouring EU Member States. In 2007, Sweden’s Migration Court determined that the 
situation in Iraq was not one of armed conflict, which led to a significant fall in recognition rates 
and therefore potentially to a shift in flows from Sweden to its neighbours. Revealing this shift, 
in 2008 numbers of Iraqi asylum applications in Sweden were reduced by two-thirds when 
compared to 2007, while numbers almost doubled in Germany, more than doubled in the 
Netherlands, quadrupled in Finland, and increased almost 5-fold in France and Italy, as many 
other MS witnessed decreases, and thousands of Iraqis asylum-seekers withdrew (or had their 
applications withdrawn) in Sweden in 2007 and 2008. The UNHCR noted that it also believed 
Sweden’s active return policy led to this drop and to a potential shift in flows from Sweden 
(Swedish authorities also noted that return flights contributed to the decrease of Iraqi asylum 
claims in the country). 
 Protection policies can be terminated in one MS based on the fact that similar protection policies 
do not exist in other MS. For instance, each time that the Netherlands terminated its categorical 
protection policies for Iraqis, Dutch authorities noted that in addition to the security situation in 
Iraq, the categorical protection for Iraqis was in fact terminated because similar protection 
policies did not exist in other EU MS. In 2006, the first categorical protection policy for Iraqis 
was ended because neither Belgium, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, nor Germany 
had any special policy in relation to Iraq, and that the Netherlands attaches considerable 
significance to aligning Dutch policy with the policy in other European countries. Likewise, in 
2008, the second categorical protection for Iraqis was ended because of “the fact that (…) 
neighbouring countries [of the Netherlands], in particular the United Kingdom, Denmark, and 
Sweden, did not pursue a special policy on Iraqi asylum applicants” (se Endnotes 22 and 34). 
 The role of the harmonized Country of Origin information (COI) seems to be crucial for the 
proper functioning of the CEAS. Member States evaluated the security situation in Iraq 
differently and unevenly throughout the crisis, despite transposition of the Qualification 
Directive, which had an impact on recognition rates. 
 Iraqi asylum-seekers were more likely to be granted a certain protection status or were more 
likely to have their asylum claims rejected depending upon which MS their asylum claims were 
filed. 
 Calls from the UNHCR and the EU to resettle Iraqi refugees have been instrumental in 
implementing large-scale refugee resettlement programmes throughout the EU.  
 Large numbers of Iraqi beneficiaries of international protection had their protection statuses 
revoked (mainly by Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium), potentially having implications 
for the current Syrian crisis. 
 Out of nearly 95,000 Iraqis ordered to leave the EU, data shows that only 30% of these have 
actually returned. Only 30% of those ordered to leave (28,980) were recorded as actually being 
returned (including both voluntary and forced), revealing the difficulties in return enforcement 
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(the status of the remaining 70% of Iraqis ordered to leave the EU, or 66,500 Iraqis, is 
uncertain). 
 Voluntary and forced returns of Iraqi nationals from the EU are difficult to carry out due to the 
unattractiveness of voluntary return and the low enforceability of forced return. In the Iraq case, 
there were several obstacles to voluntary and forced return. Regarding voluntary return, although 
many MS offered higher levels of return assistance to Iraqi nationals, in addition to other 
assistance like vocational training and monetary incentives, the number of voluntary returns 
were small in comparison to the numbers of Iraqis issued with an order to leave the EU– IOM 
figures show over 12,000 Iraqis utilised assisted voluntary return programmes between 2008-
2012 (out of all host countries, not only EU countries, this data is unavailable) compared to the 
95,000 Iraqis that were ordered to leave the EU during this time period. Even though several MS 
have concluded or are concluding readmission arrangements with Iraq (the UK, Germany, 
Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Finland) and even though the European Union and Iraq signed (yet 
not fully ratified) the ‘EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ in May 2012, including 
a readmission clause for Iraqi nationals in the EU, returns are complicated by the fact that Iraqi 
authorities have banned the return of Iraqi nationals (excluding voluntary), in addition to not 
granting travel documents. Greek officials also noted that Iraq returns were complicated by the 
fact that the number of removed is much lower than the number of apprehended, and this 
discourages police authorities to proceed to the apprehensions of these migrants. Regarding the 
Greek-Turkish readmission agreement, Greece also noted that the non-cooperation of Turkey 
was a further obstacle to return. When Iraqi authorities refuse to accept the return of failed 
asylum-seekers and others, there is little choice but to allow these individuals to remain within 
the European Union, in most cases with so-called “tolerated stay” status, engendering various 
access to rights depending upon EU MS. Indeed, Iraqis frequently topped the list of nationalities 
granted this status throughout various years in several MS. In these situations, Iraqis (and 
potentially Syrians in the future) with tolerated stay live in “legal limbo.” 
 Ten years after the invasion, Iraqis are still in need of protection, and they continue to search for 
asylum mainly within the EU. Despite decreasing since the peak years of the crisis, the number 
of Iraqis applying for asylum within the EU during the first eight months of 2013 alone is nearly 
equivalent to the total number of Syrians applying for asylum in the whole of 2011, 
demonstrating that ten years after the war, Iraqis continue to search for asylum in the EU in 
significant numbers. Indeed, the EU even prioritised Iraqi refugee resettlement through the Joint 
EU Resettlement Programme in 2013, demonstrating that Iraqis are still in need of protection 
over a decade since the invasion. 
3. The EUs Response to Syrians in the EU Following the 2011 Civil War, 2011-2013 
3.1. Introduction 
Against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa, in March 2011 
the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown on Syrian protestors marked the starting point of the present-day 
civil war in Syria. After months of military attacks against a burgeoning Syrian opposition, composed 
mainly of Sunni fighters (including foreign elements) opposed to the Shia-led government,
 
and 
successive reprisal attacks by the opposition against the Assad regime and its supporters, brutal 
violence and absolute destruction had forced Syrians (in addition to other refugees present in Syria – 
Palestinian and Iraqi) to flee their homeland in droves. By the end of 2012, the UNHCR noted that the 
Syrian conflict had forced 647,000 people to seek shelter outside the country, representing “the largest 
annual exodus by a single refugee group since 1999, when more than 867,000 people fled Kosovo."
140
  
The conflict-induced displacements are indeed massive. Current figures show that from March 
2011 through September 2013, approximately 5.1 million Syrians have become internally displaced
141
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and an additional 2.1 million Syrians have fled to neighbouring countries - Lebanon (775,991), Turkey 
(494,361), Jordan (533,104), Iraq (194,234), Egypt (126,717), with an additional 14,959 in North 
African countries.
142
  
Syria is certainly a battlefield, and by October 2013 the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 
placed the figure of civilian casualties over 41,000, with another 41,000 government fighters and 
23,000 rebel fighters killed, for a total of 115,000 deaths since the war began.
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While the majority of Syrians fleeing such violence have sought shelter within the region, an 
increasingly evident number of Syrians have sought asylum within the European Union. Paling in 
comparison to the millions of Syrians hosted throughout neighbouring countries, approximately 
55,000 Syrians have applied for asylum within the EU since the conflict began nearly three years ago. 
Although discussion of the broader implications of the conflict is most imperative, the following 
section will focus on how the EU and its MS have managed the phenomenon of Syrians seeking 
protection within the EU, the evolution of such phenomenon, and how the EU and MS are addressing 
Syrian asylum-seekers within the EU as well as those Syrians who attempt to reach safety within EU 
borders.  
3.2. Numbers and Trends of Syrian Asylum-Seekers in the EU, 2011-2013 
For decades, Syrians have sought protection outside their homeland due to human rights violations, 
oppression, and, most recently, civil war. Preceding the present-day civil war, between 1985 and 2010 
over 63,000 Syrians sought asylum in the EU, with the majority fleeing to Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Cyprus. Germany and Sweden have a particular history of Syrian immigration. In 
addition to receiving the most Syrian asylum-seekers (before and after the civil war), both countries 
also had the largest resident populations of Syrians when compared to other MS, and comparatively 
more Syrians were granted citizenship within these countries, demonstrating the impact of established 
Diasporas on inflows of asylum-seekers (Table 19).  
Similar to the Iraqi crisis, the vast majority of Syrians searching for asylum in industrialised 
countries (before and after the civil war) did so within the European Union. According to the available 
UNHCR data, between 2011 and 2012, the EU received 85% of all Syrian asylum claims lodged in the 
industrialised world (or 28,270 applications out of 33,260) (Graph 3). Looking at Eurostat data, nearly 
55,000 Syrians have applied for asylum within the EU since the beginning of the conflict until August 
2013 (see Graph 5 in Annex for explanation of asylum applications counted). By far, Germany and 
Sweden have received the bulk (nearly 18,000 and 15,500, respectively), constituting 61% of the EU’s 
total (Tables 20 and 23, and Graph 4).  
Over the last ten years, approximately 4,000-5,000 Syrians have annually lodged asylum claims 
within EU MS (see Annex), and the conflict has clearly increased a movement that existed pre-2011.In 
comparison with levels seen in 2010, numbers of Syrians applying for asylum within the EU in 2011 
clearly elevated - reaching nearly 8,000 applications in 2011 compared with 5,000 in 2010 – with the 
majority filed in Germany (3,440), Sweden, Belgium and the UK also received noticeable increases, 
and nearly every MS witnessed an increase of Syrian asylum seekers throughout 2011. Against the 
trend, Denmark observed numbers almost cut in half (from 820 in 2010 to 470 in 2011), and France 
witnessed a marginal decrease (from 200 to 120) (Table 20).  
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Graph H. Distribution of Syrian Asylum Claims in Main Receiving EU MS,  
March 2011-August 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
Drastically escalating the following year, overall numbers of Syrian asylum applications in the EU 
tripled in 2012, with over 24,000 Syrians filing asylum claims in EU MS. Again, Germany and 
Sweden received the majority – with nearly 8,000 Syrians each, constituting 66% of the EU’s total – 
followed by the UK, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark. Dramatic increases were observed in almost 
every MS: Sweden witnessed over a 12-fold increase in arrivals (from 640 in 2011 to over 7,900 in 
2012), and Germany saw numbers double. Comparatively smaller in number, other MS also witnessed 
drastic increases: Poland and Romania saw numbers raise by seven and ten-fold, respectively; 
Bulgaria and France saw numbers increase five-fold; the Czech Republic, and Cyprus
144
 saw a tripling 
in applications; and numbers doubled in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the 
UK (Table 21).  
Demonstrating a progressively intensifying humanitarian situation, Eurostat monthly data shows 
that MS witnessed numbers strongly increase over the year, particularly after spring 2012. For 
instance, during the first half of 2012, Sweden received over 1,200 Syrian arrivals; yet, during the 
second half, Sweden received nearly 7,000. Likewise, Germany received over 2,800 in the first half of 
2012, and over 5,100 in the second half. This stark comparison between the first and second halves of 
2012 can be seen in most MS (Table 21).  
In 2013, the situation has not abated, and in fact the EU is on course to receive higher arrivals of 
Syrian asylum-seekers this year than last. While there was a slight drop in monthly arrivals towards 
the end of 2012 due to the depletion of sur place applications,
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 within the first eight months of 2013 
virtually the same number of Syrians applied for asylum in the EU as did in 2012, with almost 24,000 
applications. Sweden and Germany are clearly the main receivers – with nearly 7,000 each – followed 
by the Netherlands and Bulgaria (both of which were not main receivers in 2012), and the UK and 
Denmark. During the first eight months, numbers doubled in Spain and the Netherlands, and Bulgaria 
and Hungary saw numbers of Syrian asylum applications triple, while most other MS have not yet 
reached 2012 levels (Table 22).  
Receiving 61% of the EUs total, Germany and Sweden are clearly the main receivers of Syrian 
asylum applications. Not only do both countries share historical patterns of Syrian immigration, 
perhaps serving as a pull-factor for Syrians fleeing the current crisis,
146
 both countries have also 
implemented generous protection policies that could further contribute to the increases seen.  
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In addition to Syrian Diasporic links in Germany,
147
 German authorities have suspended rejections 
of asylum applications filed by Syrian nationals and generally grants subsidiary protection to persons 
who were not politically active in Syria.
148
 Sweden has taken a unique action by granting permanent 
residence status to all Syrians currently holding temporary residence permits (approximately 8,000 
Syrians), in addition to facilitating Syrian family reunification.
149
 However, as seen in the Iraq case, 
Sweden’s generous protection policy could have encouraged an increase in asylum claims, as Sweden 
received more than 4,500 Syrian asylum applications in only seven weeks between September and 
October,
 150
 more than at any other time – notably, preceding the Swedish Migration Board’s decision 
in the beginning of September to grant permanent residence permits to Syrians. Therefore, there is a 
potential correlation between the protection policy implemented in Sweden and the corresponding 
increase in Syrian asylum applications. 
Utilising a distinctive way to provide protection without using traditional asylum channels, in 
addition to high recognition rates for Syrian asylum-seekers in the UK, in 2012 the UK also began to 
provide the opportunity for lawfully present Syrians “to extend their stay (e.g., as a student) or swap 
immigration route (e.g., visitor to student).” 151  
Denmark, the fifth main receiver of Syrian asylum applications in the EU since the crisis began, 
has also decided to implement a protection policy for Syrian asylum-seekers. In September 2013, the 
Danish refugee appeals board, Flygtningenævnet, adjusted asylum rules so that Syrians from areas 
where civilians are in the most danger will no longer need to prove they are persecuted personally in 
order to seek asylum in Denmark.
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 It remains to be seen what impact this will have on the number of 
Syrians applying for protection in Denmark.  
Although not a traditional receiver of Syrian migrants and refugees, Bulgaria has become 
particularly overwhelmed with inflows of Syrian asylum-seekers, especially as Greek security 
operations have diverted Syrian flows to the Bulgarian-Turkish land border (discussed below). Indeed, 
while Bulgaria received only 60 Syrian asylum claims in 2011, and nearly 500 in 2012, in the first 
eight months of 2013 numbers of Syrian asylum claims tripled in Bulgaria (1,360) (Table 22). In 
September 2013, UNHCR noted that Bulgaria’s asylum centres were “bursting at the seams as Syrians 
enter Europe”153 (discussed below). 
Interestingly, although most Syrians were applying for asylum in EU MS, others were withdrawing 
their applications (or had their applications withdrawn due to abandonment of cases, etc.), as over 
1,300 Syrian asylum applications were withdrawn between March 2011 and August 2013. Although 
the most applications were withdrawn in the main receiving States, other MS with low arrivals also 
witnessed high withdrawals, for example Croatia (70) and Slovenia (55).
154
 Although the reasons for 
withdrawals are uncertain, perhaps, these Syrians found other avenues outside the asylum process to 
stay in the EU MS (e.g., by switching to worker or student visa status, or perhaps they left the EU 
altogether).  
3.3. Decisions on Syrian Asylum Applications in the EU, 2011-2013 
Remarkably, the EU as a whole granted a positive status to 85% of all decisions taken on Syrian 
asylum applications at a first instance within the EU. In other words, between January 2011 and June 
2013, 31,400 Syrian asylum-seekers out of 36,770 received a positive status throughout the EU (Table 
24). While EU MS granted Iraqi asylum-seekers varying recognition rates throughout the Iraqi crisis, 
EU Member States seem to be taking a more harmonised approach to the Syrian crisis regarding even 
distribution of high recognition rates. 
At first instance, EU MS granted a total of: 20,260 Syrians with subsidiary protection; 10,740 
Syrians with refugee status; and 370 with humanitarian status. The remaining applications - 5,340, or 
15% of all decisions – were rejected (Table 25).155 For the most part, the main receivers of Syrian 
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asylum-seekers were the main adjudicators, with Germany, Sweden, the UK, Denmark, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium making the most decisions.  
At a final decision, between 2011 and 2012 (2013 Eurostat data unavailable) MS made an 
additional 5,220 decisions on Syrian asylum applications, with a lower overall recognition rate of 66% 
(3,440) of Syrian asylum applications receiving a positive status. At a final decision, EU MS granted a 
total of: 1,790 Syrians with subsidiary protection (52%); 1,530 with refugee status (45%); and 150 
with humanitarian status (4%). The remaining 34%, or 1,760 Syrian asylum applications, were 
rejected at a final instance (Table 26). 
Graph I. First Instance Decisions on Syrian Asylum Claims in EU MS, January 2011-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
Although Bulgaria was one of the major receivers of Syrian asylum-seekers, Bulgaria made fewer 
first-instance decisions on Syrian asylum applications in comparison to other main receivers. Between 
January 2011 and June 2013, Bulgaria received 1,270 Syrian asylum applications, but made only 440 
first-instance decisions on Syrian asylum applications. France, in comparison, made twice as many 
first-instance decisions on Syrian asylum claims (850) than Bulgaria, even though it received nearly 
the same number of Syrian asylum applications (1,340). Likewise, Italy, which received 1,000 Syrian 
asylum applications during this time period, made 830 first-instance decisions. Neither were decisions 
carried over to the final decision process, as Bulgaria made only 10 decisions at a final-instance stage 
(Tables 23, 25 and 26).  
Lags in processing time for Syrian asylum applications have not only occurred in Bulgaria, but the 
phenomenon can be seen in Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Spain, amongst others, demonstrating that 
certain MS, especially those on the ‘front lines,’ may be less proficient in adjudicating asylum 
applications than other MS, perhaps due to backlogs of asylum cases and lack of resources,
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 and 
overburdening of asylum systems (as in Bulgaria, discussed below).  
If there is one commonality throughout the EU in regards to decisions taken on Syrian asylum 
applications, it is high recognition rates. At a first instance, across the board (with the exception of a 
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few), between January 2011 and June 2013, most EU MS had cumulative recognition rates above 
65%, and many MS had rates above 80% and 90%, even those with high arrivals. Remarkably, the UK 
had a cumulative recognition rate of 78%, granting 1,850 Syrians out of 2,380 with a positive decision 
(during the Iraqi crisis, the UK never granted higher than 33%). Outliers of the positive trend at a first 
instance were Greece (with a 4% recognition rate, 15 out 340 decisions) and Cyprus (5%, or 5 out of 
110 decisions), amongst others (Table 24). 
Although recognition rates were lower at a final instance, MS continued to grant the majority of 
final decisions on Syrian asylum claims (66%) with a positive status, as 3,440 out of 5,220 
applications were granted a positive status. Interestingly, some MS that granted lower rates at a first 
instance granted higher rates at a final instance; for example, between 2011 and 2012 Greece granted 
29% of Syrian asylum applications with a positive status, and Cyprus granted 13%.
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Another trend, revealed by EASO, shows that after a so-called ‘freeze’ period between July 2011 
and March 2012, whereby certain MS ‘froze’ processing of Syrian asylum applications until the 
situation became clearer (accept manifestly well-founded applications) recognition rates subsequently 
rose after April 2012 as the situation evolved into a civil war and “many applicants were recognised 
on the basis of the ongoing military/insurgent operations in line with Article 15 of the Qualification 
Directive” (although EASO does not mention which MS implemented such a freeze, see Table 24 for 
raising of recognition rates). However, according to EASO, there have been divergences in the 
application of the Common European Asylum System acquis, noting that certain MS were more 
inclined to grant subsidiary protection, and that Sweden and Germany granted mainly subsidiary 
protection based on Article 15 (b) rather than Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive.
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 A look at 
the statuses granted to Syrian asylum-seekers throughout the EU gives a clearer picture of such 
divergences.  
3.2.1. Subsidiary Protection – First and Final Instance 
At a first instance between January 2011 and June 2013, subsidiary protection was granted to 55% of 
Syrians granted a positive status in the EU, with Germany (8,840), Sweden (6,900), the Netherlands 
(1,060), and Belgium (1,310) granting the majority.  
Notably, some EU MS were more inclined to grant Syrians subsidiary protection as opposed to 
another positive status, as nearly all Syrians granted international protection at a first instance in 
Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Belgium were granted subsidiary protection (Table 25). Continuing this 
trend at a final instance between 2011 and 2012 the majority of Syrians granted a positive status in the 
EU were granted subsidiary protection, with Germany, Sweden and Austria granting the most. At a 
final instance between 2011 and 2012, 100% of Syrians granted a positive status in Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, and Sweden (92%) were granted subsidiary protection (Table 26).  
3.2.2. Refugee Status – First and Final Instance 
At a first instance between January 2011 and June 2013, refugee status was granted to 35% of Syrians 
granted a positive status in the EU, with Germany, Sweden, the UK, Denmark, and Austria granting 
the most of these decisions. Demonstrating the near certainty of Syrians being granted refugee status 
in certain EU MS, almost all Syrians granted a positive decision at a first instance in the UK and 
Denmark were granted refugee status (Table 25). At a final instance between 2011 and 2012, MS 
granted 1,530 Syrians with refugee status (45%). Nearly 100% of Syrians granted a positive status in 
Austria, Denmark, the UK, and France at a final instance were granted refugee status (Table 26). 
Christine Marie Fandrich 
26 
3.2.3. Humanitarian Protection – First and Final Instance 
Only 1% of Syrians granted a positive decision were given humanitarian status at a first instance 
between January 2011 and June 2013 (or 370 persons), with Malta (210) and the Netherlands (60) 
granting the majority (Table 25). At a final basis, 150 Syrians were granted humanitarian status (4%), 
with Germany (80), Sweden (40), and the UK (20) granting the most. Cyprus was most likely to grant 
humanitarian protection to Syrians at a final instance (Table 26).  
Graph J. First Instance Decisions on Syrian Asylum Claims in Denmark, showing the likelihood 
of Syrian asylum-seekers being granted refugee status in Denmark, January 2011-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. See Annex for detailed Tables.  
Although recognition rates for Syrian asylum applications were high throughout the EU, whether at a 
first or final instance, the above variation on statuses granted or not granted to Syrian asylum-seekers 
throughout the EU shows that an uneven adjudication of Syrian asylum claims exists, despite the EU 
Qualification Directive, and despite the severe (and seemingly analogous
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) situations of Syrian 
nationals applying for asylum within the European Union. Addressing this issue, in August 2012, the 
European Commission gathered a network of relevant EU agencies and stakeholders (so-called ‘SY 
NET’) in order to better monitor the developments taking place on the ground as well as the situation 
at the border and in the asylum systems across Europe.
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 Moreover, in June 2013 the Commission 
declared that it would “continue – together with the European Asylum Support Office – discussions 
with the Member States on the situation of Syrians in the EU, with a view to ensuring a greater degree 
of convergence between Member States' approaches to the treatment of Syrian asylum seekers, 
particularly regarding the assessment of their asylum claims.”161Even though in December 2013 the 
revised EU Qualification Directive will enter into force, attempting to harmonise the content of 
protection granted to asylum-seekers (regardless of status), thereby slightly decreasing the differences 
between protection statuses granted to Syrians (and others), huge differences still persist. Even after 
the recast, MS still have discretion over the validity periods of residence permits and the access to 
social assistance for refugees and those with subsidiary protection, and therefore some differences 
between statuses persist. For instance, Syrians (and others) granted refugee status would be granted a 
residence permit for three years, whereas those granted subsidiary protection would be granted a 
residence permit for one year.
162
 In the end, Syrians who are granted refugee status (with the high 
likelihood of being granted this status in the UK and Denmark), would have residence permits with 
longer validity than those Syrians granted subsidiary protection (with a higher likelihood of being 
granted such status in Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Belgium).  
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In the end, and regardless of high recognition rates in the vast majority of MS, some Syrian 
asylum-seekers continue to ‘shop’ for asylum across the EU due to family ties and better economic 
opportunities (discussed below). 
3.4. Syrian Refugee Resettlement, ‘Humanitarian Admissions,’ and Relocation within the EU, 
2011-2013 
Only 80 Syrians were resettled into EU MS between 2011 and 2012 - all resettled in Sweden.
163
 In 
2013, however, MS have initiated increased Syrian resettlement or have pledged future resettlement 
slots for Syrian refugees, whether through established resettlement programs or through ‘humanitarian 
admissions’ programmes (whereby individuals receive temporary protection for the duration of the 
crisis). Relocation of Syrian asylum-seekers within the EU has also increasingly been viewed as a way 
to increase protection options for Syrian refugees.  
Making the largest commitment, Germany notified the UNHCR in March 2013, that it would 
implement a ‘humanitarian admissions pilot’ whereby 5,000 Syrian refugees, primarily from Lebanon, 
would be temporarily admitted to Germany with a residence permit for two years, with the possibility 
of renewal depending upon the situation in Syria.
164
 Selection criteria include: special humanitarian 
needs, existing family or other ties with Germany, or the ability to make a particular contribution to 
rebuilding Syria once the conflict is over.
165
 By the time of writing, over 300 Syrians have arrived in 
Germany through this programme.
166
 Several German states have also announced that they will permit 
up to 1,000 Syrian refugees to stay with their Germany-based relatives.
167
 Efforts by Germany run 
parallel to its refugee resettlement programme, which stipulates that 200 refugees from Syria will be 
resettled in 2013.
168
 
Regarding other MS, resettlement of Syrian refugees into the EU has advanced in 2013 for several 
reasons. For one, in June 2013, the UNHCR announced the ‘Syria Resettlement/ Humanitarian 
Admission Programme,’ which aims to facilitate Syrian refugee resettlement to Western countries. As 
for humanitarian admissions, the UNHCR initially seeks admission of 10,000 Syrian refugees “in 
order to facilitate the immediate protection of Syrian refugees,” primarily from Lebanon, but also from 
Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. It also provides for resettlement of an initial 2,000 Syrian refugees 
from the region.
169
 UNHCR is establishing a so-called ‘Core Group’ of resettlement countries to 
“promote multilateral and multiannual commitments to resettlement of Syrian refugees and to 
strategize ways to enhance the effectiveness of the programme.”170 Looking towards 2014, the 
UNHCR further proposed in October 2013 to submit up to 30,000 Syrian refugees for resettlement or 
humanitarian admission by the end of 2014, focusing upon the most vulnerable.
171
 
So far, seventeen countries have pledged to participate in the UNHCR Programme by receiving 
certain quotas of Syrian refugees, including 10 EU MS.
172
 In response to the UNHCRs appeal, Austria 
and France, amongst others, have each pledged to accommodate 500 Syrian refugees.
173
 In contrast, 
UK officials have stated they have: “no plans to resettle or provide temporary protections to Syrians 
within the UK.”174 
Following the UNHCRs appeal, in June 2013 the European Commission called upon Member 
States “to respond positively to this call by making resettlement or humanitarian admission places 
available” to Syrian refugees, signalling the EU’s first direct request to the MS to resettle Syrian 
refugees.
175
 Continuing this line of reinforcement, in October 2013, the European Parliament 
encouraged EU MS “to address acute needs through resettlement,” in addition to existing national 
quotas and through humanitarian admission, and to make use of the funds still available under the 
preparatory action / pilot project on resettlement.
176
 
As many MS are now engaging in ‘humanitarian admissions’ (or temporary protection) for Syrian 
refugees, and indeed as the crisis will eventually subside, potentially thousands of Syrians could see 
their statuses revoked (those with humanitarian protection, as well as others), begging the question 
Christine Marie Fandrich 
28 
what will happen once they are no longer offered protection within the EU - will they be granted 
‘tolerated stay,’ return home, become irregular migrants? As seen in the Iraq case, thousands of Iraqis 
lost protection, and many were rendered to living lives in ‘legal limbo.’ MS granting Syrian nationals 
with temporary protection should have a plan for dealing with a potentially large population of Syrian 
nationals who are revoked from such protection within the EU.  
Other potential efforts by the EU to encourage Syrian refugee resettlement include the EUs attempt 
to set up by the end of 2013 a ‘Regional Development and Protection Programme’ in the Levant.177 As 
opposed to other EU Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs),
178
 the proposed RPP to address the 
Syrian crisis intends to include a development component; whether or not the RPP also includes a 
refugee resettlement component (as other RPPs provide) is unknown, as the “the programme might 
[emphasis added] explore the scope for a resettlement scheme notably to the EU Member States.”179 
While the EU adopted a ‘Joint EU Resettlement Programme’180 in March 2012, Syrian refugees 
were not included in the 2013 prioritised countries for resettlement (as were Iraqis, discussed above) 
possibly due to the so-called ‘freeze’ on decisions about Syrian at this time (above), and it remains to 
be seen if in subsequent years the EU will prioritise Syrian refugee resettlement to EU countries 
voluntarily participating in this programme. However, the European Commission’s future Asylum and 
Migration Fund for the period 2014-2020
181
 includes a resettlement programme, which will perhaps 
increase such protection for Syrian refugees within the EU.
182
 Positively, more resettlement countries 
have also incorporated quota resettlement programmes into their migration systems, thereby 
conceivably also increasing the option of resettlement for Syrians in the future.
183
 
Relocation of Syrian refugees from one MS (particularly those on the ‘front-lines’) to another may 
also be increasingly utilised within the EU. In September 2013, the European Commission organised 
the first ever ‘Relocation Forum,’ where Syrian refugee relocation was described as “an important 
gesture of solidarity, especially in light of the present refugee crisis in Syria,”184 and that “relocation 
needs to be a central part of our toolbox in the framework of contingency planning [for the Syrian 
crisis]. Relocation can assist Member States that have a specific geographical reason for needing 
assistance, such as Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria.”185  
3.5. Syrian Irregular Entry and Stay within the EU, and Return of Syrians from the EU, 2011-2013  
As Syria’s neighbouring countries have become drastically overwhelmed by arrivals, and as more and 
more Syrians attempt to reach safe havens, the EU has consequently observed an increase in Syrian 
irregular migration as a result of the conflict. Indeed, the situation has warranted attention from the 
European Commission, and in 2013 a fact-finding mission was carried out by the Commission, EASO 
and Frontex in Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece, to monitor the potential migratory pressures coming, in 
particular, from Syria.
186
 
3.5.1. Irregular Entry  
Between January 2011 and June 2013, nearly 14,000 Syrians were detected illegally crossing EU land 
and sea borders, representing 5% of all migrants detected (or 13,550 out of 247,970). Throughout 
2012, nearly 8,000 Syrian nationals were detected crossing into the EU illegally – an increase of 389% 
when compared to 2011 (1,616 Syrian detections)
187
 - and in the first two quarters of 2013, over 4,000 
Syrian nationals were detected illegally crossing into the EU (Table 27).  
While most Syrian nationals were detected at the Greek-Turkish land border over this time 
period,
188
 several security operations carried out by Greece in the summer of 2012 led to the 
diversification of routes – notably via sea borders (Eastern Aegean Sea), the Bulgarian-Turkish land 
border, and other air routes (discussed below). These Greek operations included ‘Aspida’ (Shield), 
involving the deployment of 1,800 border guards to the Greek-Turkey land border, and ‘Xenios Zeus,’ 
focusing on apprehension and detention of irregular migrants within Greece, with an increased 
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detention sentence for those apprehended.
189
 (Since September 2013, however, Syrians in Greece are 
to be “detained for as long as it takes to verify their identity and then released, most of those with the 
means to do so move on to countries where they will have a better chance of receiving protection.”190) 
According to Frontex, “subsequent to increased operational activity at the Greek land border with 
Turkey, detections of Syrians fell significantly.”191 Undoubtedly affecting Syrian access to the EU via 
this route was also completion in December 2012, by Greece, of a border fence along the Greek-
Turkish border, which further reduced detections of illegal migrants.
192
 At the same time as Greece 
was restricting access, it planned to provide shelter on the islands of Crete and Rhodes for 20,000 
Syrian refugees.
193
  
Consequent to the near suture of the Greek-Turkish land border, Syrians attempting to illegally 
access EU territory were increasingly detected utilising three main alternative routes, by: 1) illegally 
crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to the Greek Islands; 2) crossing the land border from Turkey 
into Bulgaria;
194
 and 3) using fraudulent documents to fly from Istanbul to EU countries (while in the 
past Syrians attempted to use fraudulent documents to fly from Athens to EU countries).
195
  
Regarding access via sea borders, according to Frontex, “most detections of Syrian nationals 
shifted from the land border to the sea border with Turkey” following Greek security operations 
there.
196
 Indeed, between October 2012 and June 2013 more Syrians were detected attempting to cross 
illegally via sea borders than land borders, reversing the trend seen in previous years. Regarding 
Syrians crossing the East Aegean Sea illegally in 2013, Frontex noted that “all were heading for 
Germany and Sweden to claim asylum.”197 In response to the growing migratory pressure in the 
Eastern Aegean Sea, Frontex has strengthened the ‘Joint Operation (JO) Poseidon Sea with additional 
air and maritime surveillance. 
Graph K. Syrian Migrants Illegally Entering the EU via Land and Sea Borders,  
January 2011-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Frontex Data compiled from Frontex FRAN Quarterly Reports, 
Quarters Q1-2011 through Q2-2013. 
From Turkey, Syrians have also been traveling directly to Italy via the sea route. Between August and 
October 2013 alone, over 6,000 Syrians and Palestinians who were refugees in Syria arrived in Italy 
aboard 63 boats, compared to the 350 Syrians who came in all of 2012.
198
 Syrians have also recently 
been detected attempting to cross from Libya and Egypt via the Central Mediterranean Route, 
especially as inflows of Syrian refugees to Libya and Egypt have increased and as living conditions in 
these countries have become more complicated. However, sea routes are incredibly dangerous (as 
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most recently demonstrated by the Lampedusa crisis) - after departing from Libya, up to 300 people 
went missing after a boat carrying as many as 500 Syrians and Palestinians from Syria sank off the 
coast of Malta in October 2013; the same day, a boat of 112 passengers, including 40 Syrians, sank off 
Egypt's coast.
199
  
In light of the arrivals in Italy, in September 2013 Italy announced the extension of the Protection 
System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) whose capacity will increase from 3,000 to 
16,000 over the next three years.
200
 However, as UNHCR notes, an increasing number of persons 
(including Syrian nationals) avoid fingerprinting once in Italy, and try to reach other European 
countries in order to apply for asylum, reportedly due to poor reception conditions and integration 
prospects in Italy.
201
 
Concerning access via the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, detections of illegal border-crossing 
“immediately” increased as Syrians became “displaced by operational activity in Greece.” 202 The 
situation has drastically impacted the abilities of the Bulgarian authorities to address the humanitarian 
needs. Indeed, between January and October 2013, 6,400 immigrants crossed the Bulgarian border 
illegally, most of them from Syria, and the “influx is putting pressure on the country's limited 
resources for responding to mass immigration.” 203 Indeed, Bulgarian officials have said the country 
may have to provide shelter for as many as 11,000 Syrians by the end of the 2013.
204
 EASO and 
Bulgaria signed an Operating Plan in October 2013, providing for EASO support to Bulgaria until 
September 2014,
205
 perhaps alleviating some of the pressure on Bulgaria’s fledgling asylum system.  
Whereas Bulgaria may not have been an attractive option in the past,
206
 the country has 
increasingly become preferred for several reasons. In addition to Greek security operations, 
“Smugglers who used to lead migrants from Turkey into Greece are increasingly moving them to 
Bulgaria instead, in part due to the construction of a 10.5km fence at one of the most popular crossing 
points along the Turkish-Greek border.”207 The cheap price of crossing into Bulgaria (as opposed to 
Greece) from Turkey as well as the cheaper cost of living in Bulgaria may also attract Syrians to take 
this route.
208
  
Subsequent to the increase of detections, throughout 2012 the Bulgarian Border Guard Authority 
deployed additional border guards and equipment at the land border, including joint-border patrols 
with Turkey announced in September 2012,
209
 and since October 2012 it has initiated a specialised 
police operation, enhanced air surveillance at the Bulgarian –Turkish land border, and implemented an 
Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS).
210
 Furthermore, in October 2013 the government 
unveiled a plan to build a 30km fence along a stretch of the Bulgarian-Turkish border in response to 
the rising numbers,
211
 and entered agreed with Turkey to create a joint border committee to manage 
the flux of refugees from war torn Syria.
212
 Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon Land is supporting the 
Bulgarian authorities with the screening and debriefing of irregular migrants. In light of the unfolding 
tightening of border security, Bulgaria’s actions may well have the effect of Greece’s previous 
security measures – decreased access of Syrians (and other migrants) to EU territory – perhaps also 
consequently leading to sprouts of new access routes utilised by migrants and smugglers.  
Regarding entry by air, in 2012 Syrians were the most detected nationality on intra-Schengen 
flights with fraudulent documents (especially from Greece to EU airports, notably German, Belgian, 
and Dutch).
213
 Since the beginning of the Greek operation Aspida, however, Syrians were increasingly 
detected arriving from Istanbul rather than Athens, with the “significance of this route likely to 
increase in 2013 while the Greek operation Aspida is still active at the Greek land border with 
Turkey.
214
 In the second quarter of 2013, Syrians on flights from Turkey attempting to access EU 
territory illegally flew mainly to Sweden, Copenhagen, German and Italian airports.
215
  
Other less-traveled routes have also become increasingly utilised by Syrians attempting to enter the 
EU. In the last quarter of 2012, Syrians were actually returning (legally and illegally) from the EU to 
Turkey, perhaps to “facilitate more migrants…or to further another route to reach their final 
destinations.”216 Throughout 2012, Syrians were also among the top nationalities crossing the northern 
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end of the common borders (Finland and Norway) by Russian authorities, and Frontex claimed that a 
small proportion of irregular movements to the EU by Syrians are likely to use Ukraine, Belarus or the 
Russian Federation as transit points.
217
 Likewise, in the Western Balkans route, in 2012 detections of 
Syrians rose 17 times compared to 2011 - from 92 illegal border crossings in 2011 to 1,646 in 2012,
218
 
with most of the growth “linked to secondary movements….from Greece to other Member States.”219 
Moreover, in July 2013, the first detection of Syrians on the Black Sea in Romania occurred, 
demonstrating a shift in migratory patterns.
220
  
Not only have Syrians been detected illegally entering from third-countries into EU territory, but 
they have also been detected traveling across Schengen borders to reunite with family/friends and for 
so-called ‘asylum-shopping.’ For instance, even with high recognition rates in countries such as 
France and Italy, Syrians have been detected illegally crossing land or sea borders, whether from 
France to the UK or from Italy to Northern European countries. Indeed, Frontex revealed that Syrians 
utilise Italy as a first access point (mainly via sea) in order to travel to other EU countries (particularly 
France, Germany and the Netherlands), where they have relatives and friends, as their settlement in 
these countries “had already been arranged.”221 Authorities in France, Switzerland and Austria have 
sent back many refugees coming from Italy because they do not have travel documents.
222
 Recently, in 
France a group of Syrians attempted to cross into the UK from France as opposed to applying for 
asylum. Syrians chose the UK in order to be reunited with friends and family, and as according to the 
deputy mayor of a UK port city, Britain was a target for Syrian refugees because it was regarded as a 
"paradise" for people trying to start new lives. Furthermore, it was reported that smuggling networks 
have facilitated these movements, charging up to 11,800 euros per person to smuggle someone into 
Europe.
223
 
Although the EU Parliament, in October 2013, has called on MS to “explore all existing EU law 
and procedures for providing safe entry into the EU in order to temporarily admit Syrians fleeing their 
country” and noted that “legal entry into the EU is preferable to more dangerous irregular entry, which 
could entail human trafficking risks,”224 the security situation outlined above demonstrates that the 
Parliament’s request may be an increasingly challenging goal to achieve.  
3.5.2. Refusal of Entry 
Between 2011 and 2012 nearly 1,400 Syrian nationals were refused entry at the external borders of the 
EU, with France, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland and Italy refusing the most (Table 28). Syrian nationals 
were mainly refused entry at air borders (59%, or 810 Syrians), followed by sea (22%, 300) and land 
(18%, or 250). France, Poland, Belgium, and Cyprus refused the most Syrians at the air border when 
compared to other MS. Practically 100% of Syrians refused entry into France were refused at the air 
border (310 out of 330). Greece and Bulgaria refused the most Syrians at the land border, and 
Bulgaria, Italy, Estonia, and Romania refused the most at the sea border (Tables 29, 30 and 31). Over 
half of all refusals were due to Syrians not possessing valid visas or residence permits, and other main 
reasons included no valid travel documents, purpose and conditions of stay unjustified and false travel 
documents.
225
 In June 2013, however, the European Commission called on Member States to admit 
any Syrians arriving at the external borders of the Union,
226
 and therefore it remains to be seen 
whether this will have an impact on refusal of Syrian entries at EU borders.  
3.5.3 Syrians Illegally Present  
Between 2011 and 2012, over 22,400 Syrians were found to be illegally present within the EU. 
Numbers of Syrians illegally present in the EU rose slightly in 2011 when compared to 2010 (from 
4,100 to 5,370), but jumped dramatically in 2012 reaching over 17,000 Syrian nationals illegally 
present within EU territory.
227
 The majority were discovered in Greece (8,350), Germany (3,860), and 
Sweden (3,380) (Table 32). Most Syrians found to be illegally present within the EU were male (76%, 
or 17,030), with the majority between the ages of 18-34 (11,360).
228
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3.5.4. Returns of Syrians from the EU 
Between 2011 and 2012, Eurostat data shows that over 13,000 Syrians found to be illegally present 
within the EU were ordered to leave EU MS, and during the same timeframe over 2,000 were returned 
(Eurostat does not provide the county to which Syrian nationals were returned). Greece ordered over 
59% of Syrian return orders (7,810), followed by the UK, Belgium, Bulgaria, Sweden, and France 
(Table 33). Even though Greece ordered the majority of return orders, Cyprus implemented the most 
returns (420), followed by Sweden, Greece, the UK, Germany and Bulgaria and Romania (Table 34). 
According to the European Commission, currently “there seems to be a general consensus that Syrians 
present in the EU should not be returned to Syria,”229 and perhaps 2013 data will show a reduction in 
returns. Certain MS have also refrained from returning Syrians (and Palestinians from Syria) to other 
MS along Dublin regulations if it is known that these States cannot meet their obligations to asylum-
seekers under EU and international law.
230
 
4. Main Findings  
 Like the Iraq case, by far, the EU has been the main receiver of Syrian asylum-seekers in the 
industrialised world. The EU received 85% of all Syrian asylum applications lodged in 
industrialised countries between 2011 and 2012 (or 28,270 applications out of 33,260). Between 
March 2011 and August 2013, an approximate total of 55,000 Syrians applied for asylum within 
the EU. 
 Similar to the Iraq case, by far, the majority of Syrian asylum applications were filed in 
Germany and Sweden. Germany and Sweden received 61% of all Syrian asylum claims filed 
within the EU between March 2011 and August 2013 (or a total of 33,465 out of 54,965). 
 As was seen during the Iraqi crisis, the vast majority of Syrian asylum claims were filed in MS 
(particularly Germany and Sweden) which also had the largest Syrian Diasporas and histories of 
Syrian immigration within the EU, demonstrating the impact of established Diasporas on new 
inflows of Syrians to the EU.  
 As in the Iraqi crisis, there is a potential correlation between the policy implemented in an EU 
MS and the corresponding levels of asylum applications received. In the Syrian case, it seems 
likely that following Sweden’s decision in September 2013 to grant permanent resident status for 
all Syrian asylum-seekers in the country currently possessing a temporary residence permit, in 
addition to facilitating Syrian family reunification, could have increased the inflows of Syrian 
asylum-seekers to Sweden as the country received more than 4,500 Syrian asylum applications 
in only seven weeks between September and October 2013,
 
more than at any other time – 
notably, preceding the Swedish Migration Board’s decision to grant permanent residence permits 
to Syrians. 
 While EU MS granted Iraqi asylum-seekers varying recognition rates throughout the Iraqi crisis, 
EU Member States seem to be taking a more harmonised approach to the Syrian crisis regarding 
even distribution of high recognition rates. Remarkably, the EU as a whole granted a positive 
status to 85% of all decisions taken on Syrian asylum applications at a first instance. Although 
differences exist between the types of statuses granted to Syrian asylum-seekers in the EU, the 
majority of EU MS had high recognition rates for Syrian asylum-seekers. 
 Syrian asylum-seekers were more likely to be granted a certain protection status or were more 
likely to have their asylum claims rejected depending upon which MS their asylum claims were 
filed. As the above analysis shows, Syrians were more likely to be granted subsidiary protection 
(Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, refugee status (the UK and Denmark), or were more 
likely to face a rejection of their asylum claim (Greece and Cyprus) depending upon the MS 
where their asylum application was filed, despite the EU Qualification Directive, and despite the 
severe (and seemingly analogous
231
) situations of Syrian nationals applying for asylum within 
the European Union. Even though the new Qualification Directive enters into force in December 
A Comparative Study on the Asylum Landscapes within the EU following the Crises in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2013 
33 
2013, providing more equal rights to those granted a protection status within the EU, MS still 
have discretion with regards to the validity periods of residence permits and the access to social 
assistance, demonstrating that Syrians will likely have access to varying levels of rights 
depending upon which MS their asylum claim is filed.  
 Despite high recognition rates in the vast majority of MS, some Syrian asylum-seekers continue 
to ‘shop’ for asylum across the EU due to family ties and better economic opportunities. Even 
with high recognition rates in countries such as France and Italy, Syrians have been detected 
illegally crossing intra-Schengen land or sea borders, to seek asylum, in order to reunite with 
family/friends or to obtain better economic opportunities.  
 Calls from the UNHCR and the EU to resettle Syrian refugees have been instrumental in 
implementing large-scale, EU-wide refugee resettlement/humanitarian admissions programmes. 
 As MS are engaging in ‘humanitarian admissions’ (or temporary protection) for Syrian refugees, 
potentially thousands of Syrians could see their statuses revoked, as happened in the Iraq crisis. 
Likewise, as the Iraq crisis shows, Syrians granted any protection status could have their 
protection revoked, thereby raising the question, what will happen to such Syrians once they are 
no longer under protection? Indeed, Germany plans to admit 5,000 Syrians through humanitarian 
admission, and thousands more have been granted refugee status and subsidiary protection 
throughout the EU, begging the question what will happen once these Syrians are no longer 
offered protection within the EU - will they be granted ‘tolerated stay,’ return home, become 
irregular migrants (keeping in mind the tens of thousands of “missing” Iraqis within the EU)?  
 Compared to the Iraqi crisis, the EU has implemented new tools to address the Syrian refugee 
crisis including: by recommending a ‘Regional Protection Programme’ to address the situation in 
neighbouring countries, which uniquely has a development aspect, and which also might include 
a resettlement component; humanitarian admissions of Syrian refugees have been encouraged; 
the European Commission organised the first ever ‘Relocation Forum,’ where Syrian refugee 
relocation was promoted; the European Commission gathered a network of relevant EU agencies 
and stakeholders (so-called ‘SY NET’) in order to better monitor the developments taking place 
on the ground as well as the situation at the border and in the asylum systems across Europe.  
 Greek security operations ‘Aspida’ and ‘Xenios Zeus’ in the summer of 2012 led to the 
diversion of Syrian inflows to the EU to sea routes and the Bulgarian-Turkish land border. 
Indeed, since October 2012, more Syrians have been detected entering the EU via sea borders 
than land borders, reversing the historical trend witnessed in previous years. Moreover, once 
Greece tightened security at the Greek-Turkish land border, smugglers diverted to the Bulgarian-
Turkish land border. 
4. Recommendations 
The above analysis attempts to review the EUs approach to one refugee crisis in the Middle East (the 
2003 Iraq War and its aftermath) in order to apply lessons learned to the new crisis affecting the region 
(the 2011 Syrian civil war). While we have seen that major differences exist between the two conflicts, 
a comparative analysis shows that the EU: can utilise certain tools from previous conflicts in order to 
address the current conflict in Syria; prepare, to the extent possible, for future scenarios by studying 
the trajectory of previous refugee inflows to the EU and its MS; and to provide the best protection 
possible while at the same time protecting EU borders from those who may jeopardise protection for 
the individuals most in need. By drawing on the EUs experiences during the Iraqi crisis, as well as by 
analysing the current situation of Syrians applying for asylum within the EU, the following presents 
recommendations that the EU, MS and the relevant EU agencies could take in order to address 
protection needs of Syrians currently seeking safety within the European Union.  
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1. The EU could set a specific Syrian refugee resettlement goal, as was done during the Iraq 
crisis, and Syrian refugee resettlement could be prioritised through the EU Joint Resettlement 
Programme, or by the new Asylum and Migration Fund mechanism. As the Iraq crisis 
demonstrates, the EU has an influential voice when encouraging Member States to resettle refugees. In 
2008, the JHA encouraged the specific goal of resettling 10,000 Iraqi refugees throughout the EU, and 
following these conclusions several MS implemented ad-hoc programmes or increased resettlement 
for Iraqi refugees. In the Syrian case, although the MS are already participating in the UNHCRs Syria 
Resettlement/ Humanitarian Admission Programme, the EU could set a specific goal to resettle Syrian 
refugees, in-line and in addition to the UNHCR plan, as was done during the Iraqi crisis, to further 
encourage MS to engage in resettlement. Moreover, Iraqi refugee resettlement was prioritised in the 
EU Joint Resettlement Programme for 2013, and Syrian refugee resettlement could likewise be 
prioritised for 2014 through existing programmes, perhaps the new Asylum and Migration Fund 
(2014-2020).  
 
2. Emergency Transit Centres (ETC) for Syrian refugees could be created in Bulgaria and other 
EU MS, as was done during the Iraqi crisis, to encourage the direct resettlement of Syrian 
refugees. Although the EU has commendably utilised new tools to address the Syrian refugee crisis, it 
could also consider implementing certain tools that were utilised during the Iraqi crisis, like the 
Emergency Transit Centres. As noted by the UNHCR, the “ETC enables UNHCR to bring refugees to 
a safe place. In addition, resettlement countries can visit the facility to conduct interviews with 
candidates for resettlement under the best possible conditions. Medical examinations and treatment 
can be carried out and refugees can attend orientation workshops and language courses in order to 
prepare them for their future resettlement countries.”232 UNHCR and IOM assisted the EU in creating 
Emergency Transit Centres in Romania and Slovakia, and several joint missions by MS to these 
centres led to the direct resettlement of refugees from Iraq to EU MS. The EU could implement such a 
centre in Bulgaria (as the asylum system is overburdened by the influx of Syrians) and other MS, and 
joint missions to the centres could be taken in order to resettle Syrians throughout the EU. If MS are 
more inclined to provide humanitarian admissions, these types of selections could also be made at the 
ETCs.  
 
3. The European Commission could conduct a symposium with EU MS and the relevant EU 
agencies regarding Syrian refugees granted humanitarian admission to the EU (and the rights 
they are granted) as well other Syrians who potentially will have their protection statuses 
revoked to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, such persons from entering into a state of 
‘legal limbo’ or from becoming irregular migrants. As several MS are currently providing 
humanitarian admission (temporary protection) to Syrian refugees (indeed, Germany has pledged to 
offer 5,000 Syrians with humanitarian protection), and as the Iraq crisis shows that thousands of 
refugees and others with protection statuses can have their protection statuses revoked, a discussion 
could be had regarding how to deal with the thousands of Syrians granted temporary protection within 
EU MS, and other potentially likely to lose protection, once the crisis subsides and protection statuses 
are revoked. Of course, any plan will have to deal with the situation on the ground in Syria, which 
could end in the coming months or endure for over a decade like the Iraq crises. Yet, MS should be 
prepared to deal with Syrian refugees who may no longer be offered protection in the EU once the 
Syrian crisis subsides: will they be returned? be granted ‘tolerated stay?’ have chances to integrate into 
the host country? This discussion should also include how to bring individuals granted temporary 
protection status within the scope of application of the Qualification Directive and the Long-Term 
Residence Directive, so that Syrians and others are not brought to the EU within a framework that 
grants them substandard protection without access to the rights granted to others.  
 
4. In conjunction with increased Syrian refugee resettlement, if possible, measures could be 
taken to open legal channels for Syrians to the EU, for example, EU MS could operate outside 
traditional asylum channels by providing the opportunity for Syrians already in the EU to extend their 
stay (e.g., as a student) or swap immigration route (e.g., visitor to student) (as is done in the UK).  
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5. Pilot Return and Reintegration Study/Programme for Iraqi Nationals. Given the history of 
protection status revocation for thousands of Iraqis within the EU; given that some MS are currently 
granting ‘humanitarian admissions’ or temporary protection to Syrian refugees, and that in the future 
potentially thousands of Syrians may also have their protection statuses revoked; given the extreme 
difficulties in implementing voluntary and forced return of Iraqi nationals; given large numbers of 
“missing” Iraqis within the EU; given that the data within this current study is limited, the European 
Commission could conduct a study on the situation of Iraqi nationals currently facing deportation 
within the EU, those granted with ‘tolerated stay,’ the statuses of Iraqis after protection status 
revocation, the known state of Iraqis currently residing in the EU irregularly, as well as statistical data 
on the forced and voluntary return of Iraqi nationals from the EU, in addition to return and 
reintegration prospects once returned to Iraq or the region, and on the current successes and failures of 
Iraqi return programme throughout EU MS, in order to inform the process of return for the thousands 
of Syrian nationals (and other irregular Syrians, as this number has been increasing) who will most 
likely lose their protection status once the Syrian crisis subsides. The Commission could also design, 
with the most concerned MS, Frontex, and IOM a pilot EU-wide return programme for Iraqi nationals 
(as opposed to various programmes throughout MS), including forced and voluntary return depending 
upon the conditions on the ground, learning from the challenges and best practices already 
encountered by MS with large populations of irregular Iraqi nationals. This pilot could also serve as a 
basis for a future Syrian return programme. The EU, however, could negotiate with the Iraqi 
authorities, depending upon the security conditions on the ground, to respect the terms of the EU-Iraq 
Partnership agreement, and if the Iraqi government continues to refuse forced returns but accept 
voluntary returns, the EU, MS and the relevant EU institutions (in addition to IOM) could work 
together on this pilot project to see in which ways voluntary return can be encouraged. Indeed, 
according to Frontex, “experience has shown that efforts of Member States to return irregular migrants 
can be directly conducive to discouraging future migrant flows into and inside the EU.” By lessening 
the burden on MS due to the presence of irregular migrants, the European Commission could also 
encourage MS to widen the protection space for others in need, given that irregular migrants have 
been returned. 
 
6. Increased border security in a synchronized manner and higher penalties for human 
smugglers. As Frontex noted, there was an immediate shift in flows following the Greek operations 
Aspida and Xenios Zues - when one door closes (the Greek-Turkish land border) another door opens 
(via sea routes, flights from Istanbul using fraudulent documents, and the Bulgarian-Turkish land 
border). Indeed, Syrians have even been detected attempting to enter through less-traveled routes such 
as the through Russia, the Black Sea, and the Western Balkans. Therefore, the EU, Frontex and 
concerned MS could devise a plan for addressing border security in a synchronised manner, as 
opposed to concentrating on “troubled spots,” as the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) 
has. A synchronised approach could decrease the likelihood that flows will be diverted unexpectedly, a 
situation which burdens the asylum systems in these countries and renders these countries incapable of 
providing for persons in need of protection (for example, the current situation in Bulgaria).  
In addition to enhanced and synchronised border security (and indeed, along with a functioning return 
policy) the EU could enact stricter penalties on the smugglers and criminal networks currently 
facilitating the illegal entry of migrants into the EU. As seen above, the monetary incentive to engage 
in human smuggling is high. The punitive disincentive therefore must be equally substantial. Frontex, 
Europol, and the concerned MS could work together to apprehend smugglers, and the EU and MS 
could work together to impose stricter penalties on those apprehended. In addition, it could also work 
with top origin countries of smugglers and encourage them to dually implement stricter penalties 
against such criminals. The incentive for these countries to cooperate with the EU would be to develop 
a stronger deterrent so that smugglers would no longer use these territories due to the higher risks 
involved. A media campaign demonstrating the new penalties could also be carried out within the EU 
and in top origin countries to dissuade future smugglers.  
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Annex  
Graph 1. Total Iraqi Asylum Applications in the EU compared to Total Iraqi Asylum 
Applications in Industrialised Countries, 2000-2012
233
 
 
*Source: Data compiled from UNHCR Asylum Levels and Trends reports, 2002-2012. 
Table 1. Average Yearly Iraqi Population, Iraqi Asylum Applications, and Iraqis Granted 
Citizenship within the EU, Pre-2003 
Country 
 
 
 
Average Iraqi 
Population 
Per Year 
1998-2002 
Country 
 
 
 
Iraqi Asylum 
Applications 
between 1985-
2002 
Country 
 
 
 
Iraqis Granted  
Citizenship  
between  
1991-2002 
TOTAL  125,539 TOTAL 263,200 TOTAL  73,128 
Germany  54,680 Germany  80,030 Sweden 27,352 
Sweden 30,188 Netherlands 41,145 Netherlands 15,846 
UK 22,764 UK 40,480 UK 12,817 
Denmark 12,752 Sweden 36,795 Denmark 7,296 
Netherlands 10,268 Austria 20,600 Germany  6,107 
Greece 5,412 Denmark 16,500 Austria 1,453 
Finland 2,878 Greece 11,645 Finland 944 
France 2,864 Hungary 2,990 France 411 
Austria 1,293 Romania 2,490 Spain 337 
Italy 1,130 Spain 2,385 Belgium 322 
Spain 765 France 2,335 Romania 56 
Romania 741 Belgium 1,540 Italy 45 
Hungary 285 Slovakia 990 Hungary 39 
Belgium 235 Finland 920 Greece 32 
Bulgaria 234 Slovenia 750 Portugal 19 
Czech  188 Czech  630 Czech  16 
Portugal 156 Italy 390 Poland 13 
Poland 85 Poland 250 Cyprus 10 
Malta 29 Ireland 150 Slovenia 10 
Luxembourg 14 Bulgaria 85 Bulgaria 2 
Lithuania 5 Luxembourg 40 Slovakia 1 
Slovenia 4 Cyprus 15 Estonia 0 
Latvia 3 Estonia 15 Latvia 0 
Estonia 2 Portugal 15 Lithuania 0 
Cyprus : Lithuania 10 Luxembourg 0 
Ireland : Latvia 5 Ireland : 
Slovakia : Malta :  Malta : 
* Source: Data compiled from Eurostat (data not available for certain years or MS. See footnote, Table 3) 
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Table 2. Iraqi Asylum Applications in EU MS, 2003-August 2013
234
 
 
* Source: Data compiled from Eurostat  
  
GEO/TIME 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan.-Aug. 2013 TOTAL 2003-2013
Austria 4,473 1,445 230 220 380 470 500 395 345 485 495 230 5,195
Belgium 461 245 335 825 550 860 1,180 1,535 1,990 2,210 975 470 11,175
Bulgaria 946 205 40 45 65 530 350 305 450 345 325 175 2,835
Cyprus 21 30 90 145 130 200 155 0 340 50 5 0 1,145
Czech Republic 201 105 35 45 80 45 30 10 5 10 5 5 375
Denmark 1,032 440 215 265 520 1,070 560 310 235 130 125 60 3,930
Estonia : 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Finland 107 145 120 285 220 290 1,195 1,130 515 580 830 510 5,820
France 242 560 165 125 115 145 650 605 450 265 185 50 3,315
Germany 10,367 3,850 1,295 1,985 2,115 4,325 8,155 7,320 5,945 6,210 5,675 2,470 49,345
Greece 2,567 2,880 665 970 1,415 5,475 1,760 885 340 255 315 80 15,040
Hungary 2,006 350 35 20 70 135 130 55 50 55 30 35 965
Ireland 148 130 35 55 215 280 205 75 30 20 10 15 1,070
Italy : : : 320 : : 755 405 380 310 405 305 2880
Latvia : 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 10
Lithuania 6 0 0 5 0 0 5 15 5 5 5 0 40
Luxembourg 34 15 15 10 15 15 30 65 95 45 25 20 350
Malta 36 5 30 25 15 5 5 5 5 0 5 0 100
Netherlands 1,022 3,475 1,045 1,620 2,765 2,005 5,310 2,165 1,905 2,005 1,885 1,030 25,210
Poland 136 75 5 10 30 20 70 20 25 30 25 5 315
Portugal : 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 15
Romania 381 245 65 70 70 245 175 90 65 60 45 25 1,155
Slovakia 1,245 480 115 35 205 130 40 10 10 10 5 5 1,045
Slovenia 131 185 30 15 5 5 0 5 10 10 0 0 265
Spain 82 135 55 40 40 1,580 60 35 20 20 20 20 2,025
Sweden 5,447 2,700 1,455 2,330 8,950 18,560 6,325 2,310 1,995 1,640 1,345 865 48,475
United Kingdom 14,565 4,290 1,880 1,595 1,315 2,075 : 1,085 610 445 440 220 13,955
TOTAL 45,656 21,995 7,955 11,070 19,285 38,465 27,650 18,835 15,820 15,205 13,180 6,595 196,055
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Graph 2. Iraqi Asylum Applications filed in EU MS, March 2003-August 2013 
 
* Source: Data compiled from Eurostat  
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Table 3. Total Numbers of Decisions on Iraqi Asylum Applications in EU MS, 2003-August 
2013
235
 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
  
GEO/TIME2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan -Jun 2013 Total 
TOTAL 21080 17910 12370 16645 27805 32755 24345 15640 13930 11240 5495 199215
Germany 5275 3420 1690 1725 6820 7260 8850 6460 5200 4470 2400 53570
Sweden 1895 4740 3095 8645 12100 12340 4230 1785 1930 1030 555 52345
Netherlands 2110 1960 2765 2070 3325 4490 2255 2270 1885 760 23890
United Kingdom 7290 5095 2075 970 1615 1645 1510 925 455 325 200 22105
Greece 1985 825 1320 1850 4020 3990 905 145 235 170 95 15540
Belgium 160 215 320 460 : 1145 1180 1185 1500 1245 295 7705
Finland 45 60 100 95 280 420 710 1030 560 605 475 4380
Austria 195 205 175 145 310 495 375 385 390 445 180 3300
France 560 210 135 135 145 340 535 335 240 220 75 2930
Italy : : 305 : : 485 450 365 325 260 260 2450
Denmark 240 530 130 100 380 250 210 120 105 100 55 2220
Bulgaria 265 85 25 20 290 355 295 170 310 245 85 2145
Spain 55 140 25 25 1040 120 45 10 15 15 5 1495
Ireland 35 190 50 135 240 245 130 20 25 15 5 1090
Cyprus 10 0 10 60 135 0 165 280 225 70 25 980
Hungary 525 90 15 40 75 80 55 20 25 35 0 960
Romania 205 60 65 60 180 135 95 50 40 30 5 925
Poland 170 40 5 10 40 30 30 15 25 5 0 370
Slovakia 10 0 25 60 65 45 15 5 5 5 0 235
Luxembourg: : : : : 5 60 50 40 50 20 225
Czech Republic 30 10 5 20 60 40 5 20 5 5 0 200
Malta 15 25 30 10 5 5 5 5 0 5 0 105
Slovenia 0 10 0 10 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 35
Estonia 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Portugal 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 4. Total Positive Statuses Granted to Iraqi Asylum Applications in EU MS, 2003-June 
2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
Table 5. Total Rejected Iraqi Asylum Applications in EU MS, 2003-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
  
GEO/TIME2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan-Jun 2013 Total
TOTAL 6510 2305 4060 9315 17550 15090 11690 8205 7540 6045 3025 91335
Germany 570 90 80 190 5795 5815 5750 3445 2875 2780 1315 28705
Sweden 1095 245 1500 8160 9720 3830 1000 785 890 350 175 27750
Netherlands 1590 1255 1900 390 : 2225 1850 1225 1245 1205 555 13440
United Kingdom 2410 200 185 105 345 470 285 170 120 100 65 4455
Belgium 20 60 60 85 : 605 605 725 1145 305 115 3725
Finland 10 5 5 20 185 235 370 580 330 385 330 2455
Austria 145 130 130 90 215 395 285 255 295 335 135 2410
Italy : : 50 : : 425 355 295 215 240 200 1780
France 30 30 20 30 70 280 440 250 155 160 55 1520
Bulgaria 235 85 20 20 280 230 200 85 125 65 30 1375
Denmark 55 5 10 0 335 155 110 50 30 10 10 770
Cyprus 10 0 10 50 120 0 150 245 15 20 10 630
Hungary 240 45 10 25 70 55 35 10 5 10 0 505
Romania 40 30 25 30 105 95 80 20 25 20 5 475
Ireland 10 35 10 65 100 110 20 0 0 10 5 365
Greece 20 10 20 20 75 10 30 15 20 5 10 235
Spain 5 55 15 15 20 60 35 5 10 10 5 235
Czech Republic 10 5 0 10 50 30 5 15 5 5 0 135
Poland 0 10 0 10 20 30 25 10 25 0 0 130
Luxembourg: : : : : 0 50 15 10 20 5 100
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 40 35 10 5 0 5 0 95
Malta 10 10 10 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Slovenia 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GEO/TIME2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan-Jun 2013 Total
TOTAL 14580 15570 8305 7320 10255 17660 12660 7450 6405 5210 2465 107880
Germany 4705 3325 1610 1540 1025 1445 3100 3015 2325 1690 1085 24865
Sweden 800 4495 1595 485 2380 8510 3230 1000 1040 680 380 24595
United Kingdom 4880 4895 1890 865 1265 1175 1230 760 335 225 135 17655
Greece 1965 785 1300 1830 3950 3985 875 130 220 165 85 15290
Netherlands 525 705 865 1675 : 1100 2640 1030 1030 685 205 10460
Belgium 145 155 265 380 : 545 575 460 350 945 185 4005
Finland 35 55 95 75 100 185 345 450 230 220 145 1935
Denmark 185 525 120 100 45 95 100 75 75 90 45 1455
France 530 180 115 105 75 60 95 85 85 60 15 1405
Spain 50 85 10 10 1020 60 10 5 5 5 0 1260
Austria 50 80 50 50 95 95 90 130 100 110 45 895
Bulgaria 30 0 0 0 10 125 95 85 185 185 55 770
Ireland 25 155 45 70 140 135 110 20 25 5 0 730
Italy : : 250 : : 55 95 70 115 20 60 665
Romania 165 30 40 30 75 40 15 30 15 10 5 455
Hungary 285 40 5 10 5 25 20 10 20 25 0 445
Cyprus 0 0 0 10 20 : 15 35 210 55 5 350
Poland 170 30 5 0 15 0 5 5 5 0 0 235
Slovakia 10 0 20 60 20 10 0 5 0 0 0 125
Luxembourg: : : : : 0 10 35 30 30 15 120
Czech Republic 25 10 5 10 10 10 0 5 0 0 0 75
Malta 0 10 15 10 0 5 5 5 0 5 0 55
Slovenia 0 10 0 5 5 0 0 5 5 0 0 30
Estonia 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 6. Annual Recognitions Rates in the EU for Iraqi Asylum Applications, 2003-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
Table 7. Annual Recognition Rates in Selected EU MS for Iraqi Asylum Applications, 2003-2012  
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat.  
  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL
Total Decisions 21080 17910 12370 16645 27805 32755 24345 15640 13930 11240 193720
Total Positive Statuses Granted 6510 2305 4060 9315 17550 15090 11690 8205 7540 6045 88310
Recognition Rate (%) 31 13 33 56 63 46 48 52 54 54 46
GEO/TIME 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL
Austria Total Decisions 195 205 175 145 310 495 375 385 390 445 3,120
Austria Total Positive Decisions 145 130 130 90 215 395 285 255 295 335 2,275
Recognition Rate (%) 74 63 74 62 69 80 76 66 76 75 73
Belgium Total Decisions 160 215 320 460 : 1,145 1,180 1,185 1,500 1,245 7,410
Belgium Total Positive Decisions 20 60 60 85 : 605 605 725 1,145 305 3,610
Recognition Rate (%) 13 28 19 18 : 53 51 61 76 24 49
Bulgaria Total Decisions 265 85 25 20 290 355 295 170 310 245 2,060
Bulgaria Total Positive Decisions 235 85 20 20 280 230 200 85 125 65 1,345
Recognition Rate (%) 89 100 80 100 97 65 68 50 40 27 65
Cyprus Total Decisions 10 0 10 60 135 0 165 280 225 70 955
Cyprus Total Positive Decisions 10 0 10 50 120 0 150 245 15 20 620
Recognition Rate (%) 100 100 83 89 91 88 7 29 65
Denmark Total Decisions 240 530 130 100 380 250 210 120 105 100 2,165
Denmark Total Positive Decisions 55 5 10 0 335 155 110 50 30 10 760
Recognition Rate (%) 23 1 8 0 88 62 52 42 29 10 35
Finland Total Decisions 45 60 100 95 280 420 710 1,030 560 605 3,905
Finalnd Total Positive Decisions 10 5 5 20 185 235 370 580 330 385 2,125
Recognition Rate (%) 22 8 5 21 66 56 52 56 59 64 54
France Tota Decisions 560 210 135 135 145 340 535 335 240 220 2,855
France Total Positive Decisions 30 30 20 30 70 280 440 250 155 160 1,465
Recognition Rate (%) 5 14 15 22 48 82 82 75 65 73 51
Germany Total Decisions 5,275 3,420 1,690 1,725 6,820 7,260 8,850 6,460 5,200 4,470 51,170
Germany Total Positive Decisions 570 90 80 190 5,795 5,815 5,750 3,445 2,875 2,780 27,390
Recognition Rate (%) 11 3 5 11 85 80 65 53 55 62 54
Greece Total Decisions 1,985 825 1,320 1,850 4,020 3,990 905 145 235 170 15,445
Greece Total Positive Decisions 20 10 20 20 75 10 30 15 20 5 225
Recognition Rate (%) 1 1 2 1 2 0 3 10 9 3 1
Hungary Total Decisions 525 90 15 40 75 80 55 20 25 35 960
Hungary Total Positive Decisions 240 45 10 25 70 55 35 10 5 10 505
Recognition Rate (%) 46 50 67 63 93 69 64 50 20 29 53
Ireland Total Decisions 35 190 50 135 240 245 130 20 25 15 1,085
Ireland Total Positive Decisions 10 35 10 65 100 110 20 0 0 10 360
Recognition Rate (%) 29 18 20 48 42 45 15 0 0 67 33
Italy Total Decisions : : 305 : : 485 450 365 325 260 2,190
Italy Total Positive Decisions : : 50 : : 425 355 295 215 240 1,580
Recognition Rate (%) 16 : 88 79 81 66 92 72
Netherlands Total Decisions 2,110 1,960 2,765 2,070 3,325 4,490 2,255 2,270 1,885 23,130
Netherlands Total Positive Decisions 1,590 1,255 1,900 390 : 2,225 1,850 1,225 1,245 1,205 12,885
Recognition Rate (%) 75 64 69 19 : 67 41 54 55 64 56
Poland Total Decisions 170 40 5 10 40 30 30 15 25 5 370
Poland Total Positive Decisions 0 10 0 10 20 30 25 10 25 0 130
Recognition Rate (%) 0 25 0 100 50 100 83 67 100 0 35
Romania Total Decisions 205 60 65 60 180 135 95 50 40 30 920
Romania Total Positive Decisions 40 30 25 30 105 95 80 20 25 20 470
Recognition Rate (%) 20 50 38 50 58 70 84 40 63 67 51
Spain Total Decisions 55 140 25 25 1,040 120 45 10 15 15 1,490
Spain Total Positive Decisions 5 55 15 15 20 60 35 5 10 10 230
Recognition Rate (%) 9 39 60 60 2 50 78 50 67 67 15
Sweden Total Decisions 1,895 4,740 3,095 8,645 12,100 12,340 4,230 1,785 1,930 1,030 51,790
Sweden Total Positive Decisions 1,095 245 1,500 8,160 9,720 3,830 1,000 785 890 350 27,575
Recognition Rate (%) 58 5 48 94 80 31 24 44 46 34 53
UK Total Decisions 7,290 5,095 2,075 970 1,615 1,645 1,510 925 455 325 21,905
UKTotal Positive Decisions 2,410 200 185 105 345 470 285 170 120 100 4,390
Recognition Rate (%) 33 4 9 11 21 29 19 18 26 31 20
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Table 8. Variance of Recognition Rates Granted to Iraqi Asylum Applications in Selected EU 
MS, 2003-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat.  
Table 9. Total Iraqis Granted Refugee Status in EU MS, 2003-June 2013  
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
 
  
GEO/TIME 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Recognition Rate
Austria 74 63 74 62 69 80 76 66 76 75 100%
Belgium 13 28 19 18 : 53 51 61 76 24 90-99%
Bulgaria 89 100 80 100 97 65 68 50 40 27 80-89%
Cyprus 100 0 100 83 89 0 91 88 7 29 70-79%
Denmark 23 1 8 0 88 62 52 42 29 10 60-69%
Finland 22 8 5 21 66 56 52 56 59 64 50-59%
France 5 14 15 22 48 82 82 75 65 73 40-49%
Germany 11 3 5 11 85 80 65 53 55 62 30-39%
Greece 1 1 2 1 2 0 3 10 9 3 20-29%
Hungary 46 50 67 63 93 69 64 50 20 29 10-19%
Ireland 29 18 20 48 42 45 15 0 0 67 0-9% 
Italy : : 16 : : 88 79 81 66 92
Netherlands 75 64 69 19 : 67 41 54 55 64
Poland 0 25 0 100 50 100 83 67 100 0
Romania 20 50 38 50 58 70 84 40 63 67
Spain 9 39 60 60 2 50 78 50 67 67
Sweden 58 5 48 94 80 31 24 44 46 34
United Kingdom 33 4 9 11 21 29 19 18 26 31
GEO/TIME2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan-Jun 2013 Total
TOTAL 950 365 415 710 6785 8215 7395 4925 4455 3845 1830 39890
Germany 540 40 65 160 5760 5750 5540 3315 2780 2655 1215 27820
Sweden 20 5 15 185 155 680 290 535 560 195 115 2755
Belgium 20 60 60 50 : 335 305 300 475 285 95 1985
Austria 145 130 130 90 215 225 165 85 130 145 50 1510
France 30 30 20 15 45 245 420 245 155 155 55 1415
United Kingdom 85 10 5 45 210 250 125 80 65 65 55 995
Netherlands 10 15 45 25 : 180 200 130 125 130 75 935
Italy : : 20 : : 210 135 105 40 40 35 585
Finland 0 0 0 15 20 40 35 70 40 100 105 425
Ireland 10 35 10 65 100 110 20 0 0 5 5 360
Romania 20 15 20 30 105 80 25 15 25 15 5 355
Hungary 35 15 5 15 65 25 10 5 0 0 0 175
Greece 0 0 0 0 65 5 10 10 10 5 0 105
Luxembourg: : : : : 0 50 10 10 20 5 95
Denmark 15 0 0 0 0 15 35 5 0 5 5 80
Spain 5 5 5 10 20 10 15 0 0 0 0 70
Cyprus 0 0 10 0 5 : 0 5 15 15 5 55
Poland 0 0 0 0 5 30 0 5 15 0 0 55
Bulgaria 5 0 0 0 0 10 15 0 5 5 5 45
Czech Republic 5 0 0 5 15 10 0 5 5 0 0 45
Malta 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5
Slovenia 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 10. Total Iraqis Granted with Humanitarian Status (including Subsidiary Protection 
Status), 2003-2007 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
Table 11. Total Iraqis Granted Subsidiary Protection in EU MS, 2008-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
  
GEO/TIME2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL
TOTAL 5555 1940 3615 8620 10760 30490
Sweden 1075 240 1485 7980 9565 20345
Netherlands 1580 1245 1850 365 : 5040
United Kingdom 2325 190 180 65 135 2895
Bulgaria 225 85 20 20 275 625
Denmark 40 5 5 0 335 385
Hungary 210 35 5 10 5 265
Finland 10 5 5 10 165 195
Cyprus 10 0 0 50 115 175
Germany 30 50 20 30 35 165
Greece 20 10 20 20 10 80
Spain 0 45 10 5 0 60
France : 0 5 15 25 45
Czech Republic 0 0 0 5 35 40
Romania 20 15 5 0 0 40
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 40 40
Belgium : : : 35 : 35
Poland 0 10 0 10 15 35
Malta 10 5 5 0 5 25
Austria 0 : : : : 0
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland : : : : : :
Italy : : : : : :
Luxembourg : : : : : :
GEO/TIME2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan-Jun 2013 Total 
TOTAL 4630 3055 2610 2490 1575 725 15085
Sweden 2810 590 210 240 110 30 3990
Netherlands 470 985 740 835 700 195 3925
Finland 185 325 490 275 265 210 1750
Belgium 265 300 425 675 15 15 1695
Italy 200 205 155 130 160 150 1000
Austria 170 120 175 160 190 80 895
Bulgaria 220 185 85 120 60 20 690
Cyprus : 150 240 0 0 0 390
Denmark 125 50 15 10 5 0 205
Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG)20 30 25 15 30 15 135
Spain 55 20 5 5 5 5 95
France 30 20 5 0 5 0 60
Czech Republic 20 5 15 0 5 0 45
Poland 5 25 5 10 0 0 45
United Kingdom 10 5 15 5 10 0 45
Hungary 15 10 0 5 5 0 35
Slovakia 25 10 0 0 0 0 35
Greece 5 15 0 5 0 5 30
Romania 0 5 5 0 5 0 15
Ireland 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 12. Total Iraqis Granted Humanitarian Status in EU MS, 2008-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
Table 13. Total Positive Statuses Withdrawn from Iraqi Asylum-Seekers in the EU, 2008-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
  
GEO/TIME2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jan-Jun 2013 Total
TOTAL 2235 1245 660 575 610 445 5770
Netherlands 1575 665 350 280 370 285 3525
Sweden 340 120 45 90 45 35 675
Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG)45 180 105 80 95 85 590
United Kingdom 210 155 75 50 25 10 525
Italy 15 15 35 40 40 15 160
Denmark 15 25 25 20 0 5 90
Finland 5 10 20 15 20 5 75
Romania 15 50 0 0 0 0 65
Hungary 15 15 5 0 5 0 40
Cyprus : 0 0 0 5 5 10
Greece 0 10 0 0 0 0 10
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estonia : : : : : 0 0
Luxembourg 0 : : : : 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria : : : : : : :
Belgium : : : : : : :
Bulgaria : : : : : : :
France : : : : : : :
Ireland : : : : : : :
Latvia : : : : : : :
Lithuania : : : : : :
Portugal : : : : : : :
Slovenia : : : : : : :
GEO/TIME2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL
TOTAL 1050 3150 2870 640 130 7840
Germany 895 2345 1530 120 120 5010
Netherlands 30 400 855 : : 1285
Belgium 0 305 400 480 : 1185
Sweden 90 80 15 10 : 195
Slovakia 35 5 5 : : 45
Austria 0 5 15 20 : 40
Denmark : : 25 : : 25
France 0 5 5 0 5 15
Italy 0 5 10 0 0 15
Ireland 0 0 5 5 : 10
Romania 0 0 : 5 5 10
Hungary 0 0 5 : : 5
Bulgaria : 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus : 0 0 0 : 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 : : : : 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 : 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 : 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 : : 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 : 0 0
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom : : 0 0 0 0
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Table 14. Total Numbers of Iraqi Refugees Resettled into EU MS through Resettlement 
Programmes, 2003-2012 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total  
Belgium             30   0   30 
Denmark 5 4 n/a 1 119 40 15 5 0 5 194 
Finland 3 3 n/a 3 159 145 270 220 185 60 1,048 
France           165 365 170 70 20 790 
Germany             2,070 430 0 130 2,630 
Ireland 6 0 0 0 0 5 5 15 5 0 36 
Italy         n/a 0 0 0     0 
Lux.      
 
      30       30 
Neth. 5 4 0 * n/a 165 90 125 80 n/a 469 
Portugal         0 5 0 15 5 0 25 
Sweden 89 32 64 78 729 275 360 110 50 10 1,797 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 235 625 245 90 95 1,290 
Total  107 40 67 82 898 1,035 3,860 1,335 485 320 8,229 
*Source: Data from 2003 through 2007 obtained from national migration authorities.
 236
 Data from 2008 through 
2012 compiled from Eurostat. Shaded areas within table indicate absence of a resettlement programme.  
Table 15. Total Number of Iraqis Found to be Illegally Present in EU MS, 2008-2012 
GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL 
TOTAL 37345 23425 16680 12095 9290 98835 
France 14795 4785 3135 1605 890 25210 
Greece 7375 5685 4325 2515 2335 22235 
Germany  4715 4530 3060 3370 2680 18355 
UK 3810 2015 855 530 460 7670 
Sweden 15 1895 1645 1240 715 5510 
Finland 1560 1600 580 615 865 5220 
Italy 1890 610 485 190 145 3320 
Austria 665 460 460 470 430 2485 
Belgium 865 435 455 420 275 2450 
Netherlands 605 535 685 560 : 2385 
Bulgaria 430 270 530 310 315 1855 
Cyprus 220 190 125 70 40 645 
Spain 110 110 45 40 25 330 
Ireland 75 95 105 30 5 310 
Denmark 125 65 30 10 20 250 
Romania 20 40 40 50 30 180 
Czech  30 45 15 15 10 115 
Poland 15 20 30 15 30 110 
Hungary 10 5 45 5 : 65 
Slovakia 5 15 10 10 0 40 
Slovenia 0 5 10 0 10 25 
Lithuania 0 10 5 5 0 20 
Luxembourg : 0 0 15 5 20 
Portugal 5 0 5 5 0 15 
Latvia 5 5 0 0 0 10 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
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Table 16. Total Iraqis Ordered to Leave the EU by EU MS, 2008-2012 
GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL 
TOTAL 33905 24830 17225 10495 8890 95345 
Greece 15940 7660 4970 2515 2760 33845 
Sweden 2505 5720 3530 1340 985 14080 
Netherlands 2165 3915 2830 2500 1415 12825 
France 4525 2025 1510 670 405 9135 
UK 3810 2015 855 530 455 7665 
Belgium 1205 875 865 820 1275 5040 
Germany  670 840 745 770 565 3590 
Italy 1890 610 485 190 145 3320 
Bulgaria 430 270 530 310 315 1855 
Finland 200 465 495 330 190 1680 
Austria 275 150 165 200 90 880 
Spain 105 125 55 50 40 375 
Romania 55 50 55 55 55 270 
Hungary 40 35 70 50 30 225 
Denmark : : : 105 110 215 
Czech  40 20 15 10 5 90 
Poland 15 20 15 15 15 80 
Ireland 15 15 10 15 5 60 
Cyprus 15 10 0 10 : 35 
Slovenia 0 5 10 0 10 25 
Latvia 5 0 0 5 5 15 
Luxembourg : 0 0 : 15 15 
Lithuania 0 0 5 5 0 10 
Slovakia 0 5 5 0 0 10 
Portugal 0 0 5 0 0 5 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
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Table 17. Total Number of Iraqis Returned Following an Order to Leave by EU MS, 2008-
2012
237
 
GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL 
TOTAL 6035 8055 5945 4970 3975 28980 
Sweden 2425 3180 2215 1475 1075 10370 
UK 940 2030 785 465 455 4675 
Netherlands 480 685 670 995 515 3345 
Greece 220 320 680 595 530 2345 
Germany  655 585 420 305 290 2255 
France 380 430 550 225 195 1780 
Austria 305 240 140 150 105 940 
Finland 130 250 190 205 55 830 
Belgium 15 30 100 200 385 730 
Bulgaria 50 30 25 165 230 500 
Denmark 130 125 55 45 20 375 
Romania 50 40 45 55 70 260 
Italy 165 30 10 10 10 225 
Hungary 15 10 30 35 15 105 
Spain 25 20 0 5 5 55 
Ireland 15 10 10 10 5 50 
Poland 15 15 5 5 5 45 
Cyprus 5 10 5 15 : 35 
Slovenia 10 10 5 0 5 30 
Latvia 0 0 0 5 5 10 
Slovakia 0 5 5 0 0 10 
Czech 5 0 0 0 : 5 
Lithuania 0 0 0 5 0 5 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg : 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
Table 18. Iraqi Nationals Returned via IOM Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
(AVRR) Programmes (all programmes), 2000-2012 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 TOTAL 
TOTAL 
between 
2003-2012 
# of Iraqis 
Returned  5 14 16 541 2,075 1,952 2,921 939 2,000 2,748 2,347 2,667 2,472 
  
20,697  20,662 
*Source: Data compiled from IOM
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Table 19. Average Annual Syrian Resident Population in the EU, Syrians Acquiring Citizenship 
in EU MS, and Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS, Pre-2011 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Syrians 
Granted 
Citizenship 
between 
2002-2010 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
Average 
Yearly  
Resident  
Syrian  
Population 
1998-2010 
Country 
 
 
 
 
Total Syrian 
Asylum 
Applications 
in EU MS 
1999-2010 
 
TOTAL 28,959 TOTAL  3,314 TOTAL 63,420 
Germany  10,679 Germany  1,928 Germany  22,270 
Sweden 7,956 Sweden 554 Sweden 9,325 
UK 2,791 Greece 508 Netherlands 8,505 
France 2,074 Belgium 321 Cyprus 6,075 
Belgium 1,740 Spain 254 Greece 3,525 
Netherlands 684 Italy 206 Austria 3,250 
Spain 652 Cyprus 167 Belgium 2,960 
Italy 480 Austria 160 UK 2,265 
Austria 352 UK 113 Denmark 2,185 
Denmark 293 Denmark 97 France 670 
Romania 206 Netherlands 81 Spain 395 
Cyprus 202 Hungary 63 Hungary 290 
Poland 199 Czech  41 Czech  280 
Greece 152 Poland 18 Finland 280 
Finland 113 Slovakia 17 Italy 240 
Hungary 111 Finland 17 Romania 225 
Bulgaria 72 Ireland 7 Slovakia 215 
Czech 69 Luxembourg 3 Bulgaria 175 
Ireland 52 Latvia 3 Ireland 115 
Slovakia 46 Lithuania 2 Poland 70 
Malta 19 Slovenia 2 Malta 50 
Portugal 13 Bulgaria 1 Luxembourg 20 
Lithuania 2 Estonia 1 Estonia 10 
Luxembourg 2 Malta 1 Latvia 10 
Estonia 0 France : Lithuania 10 
Latvia 0 Portugal : Slovenia 5 
Slovenia 0 Romania : Portugal 0 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat (data not available for certain year or MS) 
Graph 3. Total Syrian Asylum Applications in the EU Compared to Total Syrian Asylum 
Applications in Industrialised, 2003-2012 
 
 
*Source: Data compiled from UNHCR Asylum Levels and Trends reports, 2002-2012. 
Graph 4. Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS, March 2011-August 2013
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*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat  
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Table 20. Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS, Mach 2011-December 2011  
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat (accessed 17 October 2013) 
Table 21. Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS, 2012  
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat (accessed 17 October 2013) 
  
GEO/TIME 2011M03 2011M04 2011M05 2011M06 2011M07 2011M08 2011M09 2011M10 2011M11 2011M12 TOTAL
Austria 30 35 20 40 35 40 45 75 35 45 400
Belgium 25 40 50 75 65 75 50 55 45 70 550
Bulgaria 5 0 5 5 10 10 15 5 0 5 60
Croatia : : : : : : : : : :
Cyprus 5 5 10 10 10 10 35 45 25 15 170
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 5 15
Denmark 30 30 20 35 15 45 45 50 65 55 390
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 5 0 5 5 5 15 10 10 5 35 95
France 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 25 15 20 110
Germany 205 200 310 245 300 370 420 345 375 315 3,085
Greece 30 10 20 15 70 20 45 20 25 30 285
Hungary 10 10 0 5 0 5 5 15 30 5 85
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
Italy 10 40 25 15 25 60 20 20 15 25 255
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 15
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Malta 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 70 25 10 120
Netherlands 5 10 5 20 15 20 25 35 30 15 180
Poland 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 10
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 30
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5
Spain 5 0 5 0 5 25 40 5 0 5 90
Sweden 40 50 45 50 50 50 65 65 75 80 570
United Kingdom 20 10 25 30 65 65 70 50 70 90 495
TOTAL 435 450 555 560 690 830 920 910 845 835 7,030
GEO/TIME 2012M01 2012M02 2012M03 2012M04 2012M05 2012M06 2012M07 2012M08 2012M09 2012M10 2012M11 2012M12 TOTAL
Austria 60 65 35 70 80 65 90 95 90 115 110 60 935
Belgium 60 55 40 55 55 75 70 95 85 165 130 145 1,030
Bulgaria 15 5 10 5 20 20 25 40 50 120 50 95 455
Croatia : : : : : : : : : : : :
Cyprus 30 15 30 50 50 30 55 75 80 60 55 35 565
Czech Republic 5 5 5 0 5 0 5 5 5 25 10 0 70
Denmark 70 45 95 50 50 60 105 105 65 75 95 65 880
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5
Finland 20 5 20 5 15 15 15 15 30 25 10 10 185
France 35 30 45 45 35 25 45 55 50 80 85 105 635
Germany 310 395 335 535 635 610 795 835 820 965 1,055 640 7,930
Greece 10 40 10 10 15 10 20 10 30 55 45 20 275
Hungary 10 10 0 5 10 5 15 15 10 20 40 10 150
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 10
Italy 15 10 15 10 15 15 40 25 50 35 90 40 360
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 15
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5
Malta 10 5 10 10 10 0 5 0 20 25 15 35 145
Netherlands 20 30 15 15 30 30 25 30 100 110 105 70 580
Poland 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 5 40 30 20 105
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 0 5 0 20
Romania 5 5 0 15 15 25 10 60 25 25 40 25 250
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 10 5 5 35
Spain 20 20 10 5 10 30 25 25 30 30 25 20 250
Sweden 155 155 155 165 235 360 640 1,150 1,325 1,255 1,160 1,160 7,915
United Kingdom 70 50 70 65 85 70 125 130 200 160 140 140 1,305
TOAL 920 945 900 1,120 1,370 1,460 2,115 2,785 3,090 3,395 3,305 2,705 24,110
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Table 22. Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS, January 2013 – August 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat (accessed 17 October 2013) 
Table 23. Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS, January 2013 – August 2013 
GEO/TIME 
 
 
 
March 
2011-
January’ 
2011 
2012 
 
 
 
January 
2013-
August 
2013 
TOTAL 
 
 
 
Austria 400 935 715 2,050 
Belgium 550 1,030 590 2,170 
Bulgaria 60 455 1,360 1,875 
Croatia  : : 110 110 
Cyprus 170 565 260 995 
Czech 15 70 45 130 
Denmark 390 880 875 2,145 
Estonia 0 5 5 10 
Finland 95 185 55 335 
France 110 635 685 1,430 
Germany 3085 7,930 6,970 17,985 
Greece 285 275 300 860 
Hungary 85 150 480 715 
Ireland 5 10 30 45 
Italy 255 360 425 1,040 
Latvia 15 15 10 40 
Lithuania 0 0 5 5 
Luxembourg 5 5 15 25 
Malta 120 145 150 415 
Netherlands 180 580 1,180 1,940 
Poland 10 105 190 305 
Portugal 0 20 65 85 
Romania 30 250 670 950 
Slovakia 5 0 5 10 
Slovenia 5 35 55 95 
Spain 90 250 475 815 
Sweden 570 7,915 6,995 15,480 
UK 495 1,305 1,105 2,905 
TOTAL 7,030 24,110 23,825 54,965 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
GEO/TIME 2013M01 2013M02 2013M03 2013M04 2013M05 2013M06 2013M07 2013M08 TOTAL
Austria 125 100 85 95 90 125 95 : 715
Belgium 155 75 60 75 70 70 85 : 590
Bulgaria 90 50 185 100 115 200 110 510 1,360
Croatia 25 15 25 15 20 5 5 : 110
Cyprus 30 55 30 30 60 30 25 : 260
Czech Republic 10 5 5 5 10 5 5 : 45
Denmark 110 70 80 95 85 120 165 150 875
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Finland 5 10 5 15 5 5 10 : 55
France 80 110 125 90 95 90 95 : 685
Germany 1,105 750 585 765 785 810 1,070 1,100 6,970
Greece 35 45 65 50 30 35 40 : 300
Hungary 40 45 80 65 80 95 75 : 480
Ireland 5 10 10 0 5 0 0 : 30
Italy 70 55 85 40 45 60 70 : 425
Latvia 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 : 10
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5
Luxembourg 0 0 5 0 0 5 5 : 15
Malta 10 15 40 20 0 30 35 : 150
Netherlands 115 105 130 130 130 165 195 210 1,180
Poland 50 15 20 10 15 35 35 10 190
Portugal 5 10 5 45 0 0 0 : 65
Romania 70 60 80 85 95 80 140 60 670
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 : 5
Slovenia 15 5 0 0 15 15 5 0 55
Spain 45 80 35 60 55 80 70 50 475
Sweden 1,025 755 775 720 780 740 1,000 1,200 6,995
United Kingdom 160 135 130 160 125 170 225 : 1,105
TOTAL 3,380 2,580 2,645 2,670 2,720 2,970 3,570 3,290 23,825
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Table 24. Recognition Rates for Syrian Asylum Applications (First Instance) in EU MS, Jan 
2011-June 2013 
GEO/TIME 2011Q1 2011Q2 2011Q3 2011Q4 2012Q1 2012Q2 2012Q3 2012Q4 2013Q1 2013Q2 TOTAL 
Austria 70 65 145 145 160 170 195 280 250 270 1,750 
Total Positive Decisions 35 45 110 110 150 145 180 265 205 240 1,485 
Recognition Rate % 50 69 76 76 94 85 92 95 82 89 85 
Belgium 75 30 5 10 5 40 150 430 465 70 1,280 
Total Positive Decisions 40 10 5 5 5 40 135 415 450 50 1,155 
Recognition Rate % 53 33 100 50 100 100 90 97 97 71 90 
Bulgaria 10 0 10 30 15 30 30 10 105 195 435 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 5 5 20 20 10 100 195 355 
Recognition Rate % 0 : 0 17 33 67 67 100 95 100 82 
Croatia : : : : 0 5 5 0 0 0 10 
Total Positive Decisions : : : : 0 5 5 0 0 0 10 
Recognition Rate %   : : : : 100 100 : : : 100 
Cyprus 20 20 15 0 20 10 5 0 5 15 110 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Recognition Rate % 0 0 0 : 25 0 0 : 0 0 5 
Czech Republic 5 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 10 40 70 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 35 50 
Recognition Rate % : : : : : 0 100 100 50 88 71 
Denmark 150 105 165 155 110 200 170 320 200 220 1,795 
Total Positive Decisions 55 80 125 105 90 165 150 280 160 190 1,400 
Recognition Rate % 37 76 76 68 82 83 88 88 80 86 78 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Recognition Rate % : : : : : : 0 : : : 0 
Finland 5 5 10 15 25 35 55 50 65 50 315 
Total Positive Decisions 5 5 5 15 15 30 50 45 55 45 270 
Recognition Rate % 100 100 50 100 60 86 91 90 85 90 86 
France 10 5 15 25 25 90 80 180 105 315 850 
Total Positive Decisions 5 0 10 25 25 80 65 170 95 305 780 
Recognition Rate % 50 0 67 100 100 89 81 94 90 97 92 
Germany  465 165 170 185 360 3,430 1,785 2,180 2,350 2,070 13,160 
Total Positive Decisions 100 35 145 150 280 3,355 1,720 2,115 2,230 1,990 12,120 
Recognition Rate % 22 21 85 81 78 98 96 97 95 96 92 
Greece 25 40 40 45 70 45 15 20 25 15 340 
Total Positive Decisions 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 15 
Recognition Rate % 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 33 4 
Hungary 0 15 0 5 30 15 10 20 20 50 165 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 5 15 10 5 15 10 35 95 
Recognition Rate % 0 0 0 100 50 67 50 75 50 70 58 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 5 0 10 5 10 20 50 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 5 10 20 45 
Recognition Rate % : : : : 0 : 100 100 100 100 90 
Italy 40 35 30 25 40 70 25 80 75 410 830 
Total Positive Decisions 20 15 20 15 40 60 25 70 70 125 460 
Recognition Rate % 50 43 67 60 100 86 100 88 93 30 55 
Latvia 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 5 5 5 25 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 5 5 5 25 
Recognition Rate % : : : 100 100 : : 100 100 100 100 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Recognition Rate % : : : : : : : : : 100 100 
Luxembourg 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 15 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Recognition Rate % 0 : : 0 : 0 : : : : 0 
Malta 0 0 5 40 90 25 0 0 105 95 360 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 5 40 90 25 0 0 105 90 355 
Recognition Rate % : : 100 100 100 100 : : 100 95 99 
Netherlands 30 25 20 15 0 10 340 270 310 340 1,360 
Total Positive Decisions 5 10 0 5 0 0 325 260 270 295 1,170 
Recognition Rate % 17 40 0 33 : 0 96 96 87 87 86 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 15 25 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 15 25 
Recognition Rate % : : : : : : : 100 100 100 100 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 : 0 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 : 0 
Recognition Rate % : : : : : : : : : : 0 
Romania 0 0 5 0 5 35 55 75 : : 175 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 20 30 70 : : 120 
Recognition Rate % : : 0 : 0 57 55 93 : : 69 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 10 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 
Recognition Rate % : : : : 0 : : : 100 : 50 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 25 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Recognition Rate % : : : : 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 5 0 5 0 0 5 10 0 20 50 95 
Total Positive Decisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 45 65 
Recognition Rate % 0 : 0 : : 0 0 : 100 90 68 
Sweden 100 95 145 190 180 340 1,200 2,750 2,785 2,930 10,715 
Total Positive Decisions 10 10 45 75 115 295 1,135 2,545 2,340 2,545 9,115 
Recognition Rate % 10 11 31 39 64 87 95 93 84 87 85 
United Kingdom 45 45 90 175 220 175 340 420 465 400 2,375 
Total Positive Decisions 10 10 35 95 120 130 300 375 435 340 1,850 
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Recognition Rate % 22 22 39 54 55 74 88 89 94 85 78 
Total Decisions 1060 650 875 1070 1375 4745 4495 7110 7390 7580 36350 
Total Positive Decisions 290 220 505 655 960 4380 4160 6655 6580 6575 30980 
Total Recognition Rate 27 34 58 61 70 92 93 94 89 87 85 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat 
Table 25. Decisions on Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS at a First Instance, January 2011-
June 2013  
Country/ 
Decisions 
 
Total 
Decisions 
 
Total 
Positive 
Decisions 
Total 
Subsidiary 
Protection 
Total Refugee 
Status 
 
Total 
Humanitarian 
Status 
Total 
Rejected 
 
Austria 1750 1485 505 975 0 275 
Belgium 1280 1155 890 265 : 120 
Bulgaria 435 355 355 0 : 85 
Croatia 10 10 10 0 : 0 
Cyprus 110 5 0 0 5 105 
Czech  70 50 50 0 0 10 
Denmark 1795 1400 145 1240 10 390 
Estonia 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Finland 315 270 155 125 0 45 
France 850 780 305 475 : 70 
Germany  13160 12120 8840 3260 15 1055 
Greece 340 15 10 5 0 325 
Hungary 165 95 65 0 20 75 
Ireland 50 45 5 35 : 5 
Italy 830 460 210 230 15 360 
Latvia 25 25 25 0 : 0 
Lithuania 5 5 5 0 : 0 
Luxembourg 15 0 0 0 : 10 
Malta 360 355 150 5 210 0 
Netherlands 1360 1170 1055 60 55 185 
Poland 25 25 15 10 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 : 0 
Romania 175 120 55 65 0 55 
Slovakia 10 5 0 0 5 0 
Slovenia 25 0 0 0 : 20 
Spain 95 65 60 5 0 30 
Sweden 10715 9115 6895 2205 10 1590 
UK 2375 1850 40 1780 20 525 
TOTAL 36350 30980 19845 10740 365 5340 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat.  
Due to Eurostat’s rounding of data, some discrepancies may exist. 
Table 26. Decisions on Syrian Asylum Applications in EU MS at a Final Instance, January 2011-
June 2013  
Country/ 
Decisions 
Total 
Decisions 
Total 
Positive 
Decisions 
Total 
Refugee 
Status 
Total 
Subsidiary 
Protection 
Total 
Humanitarian 
Status 
Total 
Rejected 
Austria 430 345 340 5  : 90 
Belgium 50 0 0 0  : 50 
Bulgaria 10 10 0 10  : 0 
Croatia 15 10 0 10  : 0 
Cyprus 120 15 5 0 10 105 
Czech  35 20 0 20 0 15 
Denmark 405 200 185 20 0 205 
Estonia 0 0 0 0  : 0 
Finland 25 25 5 15 5 0 
France 105 95 80 10  : 10 
Germany  1820 1295 535 695 75 525 
Greece 35 10 0 10 0 25 
Hungary 25 10 5 10 0 5 
Ireland 5 0 0    : 5 
Italy 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 0  : 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0  : 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0  : 0 
Malta 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Netherlands 5 0 0 0 0 5 
Poland 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0  : 0 
Romania 205 130 65 70 0 65 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0  : 0 
Spain 30 0 0 0 0 30 
Sweden 1460 975 45 895 40 485 
UK 425 295 265 15 15 135 
TOTAL 5220 3435 1530 1785 145 1760 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat.  
Due Eurostat’s rounding of data, some discrepancies may exist. 
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Table 27. Total Syrian Migrants Detected Illegally Entering the EU Compared to Total 
Migrants Detected Illegally Entering EU (Land and Sea Borders), January 2011-June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Frontex Data compiled from Frontex FRAN Quarterly Reports, Quarters Q1-2011 
through Q2-2013. 
Graph 6. Syrian Migrants Illegally Entering the EU via Land and Sea Borders, January 2011-
June 2013 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Frontex Data compiled from Frontex FRAN Quarterly Reports, Quarters Q1-2011 
through Q2-2013. 
Table 28. Syrian Nationals Refused Entry to the EU (land, sea, and air borders), 2011-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat.  
 
 
  
Q1-11 Q2-11 Q3-11 Q4-11 Q1-12 Q2-12 Q3-12 Q4-12 Q1-13 Q2-13 TOTAL
Total Migrants 32,923 41,237 38,530 28,325 13,635 23,095 22,093 13,613 9,717 24,805 247,973
Total Syrian Migrants 126 274 602 614 715 2,024 3,923 1,241 1,248 2,784 13,551
GEO/TIME 2011 2012 TOTAL  
Austria 10 0 10 
Belgium 15 75 90 
Bulgaria 60 150 210 
Cyprus 40 35 75 
Czech  10 5 15 
Denmark 5 5 10 
Estonia 40 0 40 
Finland 0 0 0 
France 60 265 325 
Germany 15 15 30 
Greece 45 75 120 
Hungary 15 10 25 
Ireland 5 10 15 
Italy 50 50 100 
Latvia 0 15 15 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 
Malta 0 5 5 
Netherlands 15 10 25 
Poland 15 95 110 
Portugal 0 0 0 
Romania 25 35 60 
Slovakia 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 10 10 
Spain 10 10 20 
Sweden 0 0 0 
UK 30 30 60 
TOTAL  465 905 1370 
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Table 29. Syrians Refused Entry at the Air Borders of the EU, 2011-2012  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat.  
 
Table 30. Syrian Nationals Refused Entry at the Land Border, 2011-2012  
GEO/TIME 2011 2012 TOTAL  
Austria 10 : 10 
Belgium : : :  
Bulgaria 15 45 60 
Cyprus 0 0 0 
Czech Republic : :  : 
Denmark : :  : 
Estonia 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 
France 0 5 5 
Germany  : : : 
Greece 35 65 100 
Hungary 10 10 20 
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy : : 0 
Latvia 0 10 10 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg : :  : 
Malta : :  : 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Poland 0 15 15 
Portugal : :  : 
Romania 0 5 5 
Slovakia 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 10 10 
Spain 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 
UK 10 5 15 
TOTAL  80 170 250 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. 
  
GEO/TIME 2011 2012 TOTAL  
Austria 0 0 0 
Belgium 15 75 90 
Bulgaria 5 10 15 
Cyprus 40 35 75 
Czech Republic 10 5 15 
Denmark 5 5 10 
Estonia 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 
France 55 255 310 
Germany  15 15 30 
Greece 10 5 15 
Hungary 5 5 10 
Ireland 0 5 5 
Italy 30 15 45 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 
Malta 0 5 5 
Netherlands 10 10 20 
Poland 15 80 95 
Portugal 0 0 0 
Romania 5 10 15 
Slovakia 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 
Spain 10 10 20 
Sweden 0 0 0 
UK 15 15 30 
TOTAL 245 560 805 
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Table 31. Syrian Nationals Refused Entry at the Sea Border, 2011-2012  
GEO/TIME 2011 2012 TOTAL 
Austria : :   
Belgium 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 40 95 135 
Cyprus 0 0 0 
Czech Republic : : :  
Denmark 0 0 0 
Estonia 40 0 40 
Finland 0 0 0 
France 0 5 5 
Germany  0 0 0 
Greece 5 0 5 
Hungary : : :  
Ireland 0 0 0 
Italy 20 40 60 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg : :   
Malta 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 
Romania 15 20 35 
Slovakia : : :  
Slovenia 0 0 0 
Spain 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 
UK 5 10 15 
TOTAL 125 170 295 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. 
Table 32. Syrian Nationals Found to be Illegally Present within EU MS, 2011-2012 
GEO/TIME 2011 2012 TOTAL  
Austria 445 850 1,295 
Belgium 100 265 365 
Bulgaria 110 510 620 
Cyprus 845 735 1,580 
Czech Republic 20 25 45 
Denmark 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 10 10 
Finland 70 165 235 
France 230 845 1,075 
Germany  1,300 2,555 3,855 
Greece 1,275 7,070 8,345 
Hungary 20 : 20 
Ireland 5 20 25 
Italy 55 105 160 
Latvia 0 20 20 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 5 5 
Malta 15 35 50 
Netherlands 35 : 35 
Poland 20 20 40 
Portugal 0 5 5 
Romania 60 70 130 
Slovakia 5 10 15 
Slovenia 0 55 55 
Spain 40 70 110 
Sweden 415 2,965 3,380 
UK 305 625 930 
TOTAL 5,370 17,035 22,405 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. 
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Table 33. Syrian Nationals Found to Be Illegally Present in the EU Issued with an Order to 
Leave by EU MS, 2011-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. 
Table 34. Syrians Returned by EU MS, 2011-2012 
 
*Source: Data compiled from Eurostat. 
  
GEO/TIME2011 2012 TOTAL 
TOTAL 3595 9630 13225
Greece 1275 6535 7810
UK 305 625 930
Belgium 325 405 730
Bulgaria 110 510 620
Sweden 320 290 610
France 185 320 505
Germany 195 95 290
Cyprus 275 : 275
Netherlands 150 110 260
Romania 75 125 200
Austria 85 105 190
Denmark 70 115 185
Hungary 75 100 175
Italy 55 105 160
Spain 40 55 95
Slovenia 0 55 55
Malta 15 35 50
Czech Republic 10 10 20
Finland 15 5 20
Poland 10 5 15
Estonia 0 10 10
Latvia 5 5 10
Luxembourg: 5 5
Slovakia 0 5 5
Ireland 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0
GEO/TIME2011 2012 TOTAL 
TOTAL 1195 1000 2195
Cyprus 415 : 415
Sweden 140 200 340
Greece 155 60 215
UK 95 100 195
Germany 90 95 185
Romania 65 90 155
Bulgaria 45 105 150
Austria 55 80 135
France 50 75 125
Hungary 25 50 75
Netherlands 20 45 65
Slovenia 0 50 50
Malta 5 25 30
Belgium 15 5 20
Estonia 0 10 10
Italy 10 0 10
Latvia 5 5 10
Denmark 0 5 5
Finland 5 : 5
Czech Republic 0 : 0
Ireland 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0
Spain 0 0 0
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asylum or humanitarian protection is unlikely to be appropriate in these cases.” UK Home Office. (12 February 2007). 
Operation Guidance Note – Iraq. Retrieved from 
 http://www.refworld.org/category,POLICY,UKHO,,IRQ,46028d432,0.html  
52 Full text of the case KH (Article 15(c) Qualification Directive) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00023 available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce40,50ffbce45d,47ea3e822,0,GBR_AIT,CASELAW,.html  
53 European Parliament. (2007). European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the humanitarian situation of Iraqi 
refugees. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aZkNrn  
54 ECRE. (October 2008). The Impact of the EU Qualification Directive on International Protection. Retrieved from 
http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/ECRE_QD_study_full.pdf  
55 “The current policy of Finland is that the natives of the so called disputed areas (the Governorates of Ninewa, Kirkuk, 
Diyala and Salah Al-Din), Baghdad and Governorates of Al-Anbar and Babel are granted subsidiary protection pursuant 
to Art. 15 lit. c of the Qualification Directive, unless they are considered able to internally relocate elsewhere in Iraq. We 
are currently reassessing our policy.” EMN. (2 October 2013). Ad-Hoc Query on Asylum seekers from Iraq. Retrieved 
from http://bit.ly/1an53fm  
56 Ibid.  
57 “Covering persons granted authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons under national law concerning international 
protection by administrative or judicial bodies. It includes persons who are not eligible for international protection as 
currently defined in the first stage legal instruments but are nonetheless protected against removal under the obligations 
that are imposed on all Member States by international refugee or human rights instruments or on the basis of principles 
flowing from such instruments. Examples of such categories include persons who are not removable on ill health grounds 
and unaccompanied minors.” (Eurostat) 
58 “A third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the 
case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious 
harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.” (Eurostat) 
59 European Migration Network. (July 2012). Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration in the Netherlands. 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/16A7A8I  
60 Ramboll and EurAsylum. (March 2013). Study on the situation of third-country nationals pending return/removal in the 
EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1iHtiKn  
61 Refers to “decisions to grant refugee status within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967.” (Eurostat)  
62 Human Rights Watch. (10 July 2007). Germany: End efforts to strip Iraqis of refugee status. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/09/germany-end-efforts-strip-iraqis-refugee-status  
63 Sperl, M. (2007). Op. cit.  
64 ECRE. (2008). Five Years on Europe is still ignoring its responsibilities towards Iraqi refugees. Retrieved from 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47e1315c2.pdf.  
65 According to Eurostat, at first instance, between 2008 and 2012, 7,840 Iraqis had their protection statuses withdrawn - 
mostly refugee status. Germany (5,010), the Netherlands (1,290) and Belgium (1,185) withdrew the most statuses. 
Germany withdrew almost exclusively refugee status, while Belgium withdrew only subsidiary protection (Eurostat data 
does not include information for the Netherlands as to status withdrawn). At a final basis between 2008 and 2012, 
approximately 1,350 Iraqis had their protection statuses withdrawn, almost entirely by Germany (1,300) and almost 
entirely refugee status (1,320). Data compiled from Eurostat.  
66 Meaning those “persons who have been granted an authorisation to reside in a Member State within the framework of a 
national or Community resettlement scheme, where such a scheme is implemented in that Member State and relates to the 
Art.4.3(g) of the Regulation. Resettlement means the transfer of third country nationals or stateless persons on the basis 
of their need for international protection and a durable solution to a Member State, where they are permitted to reside 
with secure legal status.” (Eurostat)  
67 In March 2007, UNHCR established 11 priority resettlement profiles to help process prioritised resettlement to third 
countries and declared that Iraqis fleeing from Central and Southern Iraq were entitled to prima facie refugee status. See 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=45f80f9d2&query=iraqi%20refugees  
68 European Parliament. (10 July 2007). Op. cit.  
69 For more information, see: Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development. (n.d.). 
Political Report 2009 [France]. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1bSrYBQ  
70 ECRE. (2008). Op. cit. 
71 According to the European Commission: ‘These conclusions are significant, not only with respect to the protection 
granted to the specific refugees resettled, but also because they underscore the fact that resettlement contributes to the 
maintenance of the protection situation in Syria and Jordan.’ European Commission. (2 September 2009). 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Establishment of a Joint EU 
Resettlement Programme. Retrieved from 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0447:FIN:EN:PDF  
72 For more information, see: Schneider, J. and Parusel, B. (July 2009). Op. cit. The German Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees “regard the resettlement of Iraqi refugees in Germany as a success and support resettlement as a measure of 
Christine Marie Fandrich 
62 
                                                                                                                                                                     
quick humanitarian help in the future, where appropriate in the framework of ad-hoc measures.” EMN. (March 2010). 
Annual Policy Report 2009 – Germany. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aYc3nm  
73 IRC and ICMC. (May 2010). 10,000 Refugees from Iraq: A Report on Joint Resettlement in the European Union. 
Retrieved from http://www.icmc.net/pubs/10000-refugees-iraq 
74 ECRE (2008). Op. cit. 
75 Ibid.  
76 For example, see European Resettlement Network – Italy Profile at: http://www.resettlement.eu/country/italy or IRC and 
ICMC. (May 2010) (Op. Cit.).  
77 IOM. (July 2010). IOM Assists Refugees to Relocate from Malta to France. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/173mC9B During 
Phase I (2011) there were 227 persons total relocated. During Phase II (2012), 356 places were pledged. See: EASO. 
(July 2012). EASO Fact-Finding Report on Intra-EU Relocation Activities from Malta. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/HCgbPD  
78 EASO. (July 2012). Op. cit.  
79 EU MS voluntarily participate in the Programme, and agree to receive certain groups of refugees targeted for 
resettlement, and consequently MS resettling these groups receive financial incentives (lump sums) from the European 
Refugee Fund. Specific common EU priorities for 2013 include: Congolese refugees in the Great Lakes Region; 
Refugees from Iraq in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan; Afghan refugees in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran; Somali refugees in 
Ethiopia; Burmese refugees in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand; Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan. For more 
information, see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage/highlights/refugee-resettlement-priorities-for-2013?lang=en 
80 In 2012, during ‘Operation Iskandar’ Italian authorities dismantled a criminal network involved in the smuggling of Iraqi 
migrants through Syria, Iran and Turkey heading for Italy, Germany, Switzerland, France, the UK and Scandinavia, and it 
was found that over 1,500 migrants had been smuggled by the network. “The investigation established that the criminal 
organisation was responsible for the illegal immigration of more than 1500 people. Financial investigations established 
that they earned about $12.5 million. Each of the migrants, after having paid the amount of about 8000 euro to the 
representative of the cell active in Kurdistan, was sent to a base in Turkey before they were smuggled into Greece. From 
Greece the journey was continued to Italy, mainly by the use of motorboats and occasionally by air.” For more 
information, see: http://bit.ly/1aYp2W1  
81 Numbers quoted from the Greek General Secretariat of Public Order, found in: Hellenic Migration Policy Institute. (April 
2008). Estimate of the illegal immigrant population in Greece. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/17HVbR8  
82 This data was provided by Frontex via email request on the number of detections of illegal border crossings for Iraqi 
nationals. Numbers of detections of Iraqi illegal border-crossings from 2008 through 2012 are: 8,944; 4,179; 3,628; 
1,364; 1,218; 127, respectively. 
83 “Third country nationals found to be illegally present: Third country nationals who are detected by Member States' 
authorities and have been determined to be illegally present under national laws relating to immigration (see Art. 2.1 (r) 
and 5.1(b) of the Council Regulation (EC) no 862/2007). This category relates to persons who have been found to have 
entered illegally (for example by avoiding immigration controls or by employing a fraudulent document) and those who 
may have entered legitimately but have subsequently remained on an illegal basis (for example by overstaying their 
permission to remain or by taking unauthorised employment).Only persons who are apprehended or otherwise come to 
the attention of national immigration authorities are recorded in these statistics. These are not intended to be a measure of 
the total number of persons who are present in the country on an unauthorised basis. Each person is counted only once 
within the reference period.” http://bit.ly/HQ1PL0  
84 Data compiled from Eurostat.  
85 “For the past 15 years, IOM has been providing voluntary return assistance to and from Iraq and its immediate region, 
assisting over 1 million individuals.” http://bit.ly/1a30RVj ; currently, IOM implements over 40 AVRR projects within 
26 EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland. Between 2008 and 2010, AVRRs assisted over 53,000 migrants to 
return to approximately 160 countries, and Brazilian, Serbian and Iraqi nationals represented the major nationalities. 
“Besides the assistance of migrants whose asylum claim was not successful there has been a significant increase in the 
number of migrant beneficiaries outside the asylum system and are living in an irregular and vulnerable situation in the 
host country. Very often AVRRs is seen by this category of migrants as an alternative to a possible deportation or forced 
return by the authorities of the respective host country.” IOM. Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) in 
the EU. Retrieved from http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/avrr_in_the_eu.pdf  
86 For example, see: Human Rights Watch, UK: Forced Return of Asylum-Seekers to Iraq; UNHCR, UNHCR concerned at 
planned forced return from Sweden to Iraq; Amnesty International, Sweden Must Stop Forced Returns to Iraq; Refugee 
Studies Centre – Oxford, Iraq’s refugees – beyond ‘tolerance’; and ECRE, ECRE’s Guidelines on Iraq, 2007 ; amongst 
others.  
87 European Parliament. (12 July 2007). Op. cit. Additionally, in January 2011, the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that returning asylum-seekers to Greece violates the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
88 As the ECHR struggled to cope with a 4,000% increase of such applications between 2006 and 2010, the Court’s 
President, Jean-Paul Costa, affirmed that the court was not Europe’s immigration and asylum “appeal tribunal” and 
where “national immigration and asylum procedures carry out their own proper assessment of risk and are seen to operate 
fairly and with respect for human rights, the Court should only be required to intervene in truly exceptional cases.” Even 
as late as June 2013, the ECHR was still making judgements regarding Rule 39 cases and Iraqis who faced deportation, 
this time ruling that certain applicants in Sweden (who had been in the country for five years in most cases) “in particular 
A Comparative Study on the Asylum Landscapes within the EU following the Crises in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2013 
63 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that, if removed to Iraq, the applicants would not be at risk as a result of the general situation in the country which was 
slowly improving.” For more information, see: http://bit.ly/1anan2c ; and http://bit.ly/igREji ; and http://bit.ly/1hdHIX5  
89 “Assisted voluntary return programmes assist those (mainly illegal immigrants) who agree to return (mainly to their 
country of origin) on their own admission. Usually, travel costs are borne out by the returning government, and voluntary 
returnees receive a monetary or other benefit for reintegration. The monetary and other assistance provided by voluntary 
return programmes are often incentives to encourage return.” Moreover, “Assistance in return is an important stimulus 
for voluntary return. Former asylum seekers without residence permits who wish to return voluntarily to their country of 
origin may receive assistance in building up an existence. The alien may return voluntarily with a financial contribution 
or in-kind assistance (such as further training or assistance in setting up a business) or with a combination of both.”EMN. 
(May 2012). Annual Policy Report 2011- Migration and Asylum in the Netherlands. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1bSx7dd  
90 Overall, the European Migration Network noted that the most prominent nationalities using Assisted Return in the EU 
were from Brazil, China, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey and 
Ukraine. For more information, see: http://bit.ly/1czPOHC  
91 “Rejected asylum seekers willing to return to Iraq could join a competence enhancement programme in Denmark and in 
their country of origin adapted to individuals’ situations and targeted at their finding employment or starting their own 
enterprises in their country of origin. These persons would also receive financial support on arrival in Iraq and assistance 
finding work or starting their own enterprises.” Ministry of Refugees and Immigrant Affairs. (June 2009). Report by the 
Committee of Experts on asylum rules of other countries. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/Hwv4Cs  
 “Since May 2007, rejected asylum seekers from Iraq in Denmark who cannot be forcefully returned are offered a 
reintegration contribution of approximately 2,013 Euros per adult and child, along with an accommodation supplement of 
approximately 2,013 Euros. An additional reintegration contribution of approximately 2,013 Euros per adult and 1,007 
Euros per child is paid after six months. The offer also includes 12 months’ vocational training, divided between the pre- 
and post return phase. In general, return assistance is not offered to forced returnees.” For more information, see: 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/484022172.pdf  
92 Throughout several years, the federal government, through its REAG/GARP Programme, has offered Iraqis (along with 
Afghanis and Kosovo minorities) higher benefits to return home when compared to the return benefits granted to other 
nationalities. Kreienbrink, A. (2007) Voluntary and Forced Returns of Third Country Nationals from Germany – 
Research Study 2006 in the framework of the European Migration Network. Retireved from http://bit.ly/19uvkMz See 
also: European Migration Network. (November 2011). Annual Policy Reports 2010 – Germany. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/1anb2Rp  
93 For example, in 2006, Sweden began to offer migrants from Iraq (along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and 
Somalia) a ‘special return assistance.’ In August 2007, Sweden introduced an economic reestablishment support for 
persons whose application for a residence permit was turned down. This support was established to “facilitate return to 
countries where the pre-conditions to be able to reestablish oneself are limited because of serious difficulties. Iraqis, 
Afghanis and Somalis returning voluntarily are among those eligible. However, during 2007 the interest for the support 
was limited. 102 applications were submitted. Of those only 17 were granted and given economic reestablishment 
support.” EMN. (May 2008). Annual Policy Reports 2006 – Sweden. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/173rZpc “From 
November 2008, Sweden increased the current reintegration allowance with 50 per cent. Those mainly eligible for the 
allowance are failed asylum seekers who opt for voluntary return and who are returning to countries with very limited 
preconditions for reintegration, for example Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan…During 2008, apx. 1,100 individuals, mainly 
Iraqi nationals, were granted the allowance.” EMN. (June 2009). Annual Policy Report 2008 – Sweden. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/HCisdq In 2009, however, Sweden expanded the nationalities eligible for the special reestablishment 
assistance.  
94 “In 2009, an added incentive was offered to Iraqi and Afghan nationals so that they could use extra reintegration 
assistance specifically for rebuilding homes that had been destroyed in the conflicts in those countries. This was a one-
year pilot programme which started on 1 September 2008 and ended on 31 August 2009.” EMN. (March 2010). Annual 
Policy Reports 2009 – United Kingdom. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aYiHKj  
95 IOM Helsinki Office. (2012). Developing Assisted Voluntary Return in Finland Return report on Iraq. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/1aYjdId  
96 ECRE. (2008). Op. cit.  
97 Ramboll and EurAsylum. (March 2013). Op. cit.  
98 “In 2012, a total of 6,324 people — most of whom were from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iraq, — left Greece 
with the IOM return programme, and a further 800 were repatriated by a scheme funded by Norway. Among them, about 
360 took part in resettlement programmes that included special assistance for opening businesses, or training, which were 
provided as an incentive to help them stay in their country.” Frontex. (2013). Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2013. 
Retireved from http://bit.ly/XTROn4  
99 In May 2009, following a Dutch initiative, the Temporary Desk on Iraq (TDI) was created “to determine how asylum and 
immigration services can improve their practical cooperation on protection, resettlement and return with regard to the 
Iraqi caseload and develop generic tools and mechanisms for dealing with other caseloads.” TDI MS included Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As a forum for discussing how to deal with one of the largest 
asylum-seeking populations in the European Union, the objectives of the TDI -in regards to Iraqi asylum applicants-was 
to: “set up parameters to identify and monitor differences in data related to Iraqi asylum applications; better understand 
the reasons for the differences in asylum data, applications and decisions; [and] develop tools to assist States who are 
faced with particular pressures.” EMN. (January 2010). Annual Policy Report 2009 – Policy report regarding asylum and 
Christine Marie Fandrich 
64 
                                                                                                                                                                     
migration Belgium. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1azTaJ7 Reported outcomes of the TDI in asylum were the production of 
reports on Iraqi asylum seekers in main receiving countries across Europe. Reports for Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Belgian Immigration Office. (n.d.). Tijdelijke Irak-Desk gehuisvest in gebouwen van Belgische asielinstanties. Retrieved 
from www.ibz.be/download/newsletter/tdi-nl.doc  
100 EMN. (January 2010). Annual Policy Report 2009 – Policy report regarding asylum and migration Belgium. Op. cit. 
“The UK provided expertise and resources to the returns element of the TDI, by specific country approaches to overcome 
political barriers (e.g. dialogue with the Netherlands on joint EU Iraq returns and reintegration assistance); with Sweden 
for a joint Sweden/UK charter to Iraq (June 2010); a UK/Norway/Sweden charter (September 2010); and with 
FRONTEX for regular FRONTEX-led flights to Iraq; and exchanged best practices with Sweden and the Netherlands on 
the return and documentation of Iraqi nationals.” EMN. (November 2011). Annual Policy Reports 2010 – United 
Kingdom. Retrieved from  
101 European Migration Network. (July 2012). Annual Policy Report 2011 – United Kingdom. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/171QVI9  
102 EMN. (December 2011). Practical responses to irregular migration into Sweden. http://bit.ly/1anc6Va  
103 For more information, see: http://bit.ly/HwvWHq  
104 EMN. (May 2012). Annual Policy Report 2011- Migration and Asylum in the Netherlands. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/1bSx7dd  
105 As well as nationals from: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Morocco, Russia (Chechnya), Nigeria, and Azerbaijan (Ibid).  
106 For more information, see: Asa, R. (2011) (Op. Cit.).  
107 Likewise, for Norway, “For citizens of several countries, like Iraq and Russia, forced and voluntary return has increased 
since the agreement was put into force.’ For Iraq in particular, forced returns has led to an increase in voluntary returns. 
The possibility of forced return is therefore seen as a crucial element in all bilateral readmission agreements.” European 
Migration Network. (March 2012). Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration – The Case of Norway. 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aZC4AD  
108 The MoU between the UK and Iraq (and other countries) notably serve to “help the UK to effect returns to these 
countries with greater ease than would be possible without the agreements.” European Migration Network. (March 2012). 
Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration - UK. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/HwvZ6b  
109 Sperl, M. (2007). Op. cit.  
110 As noted in the Case of F.H. v. Sweden, on 18 February 2008, the Swedish Government signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Iraqi Government, “whereby the two countries ‘resolve to cooperate in order to assist the 
voluntary, dignified, safe and orderly return to and successful reintegration in Iraq of Iraqis now in Sweden.’ Although 
primarily focusing on voluntary returns, the Memorandum also allowed for forced returns of failed asylum seekers.” See: 
European Court of Human Rights (2009). CASE OF F.H. v. SWEDEN. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1gn9yio  
111 On Denmark, see: http://www.unhcr.org/4ae1998e9.html “Furthermore, even prior to the readmission agreement forced 
returns to Iraq have been possible on a case by case basis. Forced returns has been carried out to Northern Iraq (the three 
provinces Erbil, Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah) since May 2007 for criminal Iraqis and since August 2008 for non-criminal 
rejected asylum seekers. Since May 2008 it has also been possible to carry out forced returns to Central and Southern Iraq 
of Iraqi nationals who have been convicted of serious crimes and received an expulsion order to leave Denmark.” See 
http://bit.ly/1gn9FKT  
112 EMN. (March 2012). Annual Policy Report 2011 – Greece. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1czRWiu  
113 “A current barrier to effective removal activities is the backlog of enforceable expulsion decisions to ‘challenging’ 
destinations (Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan) to which the return of persons is exceedingly difficult if not wholly impossible. 
A conceivable solution in respect to such countries might be the drafting of bilateral Memorandums of Understanding 
and intensified measures of voluntary return to the said countries. The readmission agreements with third countries 
negotiated by the EU and the bilateral protocols on the enforcement of such agreements will also serve to facilitate 
practical cooperation in the enforcement of expulsion orders.” EMN. (n.d.). Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 
Policy – Finland 2012. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/17BVMpD  
114 The Agreement was signed in May 2012 and partially entered into force in August 2012, yet the agreement has yet to be 
fully ratified. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:204:0020:0130:EN:PDF  
115 EMN. (December 2006). Research Study III, Return: the Netherlands. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1ancLpV  
116 Frelick, B. (November 2008). Stuck in a Revolving Door Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and Migrants at the 
Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Union. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1ancMKs  
117 Kreienbrink, A. - German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network. (2006). Voluntary and Forced 
Return of Third Country Nationals from Germany. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1ancLpV  
118 Larsen, C. and Rudge, N. on behalf of the UK National Contact Point for the European Migration Network. (April 2007). 
UK report for the European Migration Network’s Large Scale Study III on ‘Return.’ Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1dI3a1D  
119 Jonsson, A. and Borg, D. (2006). Return: The Swedish Approach. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1ancLpV  
120 EMN. (May 2007). Return Migration – Synthesis Report. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1gnanYh  
121 Interestingly, in 2004 the Danish People’s Party threatened to vote against the annual budget and withdraw support for 
the Danish troops in Iraq unless expulsions to Iraq were enhanced. Fekete, L. (2005) ‘The Deportation Machine: Europe, 
Asylum and Human Rights.’ Race and Class, vol. 47(1). Retrieved from http://rac.sagepub.com/content/47/1/64.full.pdf  
122 ECRE. (2008). Op.cit.  
A Comparative Study on the Asylum Landscapes within the EU following the Crises in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2013 
65 
                                                                                                                                                                     
123 Kanellopoulos, C. and Gregou, M.T. (September 2006). Greek Contribution to the EMN Research Study III: Return. 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1eT2PtD. One of the reasons is for such a high number of Iraqis who go ‘un-returned’ in 
Greece is due to the difficulty of return. Greek officials noted that “while for certain Asian countries of origin, such as 
Iran and Iraq, the number of removed is much lower than the number of apprehended. The difficulty to remove illegal 
immigrants from the latter countries of origin discourages police authorities to proceed to the apprehensions of these 
illegal immigrants.” See here: http://bit.ly/HraTFR; Greece also noted that the “main practical difficulty Greece faces for 
returning third-country nationals is the non-cooperation of Turkey, which is the main transit country for people from 
Asian and African countries. While the protocol of readmission between Greece and Turkey foresees that Turkey would 
admit the nationals of the countries which Turkey has common land borders, this does not happen in practice.” See here: 
http://bit.ly/1iHtiKn ; Furthermore, in 2012 Frontex noted that, “Due to the difficulties in implementing the return 
agreement with Turkey, most of the orders to return migrants who had illegally crossed the border with Turkey could not 
be implemented. For example, there were a total of 21,542 return orders issued for Afghans in Greece, but only 
745 effective returns.” See here: http://bit.ly/1hdLKig  
124 “The ending of conflicts and war influence especially the return of rejected asylum applicants (or beneficiaries of 
international protection whose status is then ended), which is shown in the returns to Iraq following the improved security 
situation from Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and United Kingdom.” EMN. (March 2011). 
Programmes and Strategies in the EU Member States fostering Assisted Return to and Reintegration in Third Countries. 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1czPOHC  
125 In addition to motivations noted elsewhere in the above footnotes, “Iraqis’ willingness to return was based predominately 
upon ‘pull factors’ including: a desire to help rebuild Iraq; family ties and possessions remaining in Iraq; and small 
lengths of time spent in the UK (i.e. those resident in UK for longer periods of time were less likely to want to return to 
Iraq).”EMN. (April 2007). UK report for the European Migration Network’s Large Scale Study III on ‘Return.’ 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1ancLpV  
126 Bowcott, O. (31 August 2010). Kurdish officials ban flights returning failed asylum seekers from UK. The Guardian. 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/19uB20Y ; Moreover, “The official position of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is 
that it does not favour or support any kind of return. The government will not accept returnees unless forced to do so by 
international treaties. The government does not agree with the forced expulsion of Kurdish mi-grants from the EU and is 
not willing to cooperate in de field of forced return. The KRG government is reluctant to accept forced returnees.” For 
more information, see: http://hitfoundation.eu/docs/EU_Cooperation_Return_final_report.pdf  
127 For more information, see: European Parliament. (1 January 2013). EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
Retrieved here http://bit.ly/HwwTiY ; and Bowcott, O. (2 July 2012). Iraqi parliament refuses to accept nationals 
deported from Europe. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/02/iraq-parliament-deported-nationals-
europe  
128 Iraq’s embassy in Copenhagen has refused to grant travel permits to Iraqis that do not want to return home. (see here: 
http://bit.ly/1hdMd3P ) Also, in France: “In general, we are currently unable to return to Iraq the Iraqi citizens whose 
asylum applications have been rejected, unless they are returning voluntarily. Most of the time, France carries out 
voluntary returns and readmissions (outside Iraq). Forced returns may be carried out (but it concerns a very limited 
number of cases), if the person holds a passport and with the prior consent of the Bagdad airport police authorities.” See 
here: http://bit.ly/1an53fm  
129 Dutch News. (21 June 2012). Iraq wants the Netherlands to help support returnee refugees. Retrieved from 
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2012/06/iraq_wants_the_netherlands_to.php  
130 For more information, see: EMN. (2010). EMN Synthesis Report: Non-EU Harmonised Protection Statuses. Retrieved 
from http://bit.ly/1czTpFI Pestana, I. (n.d.). Tolerated Stay: What Protection Does it Give? Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/18T1q0a  
131 UNHCR. (July 2011). Safe at Last? Law and Practice in Selected EU Member States with Respect to Asylum-Seekers 
Fleeing Indiscriminate Violence. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e2ee0022.pdf  
132 EMN. (March 2012). Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration – Greece. Op. cit.  
133 Data compiled from Eurostat. Italy (890), France (790), Belgium (460), the Netherlands (370), and Germany (300) 
refused a large majority. In Belgium, Spain, and Sweden, 100% of Iraqis refused entry were refused at the air border, in 
the Netherlands and Poland almost 100% were refused at the air border, and in France half were refused at the air border; 
over half in Italy and the UK were refused at the sea border; and over half in Greece, and half in Bulgaria were refused at 
the land border. The majority of Iraqis were refused for either not possessing a valid travel document (1,560) or valid 
visa/residence permit (1,010), or the purpose or conditions of the stay were not justified (570) or they possessed a false 
travel document (440). 
134 EMN. (December 2011). Practical Responses to Irregular Migration into Sweden. Op. cit.  
135 Ibid.  
136 ECRE. (2007). Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe. Retrieved from http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-
work/access-to-europe/95-defending-refugees-access-to-protection-in-europe.html 
137 Frontex. (2008). Frontex General Report 2007. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1a34NW8  
138 BBC. (6 September 2012). Dozens dead after Turkey migrant boat sinks. Retrieved from http://bbc.in/NO5z1S  
139 “The survivor told coast guard authorities that all the immigrants were from Iraq and had paid about 2,000 dollars per 
head to be transported to the island.” See: http://gcaptain.com/iraqi-refugees-drown-greece/  
140 UNHCR. (2013). UNHCR Global Trends 2012. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/136Wlp7  
141 http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria  
Christine Marie Fandrich 
66 
                                                                                                                                                                     
142 UNHCR. Inter-Agency Regional Response for Syrian Refugees – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey – 26 September- 
2 October 2013. Retrieved from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
143 For more information, see: http://world.time.com/2013/10/01/group-says-syria-death-toll-at-115000/  
144  In 2012, the Cypriot Asylum Service, in the framework of the early warning and preparedness system, continued to 
provide statistics and other information requested by EASO with regards to asylum flows and in particular with regards 
to asylum applications submitted by Syrian nationals. “However, in case of a mass influx of Syrian asylum seekers and 
given the available resources (both human and material), Cyprus would not be in a position to respond sufficiently to the 
needs of those persons, especially in terms of providing appropriate material reception conditions. For this reason, a letter 
was forwarded to the EASO and the Commission requesting support in multiple levels, for the case of such a scenario. 
EMN. (2013). Annual Policy Report Cyprus 2012. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1eflOAy  
145 “The applications made by Syrian nationals increased very rapidly from summer 2012 to November, when they dropped 
off considerably to levels seen in mid-July (approximately 2 750 per month). This was mostly due to the fact that a 
significant proportion of applications were from Syrians already in the EU who decided to make sur place applications as 
the situation worsened in their country and precluded their return. As this stock of persons finished making their applica- 
tions for protection, the numbers of applications dropped as only Syrians who were actually travelling to the EU directly 
from Syria or a transit country and crossing the EU external border were left to make applications. Their numbers were 
diminished by the closure of embassies in Syria and much reduced opportunities. Those fleeing thus had to obtain 
legitimate documentation for travel to the EU.” EASO. Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 
2012. Retrieved from http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EASO-Annual-Report-Final.pdf  
146 As noted above, between 1985 and 2010, 50% of Syrians seeking protection within the EU applied in Germany (22,270) 
and Sweden (9,330), in addition to the historical migration patterns discussed above. Indeed, “The presence of a diaspora 
in a Member State can also influence the choice of Member States in which to lodge an application.” EASO (2013). Op. 
cit.  
147 Reportedly, a “large proportion of Syrian applicants in Germany are of Kurdish ethnicity, which may be linked to the pre-
existing diaspora in that Member State.” EASO (2013). Op. cit.  
148 German National Contact Point for EMN. (2013). Annual Policy Report 2012. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/18SKtmD  
149 For more information, see: http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/europe-failing-syrian-refugees  
150 For more information, see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24635791 
151 EASO (2013). Op. cit.  
152 Mentioning the Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom case at the European Court of Human Rights, “Flygtningenævnet 
finds that the conditions in certain areas of Syria are currently of such a character that people would be in real risk of 
suffering human rights violations, according to the European Human Rights Convention’s Article 3, by simply being 
present in those areas.” See: http://bit.ly/1eTvFwZ  
153 UNHCR. (17 September 2013). Bulgaria's asylum centres bursting at the seams as Syrian refugees enter Europe. 
Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/52384d359.html 
154 Data compiled from Eurostat.  
155 Reasons for rejection are not listed in Eurostat. Yet, Finland explained in its 2012 annual report to the European 
Migration Network that Syrians in Finland refused asylum were refused because of the EU Dublin Regulation, and on the 
basis of safe country of asylum. It also noted that many Syrians had lived for years in Greece before applying for asylum 
in Finland. See here: http://bit.ly/17BVMpD  
156 Greece has been recently assisted by the EASO for backlogs of asylum cases and asylum system support (for more 
information see here: http://easo.europa.eu/about-us/tasks-of-easo/emergency-support/ ), and Cyprus has noted that it is 
addressing its backlog of asylum cases (for more information see here: http://bit.ly/HtCKVY)  
157 Data compiled from Eurostat.  
158 EASO. (2013). Annual Report on the Situati on of Asylum in the European Union 2012. Retrieved from 
http://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/EASO-Annual-Report-Final.pdf  
159 “How similar the applications made by individual applicants who share a certain citizenship actually are is always 
difficult to establish. In principle, a case-level analysis would need to be made to establish the level of similarity of 
applications dealt with in different Member States precisely. However, analysis of some flows, such as the Syrian one, 
show that choices made by Member States vary considerably for flows of persons who could be treated in the same way.” 
EASO (2013). Op. cit.  
160 EASO. (2013). Op. cit.  
161 European Commission. (24 June 2013). Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, and the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on Regions – Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to 
the Syrian Crisis. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/11ShKMm  
162 European Parliament and European Council. (2011). DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast). Retrieved from  
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:337:0009:0026:EN:PDF  
163 Eurostat data, accessed 1 October 2013. According to the European Resettlement Network, the EUs response to calls in 
August 2012 by UNHCR to provide resettlement places for up to 500 Syrian refugees and to consider resettling them on 
a dossier basis “was limited, in part due to the lack of flexibility to provide emergency places within predefined annual 
resettlement quotas.” See here: http://www.resettlement.eu/page/syrian-refugee-situation 
A Comparative Study on the Asylum Landscapes within the EU following the Crises in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2013 
67 
                                                                                                                                                                     
164 UNHCR. (June 2013). Responding to protection needs of displaced Syrians in Europe. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/51b7149c9.pdf 
165 BAMF. (16 September 2013). Syrian Refugees Landed. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/17D5xDS  
166 It said they will be granted temporary asylum in the country under a special Humanitarian Admissions Program. 
Germany is setting an important example,” UNHCR spokesperson Dan McNorton told IPS. “We hope more countries 
will come forward with similar schemes to help Syrians fleeing the violence.” See here: http://bit.ly/15YKaFn  
167 See here: http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/europe-failing-syrian-refugees 
168 EASO. (2013). Op. cit.  
169 UNHCR. (June 2013). Responding to protection needs of displaced Syrians in Europe. Retrieved from 
http://www.unhcr.org/51b7149c9.pdf  
170 UNHCR. (2 October 2013). Fact sheet: Solutions for Syrian refugees. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aC2sUM  
171 Ibid.  
172 Countries participating in the Programme are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and USA. Ibid.  
173 Austria: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=52242be95 France: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/syria-295/events-5888/article/syria-refugees-q-a-excerpt-from 
174 However, the UK supports the EU plan to establish a regional development and protection programme that ensures that 
support is given to the neighbouring countries that need additional help. For more information, see: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/131008-0001.htm  
175 European Commission. (24 June 2013). Op. cit. In January 2013, the European Parliament called on MS to “share 
responsibility for Syrian refugees and asylum seekers via relocation within the European Union and refrain from sending 
these persons back to Syria or third countries,” and to “develop further its approach to resettlement, especially for Syrian 
refugees from countries neighbouring Syria, in particular where children and families are concerned.” EU Parliament. (23 
January 2013). Migration and asylum: mounting tensions in the Eastern. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/14qxJF7  
176 It also calls for the EU to convene a humanitarian conference on the Syrian refugee crisis.  
177 For more information, see: European Commission. (24 June 2013). Op. cit.  
178 The EU has also set up RPPs in Eastern Europe, the African Great Lakes Region, and also agreed to apply the concept to 
the Horn of Africa and North Africa. For more information, see: http://bit.ly/19FTbsj  
179 High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) on: 21 January 2013 – Summary of Discussions. (see 
here: http://bit.ly/12beuB9 ) However, the latest Communication from the Commission regarding the EUs approach to the 
Syrian crisis (European Commission 24 June 2013 Op. cit.) does not mention resettlement within in the RPP proposed for 
Syria, so it remains to be seen if the RPP will provide such protection.  
180 European Commission. (2 September 2009). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/HtEXAD  
181 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund, 
see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0751:FIN:EN:HTML  
182 “For the period 2014-2020, the Commission proposes to set up a new mechanism which will be more flexible and 
attractive for the Member States and which will allow for more strategic use of resettlement. This should lead to a 
substantial increase in resettlement to the EU. The aim is to see more national resettlement schemes established and to 
increase the already existing ones.” (8 March 2012). Statement by EU Commissioner Malmstrom on the Council adoption 
of a common position on the Joint EU resettlement programme. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/HtFmTP  
183 EU MS with resettlement quotas for 2012 and 2013 include: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. For more on the quotas, 
see: EASO. (2013). Op. cit.  
184 European Commission (news). (25 September 2013). Relocation on the agenda. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aC3AI1  
185 European Commission (press release). (25 September 2013). Intervention by Cecilia Malmström during the Relocation 
Forum. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1bHTtSq  
186 Euractive. (9 October 2013). EU ministers discuss burden-sharing for Syrian refugees, African migrants. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/19i767Y  
187 This is compared to 613 detections in 2009, and 861 detections in 2010. See Frontex, here: http://bit.ly/XTROn4  
188 Frontex reported that almost half of Syrians arriving in Greece have relatives in the EU, with Germany and Sweden being 
their main destination countries. Frontex. (2012). FRAN Quarterly Report Q2-2012. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/Um526x  
189 Frontex. (2012). FRAN Quarterly Q3 2012. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1hJSu5j  
190 IRIN News. (25 September 2013). No welcome mat for Syrians in Europe. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/18p3m4c  
191 Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Q3 2012. Op. cit.  
192 Frontex. (2013). FRAN Quarterly Report Q1-2013. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1aFVHh7  
193 AFP. (11 October 2013). Greek islands set to take 20,000 Syrian refugees. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/HxKCpM  
194 In the last quarter of 2012, Syrians were also increasingly detected crossing the Bulgarian-Turkish border as they were 
“displaced by operational activities in Greece.” Frontex (2012). FRAN Quarterly Report Q4-2012. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/1aFVJWd  
195 Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Report Q1 2013. Op. cit.  
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid.  
Christine Marie Fandrich 
68 
                                                                                                                                                                     
198 For more information, see: http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/syria-crisis-refugees-idINL6N0I823S20131018 Since 
the beginning of 2013 until the end of August, the Italian Interior Ministry claimed more than 3,000 Syrians have arrived 
in Italy, mostly arriving by boat in eastern Sicily. See here: http://bit.ly/1cLVsSQ  
199 Reuters. (18 October 2013). Syrian refugees need safe harbour beyond region – UNHCR. Retrieved from 
http://reut.rs/17Rp50w  
200 UNHCR. (19 September 2013). Satisfaction for the expansion of posts welcome for asylum seekers and refugees. 
Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1a9Q4rn  
201 UNHCR. (July 2013). UNHCR Recommendations on important aspects of refugee protection in Italy. Retrieved from 
http://bit.ly/1dKqeNc  
202 Syrian asylum applications in Bulgaria “grew more than twice in the fourth quarter [of 2012] …most probably due to the 
shift of detections of illegal border-crossing from the Greek-Turkish border towards the Bulgarian-Turkish border.” 
Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Report Q4 2012. Op. cit. 
203 Bulgarian interior minister Tsvetlin Yovchev was quoted as saying that his country would soon get direct financial 
assistance from the EU to cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. Euractive. (9 October 2013). Op. cit.  
204 For more information, see here: http://bit.ly/1hg7g5O  
205 “The plan aims at helping Bulgaria cope with the increase in the influx while at the same time improving and 
strengthening the Bulgarian asylum and reception system, in the context of the implementation of the instruments of the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS).” For more information, see EASO: http://bit.ly/1ap206m  
206 According to Frontex spokesperson, Michal Parzyszek, “There are quite many factors influencing the influx of migrants. 
One of them, which is very important, is readmission agreements. In the case of Greece, a readmission agreement 
with Turkey doesn't truly work; in the case of Bulgaria, the cooperation with Turkey is much better so the Turkish 
authorities – if they receive proper documentation and justification – they accept people back. This is a very important 
element – potential migrants know that if they cross the border between Turkey and Bulgaria, there is high probability 
that they will be sent back to Turkey so they don't choose that way. That's one factor. The other factor is that Bulgaria is 
not fully within the Schengen Area yet, which means that migrants can expect more border checks on the way so they 
choose Greece.” See here: http://new.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=128635#sthash.6IA9WiHh.dpuf  
207 IRIN News. (22 October 2013). Syrians face bleak time in Bulgaria’s broken asylum system. http://bit.ly/16tbRrk  
208 Frontex. (2013). FRAN Quarterly Q2 2013. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1dKrjEC  
209 For more information, see: http://bit.ly/174zV47  
210 Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Report Q1 2013. Op. cit. However, Frontex noted that during interviews migrants had stated 
that their facilitators were aware of the areas under IBSS and therefore advised migrants to avoid certain areas. Frontex. 
FRAN Quarterly Q2 2013. Op. cit.  
211 IRIN News (22 October 2013). Op. cit.  
212 For more information, see: http://bit.ly/1fgL4Eg  
213 Syrians particularly were detected at the Croatian-Serbian border (Q2-12), Bulgaria (Q4 2012). Frontex. FRAN Quarterly 
Q2 2012 & Q3 2012.  
214 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf 
215 Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Reports Q2 2013.  
216 Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Report Q4-2012. 
217 Frontex. (July 2013). Eastern Borders Annual Risk Analysis 2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/EB_ARA_2013.pdf  
218 Frontex. (2013) Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2013. Retrieved from 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB_ARA_2013.pdf  
219 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf  
220 Frontex. FRAN Quarterly Report Q2 2013.  
221 Numbers increased from 5 in Q3 to 100 in Q4 2012. FRAN Quarterly Q3 2012.  
222 For more information, see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24573575; and 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/17/us-italy-migrants-syria-idUSBRE99G0UP20131017; and 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/05/world/europe/syrians-asylum.html?_r=0 
223 See here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24573575 
224 European Parliament. (October 2013). Op. cit.  
225 Data compiled from Eurostat.  
226 It also noted that “eleven countries which are part of the Schengen area impose airport transit visas on Syrian nationals. 
In light of the current circumstances, the Commission believes that it is not appropriate to add Syria to the common list of 
countries subject to the airport transit visa requirement as requested by certain Member States in the framework of the on-
going annual revision of the national airport transit visa requirements.” European Commission. (June 2013). Op. cit.  
227 Data compiled from Eurostat. Data for Croatia not available.   
228 Data compiled from Eurostat. 
229 European Commission. (June 2013). Op. cit. 
230 While most EU MS have refrained from Dublin returns to Greece, especially after M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, in 
2012, the German court ruled that "A large majority of asylum-seekers must live without shelter and without reliable 
access to food, water and electricity" in Italy, and that significant evidence exists that Italy is not meeting its obligations 
in accordance with European and international law, thereby halting the planned deportation of a Palestinian family with 
three children, which had originally arrived in Italy from Syria. For more information, see: http://bit.ly/1iJUSq8  
A Comparative Study on the Asylum Landscapes within the EU following the Crises in Iraq and Syria, 2003-2013 
69 
                                                                                                                                                                     
231 “How similar the applications made by individual applicants who share a certain citizenship actually are is always 
difficult to establish. In principle, a case-level analysis would need to be made to establish the level of similarity of 
applications dealt with in different Member States precisely. However, analysis of some flows, such as the Syrian one, 
show that choices made by Member States vary considerably for flows of persons who could be treated in the same way.” 
EASO (2013). Op. cit.  
232 For more information, see: http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/what-we-do/resettlement/etc-timisoara.html  
233 “The data presented by the UNHCR reflects the number of applicants lodging asylum applications for the first time; 
however, some countries may not be able to distinguish new from reopened or repeat claims. As US authorities reported 
the number of cases of asylum applications, not individuals, UNHCR multiplies the cases by 1.4, based on historical data, 
to reach an estimate of the number of individuals applying for asylum in the US. When possible, data for each year was 
taken from the subsequent years report (e.g., Iraqi asylum applications from year 2004 were retrieved from the 2005 
report, as the subsequent reports have been updated by UNHCR.” Reports accessible at: http://bit.ly/19ylg5k  
234 As Eurostat data is unavailable for many EU MS for 2002, data from 2002 regarding the numbers of Iraqi asylum 
applications filed in the EU was obtained from UNHCR Report Asylum Applications Lodged in Europe, North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan January through December 2002. Only first-time applications are reported by the 
UNHCR. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/3e42338a4.html Several complications may exist by using Eurostat data 
before and after Council Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 on Community Statistics on Migration and International 
Protection (entering into force in January 2008) as there are two sets of records based on separate parameters regarding 
asylum applications in Eurostat – those before and after the Council Regulation. Before the regulation, “asylum statistics 
were collected on the basis of a Gentlemen's agreement. Concepts used by countries prior 2008 and after the entry into 
force of the Regulation …may thus differ.” After the Regulation, more uniform guidelines were used for the reporting of 
asylum statistics. Also, pre-Regulation Eurostat data is unable to disaggregate first time asylum applications from the 
total number of asylum applications. Even after the Regulation, it is still difficult to compare the first asylum applications 
from the total asylum applications as numbers of first asylum applications are to be provided to Eurostat by MS on a 
voluntary basis. Moreover, numbers in Eurostat are rounded, “Due to the rounding, the sum of individuals may not 
necessarily match the given total.” With these complications in mind, the decision was made to use Eurostat total 
applications of Iraqi asylum applications, as it is not possible to disaggregate this data pre-Regulation, and not all MS 
disaggregate this data post-Regulation. Final decisions of Iraqi asylum applications (data available only after January 
2008) will be discussed below. Eurostat data accessed 27 October 2013.  
235 The total number of decisions – granting a positive status or rejection – is likely to be much higher if final instance 
decisions between 2003 and 2007 could be determined. Unfortunately, Eurostat data collected before the Council 
Regulation on Community Statistics does not provide numbers of final decisions on asylum applications. A glimpse into 
the situation can be realised, however, by looking at the available Eurostat data after 2008. Between 2008 and 2012, EU 
MS made 32,530 final decisions on Iraqi asylum applications - 79% were rejected (25,610) – almost half by Sweden 
(10,520 applications) and over one-fourth by Germany (6,140 applications). Overall, 21% received a positive decision 
(6,920), mainly refugee status. Germany, Sweden, and the UK granted the most positive decisions at a final instance. As 
there was a discrepancy between data collected before and after the Council Regulation, 15,710 applications were 
excluded from this total number. From 2003 to 2007, Eurostat included the categories “other non-status decisions” and 
“other positive decisions” in the total number of decisions. “Other non-status decisions’’ referred to those decisions 
which are defined neither as “rejections” nor as “positive” decisions. Examples include, in some Member States, 
withdrawals of applications, write-offs, abandonment of cases, any discontinuation of a claim that is not included in 
positive decisions or rejected applications. As this category was not included in the total decisions made after the 
Regulation, the total number of “other non-status decisions” (14,450) were excluded. Also, ‘other positive decisions,’ or 
“statuses” granted on non-protection grounds - for example permission to stay/reside within the territory of the Member 
State because the country of origin refuses to take back the rejected asylum seeker – were also excluded. The ‘other 
positive decisions’ category was removed after the Regulation, besides these statuses are granted on non-protection 
grounds. The exclusion of this category excludes a total of 1,260 applications. Eurostat data accessed 27 October 2013.  
236 Data for Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK obtained from email communications with the Swedish Migration Board –
Resettlement Team, Resettlement Section of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service of the Netherland’s Ministry of 
Security and Justice and the UK Home Office – Asylum Casework Directorate. All others obtained from national 
migration authorities’ websites. See annex.  
237 “Third country nationals who have in fact left the territory of the Member State, following an administrative or judicial 
decision or act stating that their stay is illegal and imposing an obligation to leave the territory (see Art. 7.1 (b) of the 
Council Regulation (EC) no 862/2007). On a voluntary basis Member States provide Eurostat with a subcategory which 
relates to third country nationals returned to a third country only. Persons who left the territory within the year may have 
been subject to an obligation to leave in a previous year. As such, the number of persons who actually left the territory 
may be greater than those who were subject to an obligation to leave in the same year. These statistics include forced 
returns and assisted voluntary returns. Unassisted voluntary returns are included where these are reliably recorded. Data 
do not include persons who are transferred from one Member State to another under the mechanism established by the 
Dublin Regulation.” Definition retrieved from Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/migr_eil_esms.htm  
238 IOM. (2012). Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration – Annual Report of Activities 2011. Retrieved from 
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/partnerships/docs/2012-IOM-
Christine Marie Fandrich 
70 
                                                                                                                                                                     
CSOConsultations/Additional_Resources/AVRR_Report_2011.pdf For 2012 numbers, see: 
http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Migration-Management-annual-review-2012.pdf 
239 Eurostat monthly data between March 2011 and August 2013, data not available for all MS and therefore these numbers 
are most likely an underestimate. This data was accessed in Eurostat on 17 October 2013 by looking at monthly data on 
asylum statistics. This data includes ‘total asylum applications’.  
 
